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Note on References and Translations 
 
With two exceptions, I refer to the Husserliana edition of Husserl’s works, 
which I cite by volume number in Roman numerals. The first exception is texts 
in the Husserliana Materialien series, which I cite by volume number in Roman 
numerals preceded by the letter ‘M’.  The second is Erfarhrung und Urteil, 
which I cite as EU. All translations are mine. Where previous English 
translations exist, I have sometimes borrowed from them, without comment. In 












The overarching aim of the three essays that form the substance of the 
present work is to contribute to the assessment of Husserlian epistemology. A 
characteristic feature of Husserl’s epistemology is the prominent place given to 
metaepistemological considerations, considerations of epistemological method 
in particular. And the most important supposed outcome of these 
considerations is a view according to which epistemological problems can be 
solved only by phenomenological means, or that epistemology is possible only 
as phenomenology. As Husserl puts it in a 1922/23 lecture course:  
The rightful problems of epistemology [Erkenntnistheorie] can … only be posed 
on the ground offered by phenomenology. All radical epistemological problems 
are phenomenological; and all other problems that, beyond those, can be 
designated as epistemological, including the problems of the correct 
“interpretation” of actually existing nature and the results of the sciences 
concerned with it, presupposes the pure epistemological problems, the 
phenomenological ones (XXV 189). 
With his epistemology, then, Husserl does not aim only at solving 
epistemological problems, but at reforming epistemology, by redetermining the 
very nature of its problems and the methods by which they are to be solved. This 
relates Husserl’s epistemological project to other projects of epistemological 
reform, such as current day naturalization projects. But where these seek to 
reform epistemology by, in effect, construing it as part of natural science, 
Husserl seeks to do so by construing it as a chapter of phenomenology, and thus 
by phenomenologizing rather than naturalizing it.1  
Given this, no assessment of Husserl’s epistemology can be complete 
without an evaluation of this reformation attempt. The aim of the first two 
essays is to contribute to such an evaluation. They both relate to what is 
arguably Husserl’s most important argument for the claim that epistemology is 
                                                   
1 As the full title of the three volumes of his Ideen—Ideen zur einen reinen 
Phänomenologie und Phänomenologische Philosophie—indicates, phenomenology is not, 
strictly speaking, a branch of philosophy on Husserl’s view. It is, rather, a self-standing 
discipline that can serve as a basis, indeed the only basis, for solving philosophical problems, by 
which Husserl means not only epistemological problems or problems of “theoretical” reason, 
but also problems of “axiological” and “practical” reason. (For an account of Husserl’s 





possible only as phenomenology, which argument they both provide reasons for 
questioning. According to this argument, which I propose to call the argument 
from the problem of transcendence, or the transcendence argument, the nature 
of the central problem of epistemology, which Husserl terms the problem of 
transcendence, imposes certain methodological requirements that 
phenomenology alone can satisfy. In the first essay, “Husserl’s Riddle of 
Cognition”, I seek to clarify Husserl’s specification of that problem, and indicate 
some of its consequences. I argue that Husserl, in effect, specifies the problem 
as the problem of the possibility of defeasible cognition, and that this, when 
combined with the transcendence argument, commits him to an arguably 
unsustainable view of epistemological cognition, on which it must be 
indefeasible. In the second essay, “Husserl’s Argument from the Problem of 
Transcendence”, I attempt to elucidate the basic structure of the transcendence 
argument, and evaluate its most decisive step—the claim that any attempt to 
solve the problem of transcendence requires performance of an “epistemological 
reduction”. Arguing that Husserl’s support for this claim is less than compelling, 
I conclude that there is reason to think that the argument fails. 
A negative assessment of Husserl’s metaepistemology would not 
necessarily entail a negative assessment of his substantive epistemology—the 
considerations offered as solutions to particular epistemological problems. For, 
despite his claims to the contrary, many of these considerations do not, 
arguably, depend for their cogency on the metaepistemological framework in 
which he himself places them, and are therefore assessable independently of it.  
Among the relevant considerations perhaps the most important and 
fruitful ones are those relating to the nature and epistemic role of perception. 
With the third essay, “Perceptual Givenness and Justification in Husserl”, I seek 
to pose challenge to Husserl’s epistemology of perception, one that is 
independent of the fate of his metaepistemology. Specifically, I suggest that 
Husserl’s basic view of perceptual justification, according to which the 
perceptual givenness of an object is an epistemic justifier for belief about it, 
would appear to be in tension with his general view of epistemic justification.  
The purpose of the rest of this introduction is to provide a background for 





relevant themes not addressed in them. I begin with a brief view of the place of 
Husserl’s epistemology in the contemporary reception of his thought. I go on to 
sketch some of his contributions to the general epistemological themes under 
which the main problematics of the essays fall: the subject matter of 
epistemology (Essay 1), the methodology of epistemology (Essay 2), and the 
epistemology of perception (Essay 3). I close with a presentation of the essays 
themselves, indicating the basis for the conclusions suggested above. 
1.  Husserlian Epistemology Today 
Phenomenology, construed as the heterogeneous philosophical tradition 
inaugurated by Husserl around the turn of the last century, is a vital force in 
contemporary philosophy. Not only is there a steady outpouring of important 
scholarly work on the major figures of the tradition—Husserl, Heidegger, 
Merleau-Ponty, Sartre, de Beauvoir, and others—and the phenomenological 
topics associated with them. But, perhaps even more importantly, the results of 
this work are fruitfully brought to bear on a number of contemporary 
discussions within different fields and traditions.2  
This is perhaps particularly true in the case of Husserl. As far as scholarly 
work is concerned, the last decades have witnessed a veritable Husserlian 
renaissance, as evidenced by the steadily increasing number of essays and 
monographs devoted to different aspects of his thought. This is not least related 
to the still ongoing publication of his lecture-courses and research manuscripts, 
which has contributed to correcting many of the distorted views of his 
phenomenology that earlier tended to stand in the way of appreciating its 
continued interest. Among the most pernicious of these has been the notion that 
Husserl’s version of phenomenology is radically discontinuous with those of 
later figures in the phenomenological movement, Heidegger’s and Merleau-
Ponty’s in particular, a notion sometimes encouraged by these figures 
themselves. This has nourished the mistaken belief that many of the themes 
                                                   
2 The classical account of the phenomenological tradition as a whole is Spiegelberg 
(1994). For two recent and complimentary overviews of the many-faceted contemporary 
relevance of phenomenology in general, see Luft and Overgaard (2012) and Zahavi (2012). For 
papers on Husserlian phenomenology from a predominantly analytic point of view, see Smith 





developed in later phenomenology, such as those of embodiedness, 
intersubjectivity, community, practice and history, are absent in Husserl, who, 
as a consequence, for many has tended to appear as something of relic of 
philosophy’s best discarded Cartesian past.3  
But the current interest in Husserl’s thought is not only scholarly. 
Husserlian philosophy has also increasingly come to be seen as a valuable 
source of ideas, concepts and arguments for advancing current discussions 
within many areas, including the philosophy of mind, epistemology, ontology 
and metaphysics, philosophy of logic and mathematics, philosophy of language, 
cognitive science and metaphilosophy.4 
These developments—the renewed scholarly interest in Husserlian 
phenomenology, and the attempts to utilize it for contemporary systematic 
purposes—are not unconnected. On the one hand, the revised view of Husserl’s 
thought forms part of the explanation for his status as an important contributor 
to present-day debates outside of the phenomenological tradition, narrowly 
construed. On the other hand, the use of his thought as a resource for these 
debates has also contributed to clarify and advance discussions within 
phenomenology itself, Husserlian and otherwise. 
The place of Husserl’s epistemology in this picture is somewhat 
paradoxical. The problems of knowledge and justification were of central 
importance to Husserl. Yet, in the contemporary scholarly interest in Husserlian 
phenomenology, they have tended to be eclipsed by problems relating to other 
themes such as intentionality in general, self-awareness, embodiedness and 
intersubjectivity. And, although for Husserl epistemology is not just a chapter, 
but the central chapter of the philosophy of mind, the current interest in his 
                                                   
3 For attempts to unseat this sort of belief in the case of the relation between Husserl and 
Heidegger, see, for instance, Stapleton (1983), Øverenget (1998), Crowell (2001) and (2013), 
Overgaard (2004), and Alweiss (2003). For reappraisals of the relation between Husserl and 
Merleau-Ponty, see, for instance, the papers in Toadvine and Embree (2002). For a collection of 
attempts to correct the traditional view of different aspects of Husserl’s phenomenology, see 
Welton (2003). See also Steinbock (1995), Zahavi (1999 and 2001) and Welton (2002).   
4 For overviews of relevant contributions, see Luft and Overgaard (2012) and Zahavi 
(2012). Among the fields open to Husserlian influence, one of the most hospitable has been the 
philosophy of mind. (See, for instance, Smith and Thomasson 2005 and Siewert 2012). Part of 
the explanation no doubt lies in in the latter’s current interest in questions concerning 
intentionality and consciousness, combined with an increased awareness of the breadth and 
sophistication of Husserl’s treatments of these topics. For an overview of current work on the 





contributions to the latter has not, with some notable exceptions, been 
accompanied by a comparable interest in his contributions to the former.5 Part 
of the reason for this may be that, in a rather sober contemporary 
epistemological climate, claims such as his claim that philosophy should be 
grounded in “apodictic evidence”, may have encouraged the view that his 
epistemology as a whole has little to offer for current debates.  
Any attempt to decide the correctness of this view requires an assessment 
of Husserlian epistemology of the kind to which I aim to contribute here—an 
assessement, that is, of both his metaepistemology and his substantive 
epistemology. And, as indicated above, any attempt at assessing the former 
requires a clarification of his view of the subject matter of epistemology, to a 
presentation of which I now turn.        
2.  The Subject Matter of Epistemology 
According to the Preface to the first edition of the Logische 
Untersuchungen, epistemology is concerned with “the relation between the 
subjectivity of cognizing [Erkennen] and the objectivity of the content cognized” 
(XVIII 7). Some time later, in a 1908 research manuscript, Husserl characterizes 
the questions to which attempting to understand this relation gives rise as 
“transcendental questions”:6 
What is at issue under the heading “transcendental questions” is, in one sense 
and generally, a “clarification” of the possibility of objectively valid cognition 
[Erkenntnis], which, on the one hand, is “subjective” qua cognition, and, on the 
other hand, reaches an “objective” being, a being that is in itself, and independent 
of subjectivity (VII 386). 
According to Husserl, then, the general problem of epistemology is the 
problem of how, if cognition is something “subjective”, it can be of something 
that is “objective” in the sense of existing “in itself”, independently of cognition, 
                                                   
5 The exceptions include, but are not limited to, Willard (1984 and 1995), Føllesdal 
(1988), Pietersma (2000) and Hopp (2011 and 2012). 
6 To my knowledge, Husserl first reference to transcendental questions or problems in the 
present sense can be found in a 1902 lecture-course (M III 75 ff.). So Kern is wrong to claim that 
Husserl did not make the term ‘transcendental’ part of his philosophical vocabulary until 1908 
(1964, 240). On the differences between Husserl and Kant’s concept of the transcendental, see 





and subjectivity in general. For something to be objective in this sense is for it to 
be “transcendent” to any and all cognitions of it, on one of Husserl’s uses of the 
term (cf. M VII 5). And this is the reason why he characterizes the problem as 
the “transcendental problem”, and also as the “problem of transcendence”: It 
concerns the question of how cognition, as something subjective, can be of what 
is transcendent to it. As he puts in a 1907 lecture course:  
If we look closer at what it so enigmatic, and what, in the first reflections on the 
possibility of cognition, brings us embarassment, we will find it to be the 
transcendence of cognition. All natural cognition, the pre-scientific and certainly 
the scientific, is transcendently objectivating cognition. It posits objects as being, 
purports cognitively to reach states of affairs, that are not “in the true sense 
given” in it, are not “immanent” to it (II 34 f./27).  
To shed light on Husserl’s construal of the problem of transcendence, I 
first take a look at the basic assumptions from which he takes the problem to 
arise (2.1). I then consider his view of its general nature (2.2), and its basic 
forms (2.3). Finally, I take a brief look at his view of the problem of scepticism 
(2.4). 
2.1  The Basic Assumptions of the Problem   
On the formulations quoted above, the problem of transcendence rests on 
three assumptions: a metaphysical assumption to the effect that there are, or at 
least can be, items or beings that are objective or transcendent, in the sense of 
having being in themselves; an epistemological assumption to the effect that it is 
possible to cognize transcendent beings as they are in themselves; and what 
could be called an ontological assumption to the effect that cognition is 
subjective, in a sense that remains to be specified. I will refer to these as the 
assumption of objective being, the assumption of the possibility of objective 
cognition, and the assumption of the subjectivity of cognition respectively. 
I will not say much about the first assumption, other than noting that 
Husserl takes the extension of the concept of objective being involved to include 
both “real” (reale) and “ideal” (ideale) objects (cf. XXXVI 24). On his use of the 
term, to talk of real objects is, roughly, to talk of spatio-temporal particulars 
possessed of various sensuous features and causal properties, and of these 





talk of non spatio-temporal objects, the category of which, for Husserl, includes 
such items as states of affairs and “essences” (Wesen) (cf. III/1 13 ff.).   
The second assumption, the assumption of the possibility of objective 
cognition, can be specified in three ways, corresponding to three Husserlian 
concepts of cognition. On the first and broadest of these, a cognition is an 
“intentional act” (intentionale Akt)— roughly, a mental occurrence 
characterized by being “of” or “directed on” something, which something 
Husserl calls its “intentional object” (intentionale Gegenstand) (XIX/1 414). 
The precise content of Husserl’s notion of intentional objects is a matter of 
controversy. On the interpretation I favour, which I cannot here attempt to 
substantiate, an Husserlian intentional object is not a special kind of object, but 
simply that on which the occurrence, qua intentional, is directed, whatever it 
might be: Any item that an experience can be specified as being “of” is, thereby, 
an intentional object in Husserl’s sense (cf. XIX/1 438 ff.).7 Thus, the intentional 
object of an intentional act may be a spatial particular, as in my perception of 
the computer in front of me; but it may equally well be a “mental” particular, as 
in a reflection on my perception of the computer. Contrary to what the ordinary 
use of the term ‘object’ might suggest, it does not even have to be a particular, 
but may be a state of affairs, as in a thought about the circumstance that the 
computer is grey, or a property, as in a thought about the greyness of the 
computer. Nor does it have to be something that exists, but may, for instance, be 
entirely fictitious, as in a thought about the god Jupiter (XIX/1 386).8 
On Husserl’s first concept of cognition, then, to be a cognition is to be an 
intentional act, or a mental occurrence possessed of an intentional object. Given 
this concept, the assumption of the possibility of objective cognition amounts to 
                                                   
7 According to this interpretation, Husserl’s concept of an intentional object would be 
what Crane calls a schematic, as opposed to a substantial, concept of an object (2000, 15 ff.). For 
a similar interpretation, see Drummond (1990) and Meixner (2006). For an alternative 
interpretation, see Smith and McIntyre (1982) and Ströker (1987).  
8 In saying that every intentional act has an intentional object, then, Husserl is not saying 
that every intentional act is related to a being of some kind, but only that it has the inherent 
character of being directed on something or other. And to say of the intentional object of an act 
that it does not exist is not, for him, to say that it exists only “mentally” or “immanently”. Nor is 
it to say that it has an extra-mental form of being other than existence, like Meinongian 
subsistence. It is just to say that while there exists a mental occurrence characterizable as being 
directed on something, that on which it is characterizable as being directed on does not exist (cf. 





the assumption that intentional acts can be directed on transcendent intentional 
objects.  
On Husserl’s second, and less inclusive, concept of cognition, a cognition is 
an intentional act that is “veridical”, in the sense of being directed on an 
intentional object that actually exists, and actually has the properties it is taken 
to have (cf. XXIV 152). Given this concept, the assumption of the possibility of 
objective cognition amounts to the assumption that intentional acts can have 
actually existing transcendent objects for their intentional objects.  
On Husserl’s third, and most epistemologically significant, concept of 
cognition, a cognition is an intentional act that is “rational” (Vernünftig), in the 
sense, roughly, that its directedness on its object is rationally supported (cf. VII 
377). More precisely, a rational cognition is an intentional act that meets two 
conditions. First, it involves what Husserl calls a “positing” (Setzung) of its 
intentional object—roughly, a belief to the effect that the object exists or has 
being (cf. XIX/1 499).9 Second, the positing concerned is “rationally motivated” 
(vernünftig motiviert), in the sense of being based on “rational grounds” 
(Vernunftgründe) or “justificatory grounds” (Rechtsgründe), grounds providing 
epistemic justification for it (cf. VII 377).10 
Given this concept of cognition, the assumption of the possibility of 
objective cognition amounts to the assumption that positings of transcendent 
objects can be rational, in the sense of being based on rational or justificatory 
grounds providing epistemic justification for them. To better see what this 
assumption involves, note should be taken of three requirements that Husserl 
places on justificatory grounds, which requirements together constitute what 
could be called his basic conception of epistemic justification, or justification for 
                                                   
9 This is simplified, for at least two reasons. First, positing in the present sense, which 
Husserl calls “doxic” positing, is only one of several forms of positing distinguished by him (cf. 
III/1 268 ff.). (For discussion of Husserl’s differentiated concept of positing, and his related 
distinction between theoretical, axiological and practical reason, see Melle 1988 and 1990.) 
Second, doxic positing is not restricted to simple attributions of being, but includes any and all 
attributions of “being-characters” (Seinscharactere), which, in addition to that of being 
simpliciter, also comprises characters like being dubitable, possible and probable (III/1 239 ff.). 
For present purposes, these complications can be put to the side, and Husserlian positing be 
construed in terms of attributions of being simpliciter. 
10 As this suggests, Husserl’s notion of rational acts bears affinities to the current notion 






On what could be called the Being Requirement, something is a 
justificatory ground for positing an object only if it serves to indicate that the 
object has being, where guaranteeing that this is so would be the upper limit of 
indicating it (cf. VII 377; VIII 398; XXXVI 85). With this requirement, Husserl 
can be seen to endorse a version of what is commonly called a teleological 
conception of justification, according to which justification is a means to an 
end—the end, roughly, of believing truths and avoiding falsehoods.12     
On what we might call the Awareness Requirement, something is a 
justificatory ground for positing an object only if it is consciously available, in 
the sense of being something of which the positing subject is suitably aware (cf. 
XXIV 130; XXX 316; XXXVI 84). In contemporary terms, then, Husserl 
endorses a form of access internalism about epistemic justification, according to 
which something can provide justification for a belief only if it is suitably 
accessible to the believing subject.13 
Finally, on what could be called the Immediacy Requirement, something is 
a justificatory ground for positing an object only if it is either immediate or 
mediate, where an immediate ground is one that does not depend on other 
grounds for its justificatory force, and a mediate ground is one that does so 
depend, and where any mediate ground ultimately depends on an immediate 
ground (cf. XXIV 136, 345; III/1 326, 328). By endorsing this view, Husserl 
commits to a version of epistemological foundationalism, according to which 
there is immediate justification, and all non-immediate justification ultimately 
rests on immediate justification.  
An important part of Husserl’s foundationalism is what could be called his 
epistemic intuitionism. This is the view that the presence of an intentional 
object as “originarily given” (originär gegeben) in an “originary giving 
intuition” (originär gebende Anschauung), or originary intuition for short, 
                                                   
11 This conception is not explicit in Husserl, but it is, I argue, implicit in passages like 
those referenced below. For a more detailed account of the conception, see Essay 3.   
12 For an account of the structure of teleological conceptions of justification, as well as a 
critique of their attractiveness, see Berker (2013). For related discussions, see David (2001), 
DePaul (2001), Fumerton (2001) and (2011), and Kelly (2003).  
13 For accounts and discussions of the nature and viability of access internalism, see, for 





constitutes an immediate justificatory ground for positing it (cf. III/1 51). For an 
object to be thus present is, roughly, for it to be present “in the flesh” or as 
“bodily selfgiven” (leibhaft selbstgegeben), as opposed, say, to being present as 
represented by some other object, like a sign or an image (cf. III/1 90). Husserl 
designates bodily selfgivenness as originary givenness because he takes it to 
constitute the most basic way of being present, or the most basic “mode of 
givenness” (Gegebenheitsweise), of intentional objects, the one from which all 
other modes of givenness are, in different ways, derived (cf. III/1 90).14  
According to Husserl, for every basic category of object there is a special 
kind of originary intuition in which objects of that category can become 
originarily given (III/1 15). In the case of physical objects, for instance, the 
intuition concerned is “outer perception” (äußere Wahrnehmung); in the case 
of intentional acts, it is “inner perception” (innere Wahrnehmung); in the case 
of states of affairs involving physical objects it is “categorial perception” 
(kategoriale Wahrnehmung); and in the case of essences, it is “eidetic intuition” 
(eidetische Anschauung) (cf. III/1 11, 14). And so, just as the presence of a 
physical object in outer perception constitutes an immediate justificatory 
ground for positing it, the presence of an intentional act, a physical state of 
affairs or an essence in an originary intuition of the relevant kind constitutes an 
immediate justificatory ground for positing them. Any object actually posited on 
the basis of such a ground will constitute the object of an “originary evidence” 
(originäre Evidenz), by which Husserl means any positing intentional act whose 
positing is based on the originary givenness of the object posited (III/1 318). 
Originary givenness being the most fundamental kind of justificatory ground, 
originary evidence, as the positing of objects on the basis of their originary 
givenness, is the most fundamental kind of rational act. 
Not all instances of originary givenness provide justification to the same 
degree, however. More specifically, the degree to which the originary givenness 
of an intentional object gives justification for positing it is determined by the 
extent to which the features of the object is bodily selfgiven (cf. III/ 51). If all of 
its features are thus given, the object is said to be adequately given. In such 
                                                   
14 For critical considerations of this privileging of bodily selfgivenness vis-à-vis other 





cases, Husserl argues, the originary givenness of the object provides an 
indefeasible or absolute ground for positing it. By contrast, if some, but not all 
of the object’s features are bodily selfgiven, the object is said to be inadequately 
given. And in such cases, although the originary givenness of the object still 
provides justification for positing it, the justification is defeasible or relative—
relative, namely, to the non-bodily selfgiven features of the object’s becoming 
bodily self-given in the further course of experience (cf. III/2 598). Whether or 
not an object can become adequately given is, Husserl argues, a matter of its 
basic category. For instance, whereas any intentional act can be adequately 
given, and will be if it occurs as the object of an inner perception, no physical 
object can become so given, not even if it were to occur as the object of an 
infinite process of outer perception.15  
As this makes clear, Husserl’s epistemological foundationalism is not a 
classical one, on which immediate justification must be indefeasible. It is, 
rather, a species of what today is called moderate foundationalism, which allows 
that immediate justification can be defeasible.16  
Against the background of Husserl’s basic conception of justification, the 
assumption that positings of transcendent objects can be rational may be 
further specified as the assumption that positings of transcendent objects can be 
based on mediate or immediate, consciously available and being-indicative 
grounds, where the immediate grounds concerned include the originary 
givenness of the objects, and where the justification provided by those grounds 
need not be indefeasible. 
Finally, let us take a brief look at the third assumption from which the 
problem of transcendence arises, the assumption of the subjectivity of cognition. 
For Husserl, to hold this assumption is to endorse at least three claims. The first 
is that cognitions in general are “experiences” (Erlebnisse), where a mental 
occurrence is an experience just in case it is subject to consciousness in the form 
of “experiencing” (erleben) (cf. X 291; XIV 45).17 The second is that no cognition 
                                                   
15 I return to this point in Section 4.2 below.  
16 For influential expositions and defences of modest foundationalism, see Alston (1976) 
and Pollock (1986).  
17 Husserlian experiencing must be distinguished from other forms of awareness of one’s 





occurs in isolation, but belongs within the unity of a temporal “stream of 
experiences”, a continuously flowing continuum of experiences stretching from 
the past through the present to the future (III/1 182). And the third claim is that 
any experience, and the stream of experiences in which it occurs, belongs to a 
subject or “ego”.18 Thus, to hold that cognition is subjective in the present sense 
is to hold, at least, that any cognition is an experience belonging to a continuum 
of experiences belonging to an ego.   
2.2  The General Nature of the Problem  
To indicate Husserl’s view of the general nature of the problem of 
transcendence, it will be useful first to consider his view of the status of the first 
two assumptions from which it arises, the assumption of objective being and the 
assumption of the possibility of objective cognition. In a 1906/07 lecture course, 
                                                                                                                                                     
First, it is a non-intentional or non-objectifying form of self-awareness: It is not an awareness in 
which one’s mental occurrences are present as objects capable of re-identification in further acts 
of awareness (cf. XXIV 247; XXVI 168). Second, experiencing is a non-contingent form of self-
awareness: My perception of the telephone on the table in front of me is independent of my 
possible reflection on it. I can perceive the telephone without turning my perception into an 
object of reflection. But, Husserl argues, my perception is not independent of my experiencing 
of it. In the absence of an experiencing of the perception of the telephone, there would not be 
any perception of the latter. And similarly with all other forms of mental occurrence. On 
Husserl’s view, then, being experienced is necessary for being mental. (It is also, he argues, 
sufficient (XIX/1 361 ff.), which is to say that it, in effect, constitutes his bid for the “mark of the 
mental”). Third, experiencing is a non-dependent form of self-awareness: Reflection is a 
dependent mode of self-awareness, in that it presupposes a more basic mode of awareness: 
namely, experiencing, and that in two ways. As co-constitutive of mental occurrences in general, 
experiential awareness is a precondition for instances of reflective awareness; and by the same 
token it is also a precondition for their objects. By contrast, Husserl argues, experiencing does 
not presuppose a more basic mode of awareness, and can therefore be characterized as “primal 
consciousness” (Urbewußtsein) (XXIV 245). As many have noted, Husserl takes this 
consciousness to coincide with what he calls “inner time-consciousness”: roughly, the 
consciousness by virtue of which our experiences appear as temporal (X 290). (See, for instance, 
Brough 1972 and Zahavi 1999.)  
18 Although Husserl endorsed this claim throughout his career, his interpretation of it 
changed. In the period, roughly, from 1901 to 1911, he construed it in two ways: as a claim that 
all experiences are related to a stream of experiences (XIX/1 363, 390), and as a claim that any 
stream of experiences includes as an essential core certain experiences intentionally directed at 
an ego understood as an empirical object among others (XIX/1 363, 374, 390). The upshot of 
these construals was a view of the ego-relatedness of experiences according to which this 
relatedness is either a relatedness to something non-objective (a stream of experiences), or to 
something radically different from them (an empirical object), but not both. Later he rejected 
this view, maintaining that the relatedness of experiences to an ego is a relatedness to something 
that is both non-objective and radically different from them. Specifically, he argued that all 
experiences are related to a non-objective ego that differs from them in remaining identical 
throughout all their actual and possible changes (III/1 123, 178 ff.). For discussion of Husserl’s 





he characterizes these assumptions, or, rather, the propositions that form their 
contents, as “trivial”:   
Let us assume that things [Sachen] exist in truth and actuality [Wirklichkeit]. 
And, obviously, this assumption seems adequate to us. It does not occur to us to 
state it. Things are in their own right. On the other hand, thinking gets a hold of 
them, thinks them, knows them, is certain of their existence, or presumes them, 
posits them as existing with the highest degree of probability. The most obvious 
situation in the world. Is there anything more trivial than these facts? 
Unfortunately, it is the fate of philosophy to have to find the biggest problems in 
the biggest trivialities. How does thinking in its various forms (the question is in 
the end the same for each one) get a hold of things, since they are surely things 
existing in their own right? How does it concur with the nature of the things in 
the form of justified knowledge? Things surely are what and how they are in their 
own right (XXIV 150/148). 
In a later passage from the same text, however, he argues that these 
propositions cease to be trivial, and become mysteries, upon recognition of the 
subjectivity of cognition:    
The trivial truism [Selbstverständlichkeit] that there are things [Sachen] in 
themselves and that we just appear on the scene and grasp them, regard them, 
make statements about them, etc. turns into a mystery. Knowing about things in 
themselves means having a subjective experience called “knowing”, and if the 
things are not something itself occurring at the same time in the human 
consciousness, like a feeling, a sensation, and so on, then all talk about knowledge 
seems fictional. No knowing can go beyond itself. It is precisely knowing, 
consciousness, and not something that is not consciousness (XXIV 153/151). 
How are we to understand this? In what sense of the term does Husserl 
take the propositions in question first to be, and then cease to be, trivial? Let us 
first note that a proposition may be trivial in two senses. On the one hand, it 
may be trivial in the sense of being obviously true or rationally indisputable. Let 
us refer to this as triviality in the epistemic sense. On the other hand, it may be 
trivial in the sense of being taken entirely for granted, or endorsed without any 
questions whatsoever being raised about it. Since triviality in this sense is a 
matter, not of the proposition itself or its justification, but of how it is taken, or 
the kind of attitude one takes towards it, we might refer to it as triviality in the 
attitudinal sense. These two senses are logically independent. A proposition may 
be trivial in the epistemic sense without therefore being trivial in the attitudinal 
sense. That all unmarried men are unmarried is epistemically trivial if any 





say, a logical inquiry, although still epistemically trivial, it may no longer be 
attitudinally trivial. For it may then no longer be endorsed without any 
questions being raised about it—questions concerning the relation between its 
truth and its logical form, say. Conversely, a proposition may be trivial in the 
attitudinal sense without therefore being trivial in the epistemic sense. I usually 
assume that my car will start when I turn the ignition. And I usually do so 
without raising any questions whatsoever about this being so. But this is not, of 
course, to say that it is rationally indisputable. 
Now, I believe we should take Husserl as holding that, prior to recognition 
of the subjectivity of cognition, the propositions in question are trivial in both 
the epistemic and the attitudinal sense; and that while, upon that recognition, 
they remain trivial in the epistemic sense, they cease to be trivial, and become 
mysteries, in the attitudinal sense. On his view, then, recognizing the 
subjectivity of cognition does not serve to undermine the rational indisputability 
of the propositions concerned. Instead, what it does is make us unable to take 
the propositions, whose truth we cannot rationally dispute, for granted: Prior to 
recognizing the subjectivity of cognition, we justifiably believe that there are 
transcendent objects, and that these objects are cognizable as they are in 
themselves; and we do so without concerning ourselves with how this can be so. 
After recognizing the subjectivity of cognition, we still justifiably believe the 
propositions; but we can no longer do so without being confronted with the 
question of how they can be true―a question that, initially at least, we find 
ourselves quite unable to answer. 
As this suggests, Husserl’s problem of transcendence really comprises two 
general problems, one epistemological and the other metaphysical. The 
epistemological problem, which could be called the problem of transcendent 
cognition, is the problem of how the assumption of the subjectivity of cognition 
can be reconciled with the assumption of objective cognition—that is, of how, if 
cognition is subjective, cognition of transcendent objects is possible. The 
metaphysical problem, which we might call the problem of transcendent being, 
is the problem of how the assumption of the subjectivity of cognition can be 
reconciled with the assumption of objective being—that is, of how, if cognition is 





scepticism in a research manuscript from the 1920s, Husserl formulates the 
latter problem as follows:  
If objectivity is “only” subjective meaning, is not the being-in-itself of a world an 
illusion? Does this not hold for every cognizing subject? How can anyone know 
that what he means and verifies in himself corresponds with that of others and is 
the same? After all, the world is supposed to be an objective world, a world in 
itself for everyone. How can I, like a human being in general, know that a world, 
and the same world, “the” world, exists for everyone? Every man can only cognize 
it as his own meaning. How can I cognize follow human beings other than as 
something meant in myself? I cannot even say: “What is true for every human 
being is what appears for him”. I can only say: What is true for me is what 
appears for me. “Everyone”—that is itself my meaning, which does not go beyond 
myself. Thus, I end with the solipsism that, it seems, Georgia’s expressed. There 
is nothing objective, no objective science. Only my being and the being of my 
meanings are given, even apodictically given, and anything else is not at all 
conceivable (VII 331 f.).19   
In referring to the problem of transcendence, however, Husserl usually has 
in mind only what I have called the problem of transcendent cognition. And I 
will follow him in this here.20  
Before turning to Husserl’s view of the status of the third assumption 
behind the problem of transcendence, I want to make two further remarks in 
relation to the view that, prior to recognition of the subjectivity of cognition, the 
propositions that form their contents are attitudinally trivial. First, as the 
following passage from a 1910/11 lecture course suggests, to take those 
propositions for granted is to be naïve, in Husserl’s special sense of the term:  
For the naïve it is wholly truistic—to such an extent that he does not find the least 
occasion to reflect on it—that objects exist in themselves, that states of affairs 
obtain in themselves (that things change, events unfold, natural and 
mathematical laws are valid, all in themselves), and that the subject in its 
experiences of consciousness can perceive the objects existing in themselves, and, 
in a valid way, determine them in thought and evaluate them, and likewise 
subjectively cognize any state of affairs, any law obtaining in itself. This truism 
(and already the most primitive one relating to the perception of a thing) is the 
riddle of all riddles [Rätsel aller Rätsel] (XXX 341). 
                                                   
19 See also IX 288 ff. 
20 As the passage just quoted indicates, Husserl appears to hold that the problem of 
transcendent being follows from the problem of transcendent cognition, in the sense that if the 
subjectivity of cognition makes mysterious the possibility of objective cognition, it also, by that 
token, makes mysterious the possibility of objective being. It is hard to see how it could do so, 
however, at least without an additional assumption to the effect that what cannot in principle be 





It should be emphasized that this naïveté is not a matter of believing the 
propositions concerned without taking account of readily available 
countervailing evidence, or some such, but of believing them without full 
understanding of what, exactly, we believe when we believe them. Thus, in 
saying that, prior to recognizing the subjectivity of cognition, we are naïve, 
Husserl is not saying that, prior to that recognition, we are unaware of a fact 
that, were it to be taken into account, should lead us to doubt that there are 
transcendent objects and that these are cognizable as they are in themselves. He 
is rather saying that, prior to that recognition, we do not raise any questions 
about what these presumed facts actually consist in.  
Second, to be naïve in the present sense of the term is to live in what 
Husserl calls the “natural attitude” (natürliche Einstellung), and by which he 
means, roughly, a certain orientation or frame of mind within which, he holds, 
we ordinarily find ourselves, and on the basis of which all our ordinary practices 
unfold.21 For Husserl, then, the loss of naïveté we suffer by recognizing the 
subjectivity of cognition represents a certain departure from the natural 
attitude:22 When, upon recognizing the subjectivity of cognition, we cease to 
take the existence and cognizability of transcendent objects for granted, we 
thereby depart from the very frame of mind in which we ordinarily operate. 
Having considered Husserl’s view of the status of the first two assumptions 
from which the problem of transcendence arises, let us now consider his view of 
the status of the third, the assumption of the subjectivity of cognition. Does he 
take the proposition that cognition is subjective to be trivial too, in one or both 
of the two above senses?  
Husserl clearly regards it as trivial in the epistemic sense: We cannot 
rationally dispute that cognition is a subjective experience or something 
occurring in consciousness. It also seems clear that he regards it as trivial in the 
attitudinal sense. Indeed, he would seem to hold that taking this proposition for 
granted forms part of living in the natural attitude. Thus, for instance, in the last 
                                                   
21 In Ideen I, Husserl determines the natural attitude in terms of the taken for granted of 
the “general thesis of the existence of the world” (III/1 60 ff.), which, although not reducible to 
them, may be seen to include both the assumption of objective being, and the assumption of the 
possibility of objective cognition.  
22 I say a “certain” departure since a full departure from the natural attitude would require 





passage quoted, he formulates the second of the two propositions assumed 
without question by the “naïve” in terms of the possible achievements of “the 
subject in its experiences of consciousness”.  
This view has two consequences worthy of note. First, it implies that the 
recognition of the subjectivity of cognition, which supposedly brings about a 
certain departure from the natural attitude, is not a matter of coming to know a 
fact to which we are entirely new, but of grasping in an explicit way a fact with 
which we are already implicitly familiar. Thus, to recognize the subjectivity of 
cognition is not just to cognize it, but precisely to re-cognize it. Second, given 
that, as Husserl argues, recognition of the subjectivity of cognition brings about 
a departure from the natural attitude, the view also implies that, upon that 
recognition, we suffer a certain loss of naïveté with respect to our belief that 
cognition is subjective. In other words, it implies that, upon recognition of the 
subjectivity of cognition, not only do the presumed facts that there are objects in 
themselves, and that we can cognize these objects as they are in themselves, 
cease to be trivial, and become mysterious, in the attitudinal sense, but, in a 
certain sense, the very fact that cognition is subjective does too.23  
Returning to the question of the general nature of the problem of 
transcendence, I want to note three consequences of what I take to be Husserl’s 
view of the status of the assumptions from which it arises. First, that he regards 
the assumptions as epistemically trivial suggests that that he sees the problem 
as a paradox, in the sense of a problem arising from a combination of rationally 
indisputable, but apparently incompatible, propositions. More specifically, he 
would appear to take the problem to be that while the assumption of objective 
being, the assumption of the possibility of objective cognition, and the 
assumption of the subjectivity of cognition are all, by themselves, rationally 
indisputable, the second assumption would, initially, appear to be inconsistent 
with the third.24 This view of the problem, we may note in passing, puts a 
constraint on any solution to it—namely, that the solution must retain the 
                                                   
23 The later Husserl will articulate this mystery in terms of the ”paradox of subjectivity”—
the supposed fact that the cognizing subject is both subject for the world and an object in the 
world, both that for which alone any worldly object can appear as such and a worldly object 
among others (VI 184). For an extended discussion of this problem, see Carr (1999).   
24 With this, I have not said anything about why, according to Husserl, these propositions 





presumed truth of all of the assumptions from which it arises.25 
Second, and closely related to this, that Husserl takes the assumptions in 
question to be epistemically trivial also suggests that the problem of 
transcendence is not a problem of justification, but what could be called a 
problem of understanding: The problem is not whether objective cognition is 
possible, given the presumed fact of its subjectivity, but how or in what sense it 
is possible, given this fact (cf. XXIV 196, 399; VII 378).26 And the task it poses is 
not to justify that objective cognition is possible, in the teeth of the recognition 
that it is subjective, but to make these assumptions intelligible, and thereby 
show that the apparent inconsistency between them is just that―apparent―and 
so resolve the paradox they initially present.  
Third, that Husserl takes living in the natural attitude to involve the naïve 
entertaining of all the assumptions concerned implies that he regards the 
problem of transcendence as what we might call a natural problem—a problem 
arising from a perceived inconsistency between propositions the taking for 
granted of which constitutes, or at least co-constitutes, living in the natural 
attitude. And this, in turn, is part of the reason why he takes the problem to be 
so important and solving it to be so urgent. For it means that, unlike most other 
paradoxes, which threaten the intelligibility of a more or less restricted range of 
phenomena, the problem of transcendence threatens the intelligibility of the 
very orientation or frame of mind in which we ordinarily find ourselves, and, 
with it, the intelligibility of all of our ordinary practises, cognitive and otherwise.  
2.3  The Basic Forms of the Problem 
As the following passage suggests, the problem of transcendence can be 
specified in terms of three basic problems, corresponding to the three 
specifications of the assumption of the possibility of objective cognition 
sketched above:  
                                                   
25 For a critical discussion of whether Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology can meet 
this constraint when it comes to the assumption of objective being, see Byers (2002). See also 
the exchange between Byers (2005) and Overgaard (2005a and 2005b).  
26 This point is generally recognized by commentators. See, for instance, Sokolowski 





What does the problem of the objectivity of cognition signify? First of all, what 
does this talk of objectivity signify? To be more elaborate, the question is: What 
makes it the case that our thinking aims at an object, that as correct thinking it 
belongs to the object, fits the object; what makes it the case that correct 
movements of thought, however convoluted they might be, necessarily have to 
meet with the states of affairs to which they relate themselves; and what makes 
cognitions possible, in which, precisely, it becomes “cognized” that what is 
thought in such and such a way truly is? (XXIV 390 f./389)  
The first problem, which might be called the problem of mere 
transcendence, is the problem of how, if cognition is subjective, or something 
occurring in consciousness, cognitions can be directed on transcendent objects 
at all, or have transcendent objects for their intentional objects. The second 
problem, which could be called the problem of veridical transcendence, is the 
problem of how, if cognition is subjective, cognitions can be directed on 
transcendent objects in a veridical way, or have actually existing transcendent 
objects for their intentional objects. And the third problem, which we might call 
the problem of rational transcendence, is the problem of how, if cognition is 
subjective, cognition can be directed on transcendent objects in a rational way, 
in the sense of positing them on the basis of mediate or immediate consciously 
available and being-indicative grounds.     
Of these three, Husserl takes the problem of rational transcendence to be 
the epistemologically most central one—central, in the sense, roughly, that any 
other problem characterizable as properly epistemological is thus 
characterizable only by virtue of being suitably related to it (cf. II 36; VII 367). 
And so, when Husserl seeks to motivate the epistemological requisiteness of 
phenomenology by arguing that only phenomenology can satisfy the 
methodological requirements flowing from the nature of the problem of 
transcendence, what he has in mind is, as a rule, this form of the problem (cf. 
XXXVI 7 f.). Before turning to those requirements, however, I want to further 
clarify Husserl’s view of the problem of transcendence by briefly considering his 
view of the problem of scepticism. 
2.4  The Problem of Scepticism 
As we have seen, Husserl’s problem of transcendence is not a sceptical 





cognition is possible. This is not, however, to say that Husserl thinks 
epistemology should be unconcerned with scepticism, construed as the view 
that transcendent cognition in general is dubitable or impossible. Indeed, in a 
1902/03 lecture course, he argues that “[t]o overcome [überwinden] scepticism 
is the permanent task of epistemology” (XXIV 367/361). And in a 1923/24 
lecture course, we find him claiming, in effect, that success in overcoming 
scepticism on the part of a science is a criterion of its philosophical value:  
[The] abundant continued existence of scepticism, which in its argumentations 
spared none of the individual sciences, even the most exact mathematics, is a 
testament to the fact that post-Platonic science did not truly achieve what, 
according to its pretention, it should achieve as philosophy: cognition as absolute 
justification. For otherwise it would have made a sceptical operating impossible, 
it would have had to dissolve the latter’s paradoxes in a clean way (VII 57). 
Broadly speaking, Husserl seeks to accomplish the task of overcoming 
scepticism in two ways. First, he argues that scepticism about the possibility of 
rational transcendence is incoherent, and that it is therefore not a position 
anyone could genuinely hold (cf. XXIV 179 ff.). Second, he seeks to show that 
scepticism, or rather—scepticism being presumed incoherent and therefore 
impossible—what could be called the inclination or tendency towards 
scepticism,27 arises only as the result of a lack of clarity with respect to the 
possibility of transcendent cognition, and that to provide such clarity therefore 
is to uproot this tendency. As he puts it in a 1907 research manuscript: 
The task of epistemology is not to refute [widerlegen] scepticism, but to remove 
the embarrassments in which cognition gets entangled through reflection upon it 
own possibilities, and to clarify this possibility, the essence of cognition, and the 
correlations with the object that belongs to it. Thereby, however, the motives that 
push towards scepticism are eliminated, while scepticism stands exposed as 
countersense [Widersinn] for those who have insight—which does not prevent it 
from not being refutable (XXIV 405/406).28 
                                                   
27 In a 1907 research manuscript, Husserl describes the effect of lack of clarity with regard 
to the possibility of transcendent cognition as follows: “The confusions in which the human 
mind gets entangled through reflection upon the possibility of cognition throws it into 
scepticism, or plants the inclination towards scepticism (XXIV 397/397; my emphasis).  
28 At first blush, this passage might appear to contradict Husserl’s previously cited claim 
that overcoming scepticism is the permanent task of epistemology. The appearance of 
contradiction may be dispelled, however, if we take Husserl to recognize a distinction between 
“refuting” and “overcoming”, where to refute scepticism means to disprove it to the satisfaction 





This, however, is in effect to say that even though the problem of 
transcendence is not, as such, a sceptical problem, overcoming scepticism is still 
a criterion of success for any attempt to solve it. For if clarifying the possibility 
of transcendent cognition is sufficient for overcoming scepticism, it follows that 
overcoming scepticism is necessary for clarifying the possibility of transcendent 
cognition. It follows, in other words, that unless an attempt to clarify the 
possibility of transcendent cognition succeeds in removing any tendency to 
scepticism, it cannot be deemed successful, at least not wholly so.  
This, I take it, is one reason why Husserl on occasion characterizes the 
problems of epistemology as “the sceptical problems of the possibility of 
cognition” (III/1 54). Another is that he regards the recognition of the 
subjectivity of cognition, and thereby of a crucial premise of the problem of 
transcendence, as an achievement of the sceptical tradition—an achievement 
from which, however, it drew the wrong conclusions (cf. XXIV 368; VII 61, 
348).  
3.  The Methodology of Epistemology 
As we have seen, Husserl takes the general problem of epistemology to be 
the problem of transcendence, the problem of rational transcendence in 
particular. And, as noted, he holds that this and any other genuine 
epistemological problem can be solved only by phenomenology. As we now shall 
see, his attempted justification for this claim is, very roughly, that any solution 
to the problem of transcendence must employ two methods, the use of which is 
both necessary and sufficient for the solution’s being a phenomenological one.29 
In what follows, I will refer to these as epistemological reduction (3.1) and 
phenomenological description (3.2).  
                                                                                                                                                     
incline towards it. For he may then be taken to argue, consistently, that while refuting 
scepticism is impossible, overcoming scepticism by clarifying the possibility of transcendent 
cognition is not. Thus construed, Husserl’s response to scepticism would have affinities to what 
Pryor has called a “modest” as opposed to an “ambitious” anti-sceptical project (2000, 517). I 
return to this point in Section 4.3.  
29 For an extended account of the dynamic interplay between Husserl’s views of the 





3.1  Epistemological Reduction 
The epistemological reduction, or “epoché”, as Husserl also calls it, is an 
operation whereby one “brackets” or “suspends” any and all forms of 
transcendent cognition, and any and all results obtained by means of it.30 The 
suspension concerned is not a matter of doubting or negating the validity of 
transcendent cognition or its results, but simply of refraining from making any 
cognitive use of them, in the sense, roughly, of not employing them as premises 
for one’s conclusions (XXIV 213 ff., 370; II 6). Thus, on Husserl’s special use of 
the term, there would be no contradiction involved in suspending a 
transcendent cognition about whose validity I remain wholly convinced, such as 
my perception of the computer screen in front of me. 
According to Husserl, the epistemological need for the epoché follows from 
what he takes to be a fundamental requirement on epistemological cognition, 
cognition adequate for solving the problem of transcendence and any other 
epistemological problem. On this requirement, epistemological cognition must 
be transcendentally unquestionable, in the sense of not itself exemplifying the 
kind of cognition whose possibility the problem of transcendence concerns (cf. 
IX 291).31 The kind of cognition in question being transcendent cognition, the 
requirement amounts to the claim that epistemological cognition cannot be 
transcendent, or that the epistemologist must refrain from making any cognitive 
use of transcendent cognition in her attempt to solve the problem of 
transcendence. As Husserl puts it:  
The problem of the How (how transcendent cognition is possible, and more 
generally: how cognition in general is possible) can never be solved on the basis 
of pregiven knowledge of what is transcendent, of pregiven propositions thereof, 
taken no matter from where, even from the exact sciences (II 38/30). 
                                                   
30 In addition to referring to this operation as epistemological reduction (II 48; XXIV 214, 
240) and epoché (XXIV 189; XIII 80), Husserl refers to it as phenomenological reduction (II 6; 
XXIV 211; XXXVI 175; III/1 69), transcendental reduction (III/1 125; III/2 563; VIII 82; IX 473 
f.) and transcendental-phenomenological reduction (III/2 642 f.). However, he also uses the 
latter terms to designate a more comprehensive methodological operation, which, in the present 
context, may be seen to consist of the methods of epistemological reduction and 
phenomenological description taken together. (For discussion of the relation between the 
reduction in the first and second of these senses, see, for instance, Larsen 2002. See also Luft 
2002 and 2012.) 
31 For an account of the central methodological role Husserl attributes to this 





All cognition of the natural world and its denizens being transcendent by 
Husserl’s lights, this means, inter alia, that no attempt to solve the problem of 
transcendence can make any use of such cognition. And this means, in turn, that 
no attempt to solve the problem can, in any way, make use of results drawn 
from any science that, in one way or another, rely on the possibility of such 
cognition, which, for Husserl, include not just the natural sciences, but also the 
social and human sciences.32      
Husserl’s attempted justification for the requirement of transcendental 
unquestionableness, as it could be called, is that any attempt to solve the 
problem of transcendence by means of transcendent cognition—any attempt 
that does not involve performance of the epoché—would represent a failure to 
recognize the proper sense of the problem, and would be incoherent:  
This sceptical positing-taking [Stellungnahme], this absolute epoché, which does 
not recognize any pregivenness, and sets its non liquet as a pure refraining from 
judgement over against all natural cognition, is the first and fundamental part of 
epistemological method. A theory of cognition that does not earnestly begin with 
this epoché sins against the sense of genuine epistemological problems. Any 
theory that erects itself on pregiven sciences, be it on metaphysics, be it on 
psychology, be it on biology, ends in countersense [Widersinn], just as it began in 
countersense (XXIV 187/184). 
Husserl specifies this claim in terms of what amounts to two arguments for 
the epistemological requisiteness of the epoché. The first is that to make use of 
transcendent cognition in attempting to solve the problem of transcendence 
would be unacceptably circular: 
If it is in principle unintelligible to us how consciousness with its consciousness-
characters [Bewusstseinscharakteren] can come to grasp and determine an 
object that is in principle transcendent to it, and in such way that it is not just 
itself intellectually satisfied, but in such a way that this transcendent object 
actually is, and is as it has been determined to be—if, I say, this is in principle 
unintelligible to us, then any attempted solution that appeals to a particular kind 
                                                   
32 As this makes clear, Husserl would regard any attempt to naturalize epistemology as 
fundamentally misguided. (For a Husserlian response to Quinean naturalization, see Rinofner-
Kreidl 2004). And so, to the extent that it is to serve an epistemological purpose, he would also 
regard as misguided any attempt to naturalize phenomenology. This is not to rule out that there 
could be a sense in which he would allow that phenomenological results might be integrated 
with results in the natural sciences of mind in a fruitful way. It is just to say that he would deny 
the resulting integrative discipline any epistemological relevance whatsoever. (For exposition 
and discussion of the current project of naturalizing phenomenology, see the contributions to 





of transcendent existents, and to what they do or do not do, is a circle (XXXVI 
83). 
The second argument is that making use of transcendent cognition in 
attempting to solve the problem of transcendence would involve a metabasis eis 
allo genos, or an illegitimate substitution of the problem to be solved for a 
different one. Referring to the requirement in question, Husserl writes:     
It is nothing other than the requirement always to bear in mind the motivating 
[bewegenden] problems and their proper sense, and not replace them with 
others. Implied in this, however, is that we may presuppose nothing as pregiven, 
use nothing as premises, allow no method of investigation, that is itself afflicted 
with the problem (X 346/357).33  
The immediate result of performing the epoché is a negative one—to 
deprive the epistemologist of cognitions and results that might, initially, have 
appeared as resources for solving the problem of transcendence, and 
epistemological problems in general. Performing the operation may yield an 
indirect positive result, however, by providing the epistemologist with a fund of 
genuine epistemological resources. For if the epoché would leave us with any 
form of cognition at all—if refraining from making use of transcendent cognition 
would not leave us bereft of cognition altogether—then that form of cognition 
would satisfy an at least necessary condition on epistemological cognition.  
Now, Husserl argues that the epoché would, indeed, leave us with not just 
one, but two forms of cognition. The first is “immanent perception” (immanente 
Wahrnehmung), by which he means originarily intuitive reflective, or second-
order, intentional experiences directed on current first-order experiences (III/1 
78, 106 f.). With regard to Husserlian immanent perception, two points should 
be noted.    
First, it should not be confused with introspection (cf. M VII 50 f.).34 
Introspection or natural reflection, as Husserl also calls it, is the reflective 
experience of one’s current experiences, construed as mental states of an 
organism inhabiting and interacting with a world of variously propertied spatio-
                                                   
33 For the characterization of this sort of replacement as a metabasis, see for instance 
XXIV 176. For discussion of the roles that attempts to avoid different kinds of metabasis plays in 
Husserl, see O’Connor (2006).  





temporal things. As thus construed, however, introspection is a form of 
transcendent cognition, and must consequently be suspended under the epoché. 
By contrast, immanent perception, or transcendental reflection, as Husserl also 
calls it, is the reflective experience of one’s current experiences, construed, not 
as mental states of oneself as a natural being, but as “pure” experiences of 
oneself as a “pure” non-worldly ego.35 Only as thus construed can reflection be 
taken to qualify as epistemologically admissible under the strictures imposed by 
the requirement of transcendental unquestionableness.36    
Second, what is given or perceived in immanent perception is not, 
according to Husserl, restricted to one’s current intentional experiences, 
narrowly construed. It also includes what he calls their “intended objects as 
intended” or their “intentional correlates”, by which, on one interpretation at 
least, he means their intentional objects, taken as, and only as, they present 
themselves in the experiences whose objects they are (cf. XXIV 230 ff.; II 55 
ff.).37 His justification for this claim takes the form of a pointing out of a 
putative descriptive possibility: On the basis of an immanent perception of, say, 
my current perceptual experience of the computer in front of me, I can describe 
the perception itself, as a transient experiential occurrence. But I can also 
describe the computer perceived just as it is perceived—very roughly, as an 
object having such and features presenting themselves to me from such and 
such a perspective with such and such a degree of clarity (cf. M VII 54 ff.).   
The second form of cognition with which performance of the epoché would 
supposedly leave us is eidetic intuition of the essences of pure intentional 
experiences and their intended objects as intended. Thus, having performed the 
epoché, what I would have available for cognitive use—the “phenomenological 
residuum” (III/1 68) or “transcendental residuum” (III/1 123)—would not be 
                                                                                                                                                     
(2012). 
35 The exact status of the Husserlian pure ego and its pure experiences, and its relation to 
the worldly ego and its experiences, is controversial. For discussion of some of the issues 
involved, see Carr (1999). 
36 Husserl can be seen to argue as follows: (1) If immanent perception is left behind after 
the epoché, then both it and the experiences perceived are pure experiences. (2) Immanent 
perception is left behind after the epoché. (3) So, both immanent perception and the experiences 
perceived are pure experiences. Others, sceptical of the credentials of the idea of pure 
experiences, might instead want to combine the denial of (3) with (1) to conclude that its 





limited to, for instance, my immanently perceived pure perception of the 
computer in front of me, and the computer taken just as it appears in that 
perception. It would also include the essence of the pure perception and its 
perceived object as perceived—the invariant features by virtue of which they are 
the kind of intentional experience and the kind of intentional correlate that they 
are (M VII 83, 88).  
According to Husserl, then, performance of the epoché does not only 
deprive the epistemologist of epistemologically inadmissible forms of cognition. 
It also provides her with epistemologically admissible forms of cognition—
admissible in the sense of satisfying a necessary condition on epistemological 
cognition. To decide that a given form of cognition is epistemologically 
acceptable in this sense is not sufficient for determining how the problem of 
transcendence is actually to be solved, however. For in order to determine this, 
we would also need to know how the form of cognition concerned is to be used 
to that end. And this is the reason why, in the passage quoted above, Husserl 
describes the epoché only as “the first and fundamental part of epistemological 
method” (cf. also XXIV 193). Elsewhere he characterizes it as only a “method of 
passage” (Durchgangsmethode) (XXXIV 90), or “method of access” 
(Zugangsmethode) (III/2 643; IX 282, 314, 340)—a method that, while it 
provides access to the domain through the investigation of which the problem of 
transcendence is to be solved, does not, as such, constitute a method for the 
actual carrying out of that investigation. 
This brings us to what Husserl takes to be the second part of 
epistemological method, or the second method of epistemology—the method of 
phenomenological description. For what Husserl does in presenting this method 
is, in effect, to determine the way in which the forms of cognition shown to be 
epistemologically admissible under the epoché can, and must, be employed in 
order actually to solve the problem of transcendence, and any other genuine 
epistemological problem. To be more precise, he determines the way in which 
the eidetic intuition of pure intentional experiences and their intentional 
correlates can and must be so employed. For, as we shall see, of the two forms of 
cognitions with which the epoché supposedly leaves us, it is, according to 
                                                                                                                                                     





Husserl, only through the methodical use of this one that the problem of 
transcendence can, ultimately, be solved.   
3.2  Phenomenological Description 
On Husserl’s use of the term, phenomenological description is descriptive 
articulation of the essences of pure intentional experiences and their intentional 
correlates, on the basis of their givenness in eidetic intuition (cf. III/1 156 ff.). 
So, to hold that this method represents the only way in which the 
epistemologically admissible eidetic intuitions of these essences can be used to 
solve the problem of transcendence is, in effect, to hold that they can be so used 
only as bases for descriptions of what is made available through them.  
How, exactly, is phenomenological description supposed to help solve the 
problem of transcendence? Note first that, according to Husserl, to articulate an 
essence on the basis of its originary intuitive givenness is tantamount to 
“clarifying” the possibility of that whose essence it is. And to clarify the 
possibility of something in this way is, he also holds, to make that possibility 
eminently intelligible, or intelligible to the highest possible degree. Thus, for 
Husserl, phenomenological description is also, and necessarily, 
phenomenological clarification: In describing the essences of pure intentional 
experiences and their intentional correlates, on the basis of their givenness in 
eidetic intuition, one also, and at the same time, clarifies the possibility of those 
experiences and correlates, and thereby makes it eminently intelligible.  
Given this, the epistemological relevance of phenomenological description 
follows: The task posed by the problem of transcendence is to make the 
possibility of transcendent cognition intelligible. But if phenomenological 
description is also, and necessarily, phenomenological clarification, then by 
articulating the essence of pure transcendent cognition, as given in eidetic 
intuition, one will, precisely, be making the possibility of transcendent cognition 
intelligible, and will, consequently, be solving the problem of transcendence.  
According to Husserl, however, phenomenological description is not just 
epistemologically relevant—it is epistemologically requisite. Indeed, it is the 
only investigative method by means of which the problem of transcendence can 





intelligible through description of its originarily given essence is not just one, 
but the only way of making that possibility eminently intelligible. And so, given 
the constraints on epistemologically admissible cognition imposed by the 
requirement of transcendental unquestionableness, there is no other way in 
which the possibility of transcendent cognition can be made intelligible, or at 
least eminently intelligible, than through phenomenological description, and 
the clarification it affords.  
Now, to engage in phenomenological description is to do phenomenology 
(cf. III/1 162). So to say that the problem of transcendence can be solved only by 
means of phenomenological description is to say that it can be solved only by 
phenomenology. And, given the supposed epistemological centrality of that 
problem, this, for Husserl, is tantamount to saying that any genuine 
epistemological problem can only be thus solved, and hence that epistemology is 
possible only as phenomenology.  
Concretely, the phenomenological description required for solving the 
problem of transcendence is to proceed on two levels. At the first level, the 
target of description is the essence of pure intentional experiences and their 
intentional correlates in general, and of transcendent intentional experiences—
intentional experiences directed at transcendent objects—and their correlates in 
particular. The general aim of the description here is threefold: first, to 
articulate the features of intentional experiences by virtue of which they are 
intentionally directed on their objects in the way that they are; second, to 
articulate the features that the intentional correlates of the experiences exhibit 
by virtue of being the correlates of precisely the experiences whose correlates 
they are; and third, to articulate the relations of correlation obtaining between 
the structural features of the experiences and those of their correlates. In Ideen 
I, where Husserl refers to pure intentional experiences and their correlates as, 
respectively, “noeses” and “noemata”,38 he characterizes this threefold aim as 
that of describing the general essence of the “noetico-noematic” correlation.39 
                                                   
38 Strictly speaking, what Husserl designates as noeses are not pure intentional 
experiences, but only those of their parts by virtue of which they are intentional, which does not 
include their sensuous or “hyletic” contents (III/1 191 ff.). I return to Husserl’s notion of these 
contents in Section 4.2. 
39 In Ideen I, the bulk of these sorts of descriptions are to be found in Chapter 3 and 4 of 





At the second level, what is to be described is the essence of rational 
intentional experiences and their correlates, and, in particular, transcendent 
rational intentional experiences, rational experiences directed at transcendent 
objects. The general aim of the description here is, again, threefold: first, to 
articulate the structural features of the experiences by virtue of which they are 
directed on their objects in a rational, or epistemically justified, way; second, to 
articulate the structural features that the intentional correlates of the 
experiences exhibit by virtue of being the correlates of experiences of the 
relevant kind, roughly, the features by virtue of which they appear with the 
character of being justifiedly posited as existing; and, third, to articulate the 
relations of correlation obtaining between the features of rational intentional 
experiences and those of their rationally posited correlates.40 Fully developed, 
these descriptions would constitute what Husserl in Ideen I calls a complete 
phenomenology of reason, or theoretical reason, to be more precise.41   
Husserl specifies the relation of correlation between intentional 
experiences and their intentional object as one of “constitution” 
(Konstitution)—that is, as a relation of the experiences constituting their 
objects, or the objects being constituted by the experiences whose objects they 
are (cf. II 12 f.). So to say that the problem of transcendence, and any other 
genuine epistemological problem, can be solved only by means of 
phenomenological description is, for him, to say that they can be solved only by 
phenomenology in the form of a full-fledged descriptive account of the 
constitution of objects by consciousness, and, in particular, of the constitution 
of justifiedly posited objects by rational cognitions. This, however, is 
tantamount to saying that epistemology is possible only, not just as 
phenomenology, but as “transcendental phenomenology”, by which Husserl 
understands, precisely, such an account (cf. IX 250; I 118).42 
                                                   
40 In Ideen I, descriptions of this sort make up Part IV.  
41 According to Husserl, theoretical reason is one of three forms of reason, the other two 
being axiological and practical reason. For discussion of his view of the relation between them, 
see Melle (1988) and (1990).  
42 The precise content of Husserl’s conception of constitution, and its implications for the 
precise content of his concept of the transcendental, and the nature of his avowed 
transcendental idealism, is a matter of controversy. This is at least in part due to the fact that, as 
Fink (1957) noted, the concept is an “operative” as opposed to “thematic” one—a concept of 





Now, as we recall, Husserl holds that the most fundamental kind of 
rational experience is evidence, or the positing of objects on the basis of their 
originary givenness in originary giving intuition. And he therefore takes the 
most fundament part of the phenomenology of theoretical reason, or the 
account of the constitution of justifiedly posited objects, to be the description of 
the noetico-noematic structures of evidence (cf. III/1 314 ff.).  
Within this part of the phenomenology of reason, Husserl takes the 
description of perception to be of crucial importance. For he takes perception to 
be the epistemically most fundamental kind of originary intuition (cf. EU 13). 
This brings us to the third part of the context for the present work: the 
epistemology of perception.  
4.  The Epistemology of Perception 
The fundamental epistemological importance Husserl attaches to 
perception is reflected in the wealth of investigations he devotes to its analysis.43 
Here I only want briefly to note some aspects of his view of the structure of 
intentionality in general (4.1), the nature of perception (4.2), and the epistemic 
role of the latter (4.3).  
4.1  The Structure of Intentionality 
The exact nature of Husserl’s theory of intentionality is contentious. As 
noted, one of the aims of the theory is to account for that by virtue of which 
intentional experiences are intentional, or to identify what could be called the 
determinants of intentionality. It is uncontroversial that in the Logische 
Untersuchungen he takes the intentionality of an intentional experience to be 
determined by an inherent and non-repeatable feature of the experience that he 
there calls its “matter” (Materie). This feature supposedly fixes both which 
object the experience is directed on, and how it is directed on that object, or 
which features it presents the object as having; and it represents an 
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contributions to the debate, see Smith (2003), Zahavi (2007b) and Thomasson (2007). See also 
Heinämaa and Hartimo (2014). 





instantiation of an “ideal meaning-species”—roughly, a repeatable way of being 
directed on just that object in just this way (cf. XIX/1 435).44 It is also 
uncontroversial that Husserl’s theory of intentionality underwent significant 
changes between Logische Untersuchungen and Ideen I, one of the most 
important of which is his introduction of the above mentioned notion of the 
“intended object as intended”, or the “noema”. The controversy concerns the 
exact nature of these changes, and, in particular, the status and theoretical role 
of the noema.  
According to one influential interpretation, developed by Smith and 
McIntyre, the introduction of the notion of the noema marks a shift in Husserl’s 
view of the determinants of intentionality. On this construal, he came to hold 
that an intentional experience is intentional, not by virtue of having an 
intentional matter, or instantiating an ideal meaning-species, but by virtue of 
“entertaining” a noema, construed as an “abstract particular” that “prescribes”, 
and thereby mediates reference to, the object of the experience. Thus construed, 
noemata are similar to Fregean senses as standardly construed, and play a role 
in determining the intentionality of experiences similar to the role such senses 
are taken to play in determining the reference of linguistic expressions (1982, 
154).45  
 According to a different interpretation, suggested by Willard, the 
introduction of the notion of the noema did not mark a shift in Husserl’s view of 
the determinants of intentionality, which remained more or less the same. 
Instead, it signalled a shift in his view of what is available for phenomenological 
description when dealing with the phenomenon of intentionality. In the 
Logische Untersuchungen, Husserl held, roughly, that the only items available 
for such description are intentional experiences, and their essences. With his 
                                                                                                                                                     
XVI, IV, IX, XI and EU.  
44 The matter of an intentional experience is one of two non-independent parts, or 
“moments”, that constitutes its “intentional essence” (intentionale Wesen), the other being its 
“quality” (Qualität) (XIX 431). Unlike its matter, which determines which object the experience 
is directed on, the quality of the experience determines how it is directed on that object—say, 
whether it is a positing or mere presentation of it (XIX 425 ff.)  
45 Smith and McIntyre’s interpretation of the noema is heavily influenced by the 
interpretation Føllesdal first proposed in his (1969), from which, however, it differs on several 
counts. For one, Føllesdal construes the noema, not as an abstract particular, but as something 
like a Peircian type, of which corresponding noeses are tokens, thus in effect taking it to be akin 





introduction of the notion of the noema, however, Husserl means to point out 
that the domain of what is phenomenologically describable must also be seen to 
include the “intended object as intended” of the phenomenologically available 
experiences, construed as something distinct both from the experiences 
themselves and from their actual objects, if there be any (1992, 41). Thus, unlike 
Smith and McIntyre, Willard argues that the notion of the noema does not 
replace the notion of species-meaning in Husserl’s account of the determinants 
of intentionality, but rather supplements it (1988, 189). That said, he finds the 
ontological status of the noema to be elusive, and suggests that the 
phenomenological clarification supposedly achievable by reference to it may 
also well be achievable without it (1992, 47). 
The two interpretations of the noema sketched so far share the assumption 
that the noema of an intentional experience is distinct from its actual object, if 
there be one. A third influential interpretation, developed by, among others, 
Drummond, rejects this assumption, holding instead that the noema of an 
experience is ontologically identical with its actual object, and that the 
difference between them is a merely attitudinal one.46 Specifically, Drummond 
argues, whereas to talk of the actual object of an experience is to talk of the 
object as it appears within the natural attitude, to talk of the noema of the 
experience is to talk of the very same object as it appears within the 
phenomenological attitude, where it appears as, and only as, the intentional 
correlate of that and other actual and possible experiences directed at it (2012, 
124).  
I cannot here attempt to evaluate these and other interpretations of 
Husserl’s notion of the noema.47 Instead, I only want to indicate ever so briefly 
some of what can be seen to be at stake in the debate.  
One’s view of the noema has consequences for one’s view of the nature of 
the epoché, and the result of performing it. It is uncontroversial that Husserl 
                                                   
46 Other proponents of this interpretation, which is commonly referred to as the East 
Coast interpretation in distinction to the so-called West Coast interpretation proposed by, 
among others, Smith and McIntyre, include Sokolowski (2000) and Cobb-Stevens (1990).  
47 For a sampling of some of the positions in the debate, see the papers collected in 
Drummond and Embree (1992). For critical discussions of Smith and McIntyre’s interpretation, 
see Willard (1988) and Drummond (1990). For objections to Drummond’s interpretation, see 





takes the phenomenological residuum—the totality of what is available as 
objects of study after performance of the epoché—to include only one’s 
originarily given pure intentional experiences and their noemata, and their 
respective essences.48 This means, however, that if the noema of an experience 
is something other than its actual object, as both Smith and McIntyre, and 
Willard, in different ways argue, then the actual object, as well as the entire 
actual world to which it belongs, will fall outside the purview of the 
phenomenologist, and by supposed implication, of the epistemologist. And, by 
the same token, it means that the epoché itself must be conceived as 
fundamentally an operation of exclusion, whereby one excludes the actual world 
from one’s field of study in order to investigate something else—namely, the 
systems of intentional experiences and noemata by virtue of which the world 
appears to us in the way it does.  
By contrast, if, like Drummond, one takes the noemata of experiences 
directed at actual objects to be ontologically identical with the latter, then those 
objects, and the world to which they belong, will no longer fall outside of, but 
form part of, the phenomenological residuum. And the epoché will no longer 
have the character of an exclusion, but, rather, of an inclusion, or a bringing into 
view of something that is not thematic in the natural attitude—namely, the 
experiential correlates of the objects concerned.  
 One’s view of the noema also has consequences for one’s view of the 
nature of Husserl’s transcendental idealism, or at least for what options would 
initially seem available in this regard. If the noema of a veridical experience is 
taken to be ontologically distinct from its object, there would not seem to be any 
great obstacles in the way of construing Husserl’s idealism as fully compatible 
with metaphysical realism. For, in that case, his talk of noemata being “unities 
of sense” that are “constituted” by their correlated noeses, and are what they are 
only in their correlation with these, can be taken as expressing no more than the 
view that in order to “entertain” a certain representation of an object—a noema 
or noematic sense that “prescribes” that object—certain specific kinds of 
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experiences are required.49  
If the noema of a veridical experience is seen as ontologically identical with 
its object, however, it would seem harder to resist the conclusion that Husserl’s 
idealism is a metaphysical idealism of sorts. For if actual objects and at least 
certain classes of noemata are ontologically identical, and noemata are unities of 
sense that are what they are only in correlation with the multiplicities of 
consciousness by which they are constituted, then, it would seem, actual objects 
too are what they are only in correlation with these multiplicities.50 
4.2  The Nature of Perception 
Like the question of Husserl’s view of intentionality in general, the 
question of his view of the nature of perception is a controversial one, with the 
main approaches paralleling the main approaches to the former question.51 That 
said, many aspects of his view are more or less beyond dispute, including the 
following six.   
First, as noted in Section 2.1, perception is a species of originary 
intuition—that is, intentional experiences whose objects are present as “bodily 
selfgiven”, as opposed to being represented by some other object, like a sign or 
an image. More specifically, perception is originary intuition of individual 
objects or particulars, whether in the form of conscious experiences or physical 
objects. Perception of conscious experiences Husserl calls “immanent” or 
“inner” perception, and perception of physical objects he calls “transcendent” or 
                                                   
49 Thus, Woodruff Smith suggests that Husserl espouses an “ontological realism joined 
with a semantic theory of intentionality” (2013, 170).  
50 This is not to say that Drummond, or other proponents of the East Coast interpretation 
generally, takes Husserl’s transcendental idealism to be a species of metaphysical idealism, 
which they do not. It is just to say that the identification of the noema and the actual object 
invites that construal, and that work is required to resist it. For interpretations on which Husserl 
is explicitly taken to be committed to metaphysical idealism, see, for instance, Ingarden (1975) 
and (1992), Philipse (1995), Smith (2003, 179 ff.) and Rollinger and Sowa (2003). For an 
account of possible interpretations of Husserlian idealism, see Smith (2013, 168 ff.) 
51 For West Coast interpretations of Husserl’s theory of perception, see Føllesdal (1974) 
and (1978), Dreyfus (1982) and Smith and McIntyre (1982). For an East Coast interpretation, 
see Drummond (1990). For a construal inspired by Willard’s account, see Hopp (2011), which 
represents the most comprehensive attempt to date at making Husserl’s early theory of 
perception relevant to central issues in contemporary epistemology of perception. Other 
important contributions include Melle (1983), Smith (1989), Mulligan (1995) and Smith (2008). 
See also Kjosavik (2003) and Soldati (2013). For a general account of phenomenological 





“outer” perception (cf. III/1 77 ff.).  
Second, perception has the character of being a presentation of an object 
that exists, and has the properties it is presented as having, independently of 
being perceived (XXXVI 191). Combined with the first point, this is to say that 
Husserl endorses a form of direct realism about perception, according to which 
perception has the character of being a direct awareness of perception-
independent objects.   
Third, although outer perception is a presentation of objects as bodily 
selfgiven, it presents them only in a “one-sided” or “perspectival” way. For at 
any point in the unfolding of a perception of a physical object, only part of the 
object is “genuinely” perceived, namely, in the case of visual perception, the part 
of the object currently facing the perceiving subject. This is not to say that the 
other parts of the object—its flanks, its insides and its rear—are not in any way 
perceived, which they are. It is just to say that they are not “genuinely” 
perceived, and that although perception is a form of originary intuition, it is an 
inadequate as opposed to adequate form of such intuition (cf. XVI 51; EU 31).  
Fourth, the noematic distinction between the genuinely and the non-
genuinely perceived parts of the object is to be accounted for in terms of a 
corresponding noetic distinction between two sorts of intentions or object-
directedness, both of which are present in any phase of an unfolding outer 
perception (cf. XI 5). To the genuinely perceived part of the object there 
corresponds intentions that are “sensuously filled”, in the sense of being 
“apprehensions” of certain experiential contents, called “sensations”, as being 
experiences of corresponding sensuous features of the object. And to the non-
genuinely perceived parts of the object, there correspond intentions that are 
“empty”, in the sense of not being apprehensions of sense-data, whether data 
corresponding to the features of the object that they present, or any other sort of 
data (XVI 46 f.).52  
Fifth, the non-genuinely or emptily presented parts of a perceived object 
constitute its “horizon”.53 And the empty intentions directed at the horizon of an 
                                                   
52 Husserl’s use of this “apprehension-content” schema in describing the structure of 
perception has been criticized by other representatives of the phenomenological tradition. See, 
for instance, Gurwitsch (1978). See also Drummond (1990) and Hopp (2008b). 





object have the character of anticipations—namely, of the genuine appearances 
of the object that would become available to the perceiving subject if her spatial 
position vis-à-vis the object were to change, for instance by her moving her body 
relative to it (XI 13 ff.). If the features of an object that come to be genuinely 
perceived in a given phase of a perceptual process correspond to features whose 
genuine appearance were horizonally anticipated in a previous phase, the 
horizonal anticipations involved are said to be “fulfilled” by the relevant 
sensuously filled intentions belonging to the later phase. By contrast, if what 
comes to be genuinely perceived does not so correspond, the horizonal 
intentions involved are said to be “disappointed” by the relevant sensuously 
filled intentions. Further, if a perceptual process is such that the horizonal 
anticipations belonging to the earlier phases of the process are continuously 
fulfilled, rather than disappointed, by sensuously filled intentions belonging to 
later phases, the process as a whole is said to be “harmonious” (einstimmig) (cf. 
III/1 320). Husserl refers to such harmonious processes as “syntheses of 
coincidence” (Deckungssynthesen), consisting, as they do, in a continuous 
synthesis of horizonal anticipations with sensory filled intentions in which the 
anticipatorily given objectual features concerned attain to actual givenness (cf. 
XVI 92). 
Sixth, to say that a given outer perception is veridical, or that its object is 
actual, is equivalent to saying that it would be harmonious no matter which 
particular course it might take—say, whether it would involve seeing its object 
from the left or from the right—and that any of the courses that is open at any 
point of its duration would remain harmonious even if, per impossible, it were 
to run off into infinity. Since, as noted above, perception has the character of 
being a presentation of an actual object, this is to say that any perception 
involves a presumption to the effect that it would remain thus harmonious, 
which can also be put by saying that the “adequate givenness” of it object, or the 
genuine perceivability of all of its features, are prefigured in the perception in 
the form of a regulative or “Kantian” idea (III/1 330 ff.).54 
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belongs, which context is, ultimately, that of the “world” (EU 28 f.).  
54 For discussion of the role of this idea in Husserl’s phenomenology of perception, see 





4.3  The Epistemic Role of Perception 
Although Husserl attributes important epistemic roles to both inner and 
outer perception, here I shall only consider his view of the role of outer 
perception, which from now on is what I shall have in mind when referring 
simply to perception. And I shall be focusing on his idea of what could be called 
the basic epistemic significance of perception. This he takes to reside in the 
supposed fact that any perception provides epistemic justification for positing 
the object perceived, or, equivalently, that the perceptual givenness of an 
object—its presence as an object of perception—constitutes a justificatory 
ground for positing it. Perceptual givenness being a form of originary givenness, 
this view is an instance of what I have called Husserl’s general epistemic 
intuitionism, on which the originary givenness of any object is a justificatory 
ground for positing it. And we could, therefore, designate it as Husserl’s 
perceptual intuitionism.55  
A point of clarification. In speaking of perception, I have, so far, been 
referring to originary intuitions of physical objects in the sense of spatio-
temporal particulars, or what Husserl calls “simple” (schlichte) perception (EU 
54). In a Husserlian context, however, talk of perception may also refer to what 
Husserl calls “categorial” (kategoriale) perception, by which he means originary 
intuitions of physical objects in the sense of states of affairs involving spatio-
temporal particulars. Of these two, the former is the more fundamental, with 
categorial perception supposedly arising from simple perception through a 
process of logical or categorial articulation of its object (XIX/2 681 ff.; XXVI 
126; EU 242 ff.).56 For Husserl, then, the term ‘perceptual givenness of physical 
objects’ is ambiguous, referring, as it can, both to the givenness of physical 
particulars in simple perception, and to the givenness of categorial physical 
objects in categorial perception, where the latter is one-sidedly dependent on 
the former. But this means that the expression ‘Husserl’s perceptual 
intuitionism’ is similarly ambiguous, since it can refer both to the view that the 
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Approach in the epistemology of perception.  





perceptual givenness of a physical particular is a justificatory ground for 
positings of that particular, and to the view that the perceptual givenness of a 
state of affairs involving such a particular is a justificatory ground for positings 
of that state of affairs (cf. XIX/2).  
This complication is a result of Husserl’s endorsement of a principle to the 
effect, roughly, that positings of objects can only be justified by experiences 
whose objects are structurally identical to those posited (cf. XIX/2 657 ff.). This 
allows that simple perceptions can justify positings of physical particulars. But it 
disallows that they can justify positings of states of affairs involving such 
particulars. And for Husserl, who takes it that positings of this kind can, in 
principle, be perceptually justified, this means that they can be thus justified 
only by categorial perceptions.57  
Given Husserl’s perceptual intuitionism, we can go on to ask different sorts 
of questions (cf. Hopp 2011, 190). One is how, exactly, the perception of an 
object, or the perceptual givenness of that object, justifies an actual positing of 
the object, when it does so. Husserl’s answer is, very roughly, that it does so by 
fulfilling the positing, in the sense of bringing the object, which is posited in a 
more or less empty way, to more or less complete originary givenness (cf. XIX/2 
566 ff.).58 Another question is by virtue of what the perception of an object, or 
the perceptual givenness of that object, constitute a justificatory ground for 
positing the object, even if it is not actually posited. This question is, arguably, 
the more fundamental. At any rate, Husserl’s answer to the first question would 
be incomplete without an answer to the second. For, in the absence of an answer 
to that question, it would not be clear how, exactly, fulfilling a positing could 
amount to justifying it.  
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57 Thus, Husserl can be seen to take a complex view of what Pryor calls the Premise 
Principle: “The only things that can justify a belief that P are other states that assertively 
represent propositions, and those propositions have to be ones that could be used as premises in 
an argument for P” (2005, 189). On the one hand, by maintaining that the perceptual givenness 
of an object can justify simple positings of it, Husserl denies the principle as a general constraint 
on justifiers. On the other, by holding that only what is itself categorially structured can fulfil, 
and thereby justify, positings of categorially structured objects, he can be seen to accept the 
principle, or a suitably modified version of it, as a constraint on justifiers of such positings.  
58 Husserl regards such fulfilments as “syntheses of identity” of a special kind. For 






On Husserl’s view, the most important reason why the perceptual 
givenness of an object is a justificatory ground for positing it is that it is 
indicative of the being of the object, or that it satisfies what, in Section 2.1, I 
called the Being Requirement on justificatory grounds. As he puts it in a 1915 
lecture course:  
Every experience [Erfahrung] evidently has a right [Recht] in itself. If I see a 
table, then I have a right to say: “That is a table”, the most evident right, a 
primordial right. For I see, precisely, the table itself in the flesh. And that is no 
coincidence, but it is an essential matter that experience has experiential right 
[Erfahrungsrecht] (XXXVI 118).  
That said, the perceptual givenness of an object indicates its being only in 
a relative or defeasible way. This is a consequence of the essential inadequacy of 
perception. For since no physical object can be adequately or absolutely given, 
the being-indicativeness of an instance of perceptual givenness depends 
essentially on the continued harmoniousness of the perceptual process to which 
it belongs. In the 1915 lecture course, Husserl puts the point as follows:   
The being of what is bodily there in the thing-perception is in principle a mere 
pretension; a justified one, in so far as the perception provides an originary 
justificatory ground [Rechtsgrund] for the statement that the thing is, and has 
the properties that appear. But it depends precisely on the further course and 
entire context of experience whether this justified pretension of being retains and 
sustains, and perhaps constantly further confirms, its justification—namely, if 
further experience, and first of all the further continuing harmonious progress of 
the perception, again and again justifiably motivates the positing of the being and 
being-thus of the thing (XXXVI 109). 
Husserl does not only take perceptual givenness to satisfy the Being 
Requirement, however. He also, in effect, holds that it satisfies the other two 
requirements on justificatory grounds that, together with this requirement, 
make up what I proposed to call his basic conception of justification. Perceptual 
givenness being a mode of givenness of physical objects—a way of being present 
to consciousness—he clearly takes it to satisfy the Awareness Requirement. And 
he equally clearly takes it to satisfy the Immediacy Requirement, holding, as he 
does, that it, like any other form of originary givenness, is an immediate 






Irrespective of the object-domain [Gegenständlichkeitssphäre] to which it may 
relate itself, cognition, as is well known, is immediate or mediate. That is: 
Cognitions, in the form of judgements that have a—perhaps limited—justificatory 
ground, draw their justification [Recht] either immediately from a being-grasping 
[seinserfassenden], “giving” act, in the way in which, for instance, a perceptual 
judgement immediately “expresses” (or explicates and expresses) what is “given” 
in a perceiving as actual; or they draw their justification from an inferential 
process that, with regard to the question concerning the justification of its 
“premises”, for its part lastly points back to immediately giving acts (III/2 534). 
In holding that the perceptual givenness of an object constitutes a 
defeasible immediate justificatory ground for positing it, Husserl endorses a 
view of perceptual justification with affinities to contemporary neo-Moorean or 
so called dogmatist views.59 The affinities are not restricted to the content of 
Husserl’s view, however, but extend to some of the uses to which he puts it. For, 
like the central proponents of the contemporary views concerned, and for 
similar reasons, Husserl holds that his view of perceptual justification has anti-
sceptical force, as I now wish to indicate. 
As noted in Section 2.4, Husserl holds that by clarifying the possibility of 
transcendent cognition, epistemology serves to overcome scepticism, by 
uprooting the “tendency towards scepticism” to which unclarity with regard to 
that possibility gives rise. The partial clarification of the essence of perceptually 
based cognition that his perceptual intuitionism supposedly provides represents 
one, if not the most, important example of this anti-sceptical strategy. A familiar 
range of sceptical arguments, the so called arguments from sceptical hypothesis, 
trade on the idea that perceptual justification is mediate, in the sense that the 
justification provided by our perceptions depends on non-perceptual 
justification for taking them to be non-deceptive.60 As we have seen, however, 
with his perceptual intuitionism Husserl rejects this idea, arguing that the 
perceptual givenness of an object is an immediate justificatory ground for 
positing it, one that does not depend on other justificatory grounds for its 
justificatory force. Indeed, he suggests that the very idea of asking for a 
justification of the justificatory force of an instance of perceptual givenness, and 
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60 For discussion of such arguments, see, for instance, Klein (1981), Stroud (1984), 
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originary givenness in general, is non-sensical. In a 1923 research manuscript 
he asks:  
What kind of reasonable questions can be posed to an evidence? And in what 
sense can they be posed? In the sense that is the Cartesian one, whether an 
evidence or a kind of evidence is at all “valid” or sound, and give justification for 
the belief that the object for whose being the cognizing subject has evidence is 
actual? (VII 335)   
And he suggests that the answer to this question is “no” when, a little later, 
he asks: “Is it not meaningless to throw the possibility of the soundness of an 
evidence into doubt?” (VII 336) 
With this, I have barely scratched the surface of Husserl’s discussions of 
scepticism, which merits far more attention than it has so far received.61 An 
adequate treatment of this topic requires the prior treatment of a number of 
other topics, however, including those addressed in the three present essays, of 
which I will now give a presentation.  
5.  Presentation of the Essays 
As already noted, the essays relate to the three themes delineated above, 
with the first concerning the subject matter of epistemology, the second 
concerning the methodology of epistemology, and the third concerning the 
epistemology of perception.  
5.1  Essay 1 
The immediate aim of the first essay is to specify the core of the problem of 
transcendence, or the “riddle of cognition” (Rätsel der Erkenntnis), as Husserl 
also calls it. As noted above, the problem concerns the possibility of 
transcendent cognition in general and rational transcendent cognition in 
particular. There are several concepts of transcendent cognition in Husserl, 
however. And it is not immediately clear in terms of which of these the problem 
is cast, and thus what, exactly, Husserl takes the problem to consist in.  
Getting clear about this is necessary for getting clear about the exact 
                                                   
61 For treatments of the topic in the literature, see, for instance, Aguirre (1970), Mertens 





nature of the epoché, which, as we recall, is to consist in a refraining from 
making use of transcendent cognition of the kind that the problem concerns. 
And getting clear about this is, in turn, important for at least two reasons.  
First, it is needed in order to see just what Husserl’s main 
metaepistemological claim—the claim that epistemology is possible only as 
phenomenology—actually amounts to. Without a specification of the epoché, the 
exact nature of what it supposedly leaves behind as a possible domain of 
investigation—the phenomenological residuum—would be left unclear. And 
Husserl’s main metaepistemological claim being more or less equivalent to the 
claim that epistemology is possible only as a pure description of this domain, 
this would also leave unclear the exact content of the former claim. 
Second, getting clear about the nature of the epoché is also needed in order 
to be able to evaluate Husserl’s case for his main metaepistemological claim. As 
we have seen, the requirement that any attempt to solve the problem of 
transcendence must involve performance of the epoché forms a crucial part of 
that case. And in the absence of a specification of the epoché, it will, therefore, 
be unclear both what the requirement actually comes to, and whether it can 
plausibly be satisfied. 
Despite its exegetical and systematic importance, the question of how to 
specify the core of the problem of transcendence has received little attention in 
the literature. Usually when discussing the problem, reference is made to one or 
another of the formulations that Husserl’s different concepts of transcendent 
cognition allows for, without much attempt being made to determine its relation 
to the others, and so determine whether or not it represents his ultimate 
specification of the problem. 
In my discussion, I make two basic claims. First, I argue that Husserl, in 
effect, formulates the core of the problem of transcendence in terms of four 
problems, where the first three correspond to three different Husserlian 
concepts of transcendence or transcendent objects. The first problem, which I 
designate as the problem of metaphysical transcendence, is to understand how 
there can be rational cognition of objects that have being in themselves, or what 
I propose to call metaphysically transcendent objects. The second problem, 





can be rational cognition of what could be called properly transcendent objects, 
where, roughly, an object is properly transcendent just in case it does not form a 
“proper” (reell) or non-repeatable part of the experience whose object it is. The 
third problem, which I term the problem of intuitional transcendence, is the 
problem of how there can be rational cognition of objects that are what I suggest 
calling intuitionally transcendent, in the sense of not being absolutely or 
adequately given. And the fourth problem, which I call the problem of defeasible 
cognition, is the problem of how defeasible rational cognition is possible, where 
a cognition is defeasible just in case it is based on defeasible justificatory 
grounds, grounds that fail to guarantee the being of the object for the positing of 
which they constitute grounds.  
Second, I argue that these formulations of the problem form a systematic 
sequence, leading from the first to the fourth, such that any later formulation in 
the sequence can be seen to constitute a specification of the core of the previous 
one. Thus, taking it that the problem of metaphysical transcendence represents 
Husserl’s initial formulation of the problem of transcendence, I seek to show 
that the core of that problem is specified in terms of the problem of proper 
transcendence, whose core, for its part, is specified in terms of the problem of 
intuitional transcendence, the core of which Husserl in effect specifies in terms 
of the problem of defeasible cognition, which, then constitutes his ultimate 
specification of the problem of transcendence.  
My discussion relates primarily to texts from what could be called 
Husserl’s middle period, which began with his so called transcendental turn 
around 1906, and ended with the publication of Ideen I in 1913.62 These texts 
provide Husserl’s clearest formulations of what I have called his argument from 
the problem of transcendence—that is, his attempt to show that epistemology is 
possible only as phenomenology by showing that only phenomenology can 
satisfy the methodological requirements that supposedly flow from the very 
nature of that problem, among which the alleged need for the epoché is the most 
crucial. In seeking to determine the core of the problem from which this 
argument takes off, I do not, however, follow Husserl’s account in any one 
                                                   






particular text. Instead, I take a modestly reconstructive approach, combining 
characterizations of the problem from different texts, so as to attempt to bring 
out what I take to be their systematic interrelations and significance. 
On what I regard as Husserl’s ultimate specification of it, then, the core of 
the problem of transcendence concerns the possibility of transcendent 
cognition, in the sense of defeasible cognition. This result is exegetically 
interesting for at least two reasons. 
First, it means that Husserl is committed to holding that only indefeasible 
cognitions are epistemologically admissible. For if the problem of 
transcendence, at its core, concerns the possibility of defeasible cognition, then 
the epoché supposedly required to solve it must consist in a suspension of any 
and all such cognition. And so the result means that Husserl’s claim that the 
problem of transcendence, and epistemological problems in general, are 
solvable only by phenomenology must be taken as equivalent to the claim, 
roughly, that they can be solved only through pure description of the essences of 
intentional experiences and their intentional correlates, not just as originarily 
given, but as indefeasibly given, or as given in indefeasible eidetic intuitions. 
Second, by the same token, the suggested specification of the core of the 
problem of transcendence means that the prospects for finding a coherent 
fallibilist view of epistemological cognition in Husserl look dim. As many have 
pointed out, the later Husserl would seem to allow that the forms of cognition 
by means of which the problem of transcendence, and other epistemological 
problems, are to be solved, need not, or need not all, be indefeasible.63 I cannot 
here enter the complicated discussion of what might be Husserl’s reasons for 
this view, and whether, at the end of the day, he would really commit to it.64 I 
merely want to note that, to the extent that Husserl construes the core of the 
problem of transcendence as the problem of the possibility of defeasible 
cognition, the requirement that any attempt to solve it must involve 
performance of the epoché effectively commits him to reject as incoherent any 
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epistemology on which epistemological cognition may be fallible.65 
In light of the supposed requisiteness of the epoché, the suggested 
specification of the core of Husserl’s problem of transcendence is also 
interesting from a contemporary systematic point of view. According to Husserl, 
an important instance of the problem concerns the question of how perceptually 
based cognition can be rational, or, more fundamentally, how the perceptual 
givenness of a physical object can constitute a defeasible justificatory ground for 
positing it. But questions such as these—roughly, questions concerning the 
capacity of perception to provide defeasible justification for belief—are in the 
forefront of contemporary epistemological debate.66 And so Husserl’s attempt to 
show that any attempt to answer them must involve performance of the epoché 
should be highly interesting, entailing, as it does, that no such attempt can rely 
on defeasible cognition of any kind.  
5.2  Essay 2 
Picking up the thread from the first essay, the second essay has two aims. 
The first is to clarify the basic structure of Husserl’s argument from the problem 
of transcendence. Doing so is important for at least two reasons. First, it is 
necessary for being able to assess the argument, and thereby assess what is 
arguably the principal way in which Husserl seeks to establish that epistemology 
is possible only as phenomenology. Second, in spite of its exegetical and 
metaepistemological significance, this task has yet to be taken up in a systematic 
way. 
The second aim of the essay is to evaluate Husserl’s case for one of the 
steps of the argument—the claim that solving the problem of transcendence 
requires performance of the epoché. Doing so is, again, important for at least 
two reasons. First, this step being the decisive step of the argument, evaluating 
Husserl’s case for it is crucial for evaluating the argument as a whole. Second, 
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much like the first task, this task has not really been taken up commentators, 
who, to the extent that they have considered Husserl’s case for his claim, have 
tended merely to restate it.67  
As noted above, Husserl’s clearest formulations of the argument from the 
problem of transcendence are to be found in texts from his middle period. So 
the textual basis for the second essay is more or less the same as the basis for 
the first. And as in the first essay, I take a modestly reconstructive, as opposed 
to a narrowly exegetical approach, combining elements from different texts into 
what I take to be an adequate representation of the gist of Husserl’s reasoning.  
For reasons of space, I do not attempt to reconstruct the entire argument, 
however, but restrict myself to identifying and describing what I regard as four 
of its basic premises. The first, which I call the Centrality Claim, states that the 
problem of transcendence is the central problem of epistemology, in the sense 
that any other epistemological problem is such only by virtue of being 
essentially related to the problem of transcendence. The second premise, which 
I call the No Transcendence Requirement, effectively coincides with the claim 
that any attempt to solve the problem of transcendence requires performance of 
the epoché, in the sense of a refraining from making use of transcendent or 
defeasible cognition. The third premise, which I term the Phenomenology 
Claim, states that phenomenological cognition, in the sense of pure descriptions 
of immanently perceived intentional experiences and their intentional 
correlates, and the essences of these as given in eidetic intuition, is the only 
form of non-transcendent or indefeasible cognition.  
From these premises it follows that phenomenological cognition is the only 
form of cognition admissible for solving the central problem of transcendence. 
It does not follow, however, that the problem can actually be solved by means of 
this form of cognition. In drawing that conclusion, Husserl can be seen to rely 
on a fourth premise. According to this premise, which I call the Clarification 
Claim, solving the problem of transcendence is a matter of clarifying the 
possibility of transcendent cognition, where to clarify the possibility of 
something consists in describing its essence on the basis of the originary 
givenness of that essence.  
                                                   





Even granted this premise, however, Husserl would not be able to reach 
his desired metaepistemological conclusion. For from the fact that the central 
problem of epistemology can be solved only by means of phenomenological 
cognition it does not immediately follow that any epistemological problem can 
only be thus solved. Due to limitations of space, though, I do not seek to identify 
the further premises on which Husserl must be seen to rely in drawing that 
conclusion. Instead, I turn to a consideration of his case for the second premise 
of the argument, the No Transcendence Requirement.  
As indicated in Section 3.1, Husserl can be seen to provide two arguments 
for this requirement. I argue that both of these are questionable. The first, 
which I propose to call the circularity argument, says that trying to solve the 
problem of transcendence by means of transcendent or defeasible cognition 
would be viciously circular. I maintain that there is strong reason to think that 
this argument fails. More specifically, I seek to show that although using 
transcendent cognition in attempting to solve the problem of transcendence 
would be circular in some sense, it is far from clear that it would be 
unacceptably so, if due account is taken of the fact that the problem of 
transcendence is a problem of understanding, and not of justification. The 
second argument, which I call the metabasis argument, says that transcendent 
cognition is simply not suited to solve the problem of transcendence, and that 
attempting to solve it by means of such cognition would therefore, in effect, be 
to replace it with another in an illegitimate way. I maintain that although it is 
not the clear that this argument fails, its success can be seen to hinge on two 
problematic assumptions: that to make the possibility of transcendent cognition 
intelligible can only consist in describing its essence on the basis of its originary 
givenness; and that this originary givenness must be an adequate or absolute 
one.   
Given that the No Transcendence Requirement is the decisive step of the 
argument from the problem of transcendence, these results give at least some 
reason to think that that argument fails. If it does, that would not, by itself, 
entail that the intended conclusion of the argument—that the problem of 
transcendence, and, by supposed implication, any genuine epistemological 





conclusion might be establishable by means of some other argument, one that 
does not rely on the No Transcendence Requirement. It is difficult to imagine 
what such an argument might look like, however. For an argument that did not 
rely on the No Transcendence Requirement would be one that did not appeal to 
the requisiteness of the epoché. And it is hard to see how such an argument 
might establish that epistemological problems can be solved only by means of 
phenomenological cognition given that, as we have seen Husserl hold, the 
epoché is the “method of access” to the domain to be investigated by means of 
cognition of this kind.  
If these suspicions are well founded, and no argument can establish that 
the problem of transcendence, and any other genuine epistemological problem, 
can be solved only by phenomenology, phenomenology would not, thereby, have 
been shown to be epistemologically irrelevant. But it would raise the question of 
what, exactly, that relevance would or could consist in.68 Saying this is not to 
deny that Husserl’s writings contain a wealth of epistemological analyses that 
might not depend for their viability on the viability of the metaepistemological 
framework in which he himself places them. It is just to point out that, absent 
that framework, it would no longer be clear in what sense, exactly, these 
analyses were to count as phenomenological. 
5.3  Essay 3   
As noted above, among the epistemological considerations of Husserl’s 
arguably separable from their original methodological context, perhaps the 
most important are those relating to the epistemic role of perception. With the 
third essay, I want to contribute to the assessment of these considerations. As 
we have seen, the core of Husserl’s epistemology of perception is what I have 
called his perceptual intuitionism—the view that the perceptual givenness of a 
physical object constitutes a justificatory ground for positing it. In the essay, I 
argue that this view would appear to be in tension with Husserl’s general view of 
epistemic justification. More precisely, I argue that fundamental aspects of 
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Husserl’s own analysis of perception give at least some reason to doubt that 
perceptual givenness satisfies the three requirements on justificatory grounds 
that constitute his basic conception of justification: the Being Requirement, the 
Awareness Requirement and the Immediacy Requirement.  
As noted above, Husserl clearly takes perceptual givenness to satisfy these 
requirements. That is, he holds, first, that the perceptual givenness of an object 
is being-indicative, in the sense of indicating that the object has being and 
actually has the features it is presented as having; second, that it is consciously 
available, in the sense of being something of which the perceiving subject is 
explicitly or implicitly aware; and, third, that it is an immediate justificatory 
ground, in the sense of a ground that does not depend on other grounds for its 
justificatory force.  
As I seek to show, however, these claims appear to sit uneasily with a 
fundamental tenet of Husserl’s theory of perception—namely, his idea of the 
horizonal or anticipatory structure of perception and perceptual givenness, or 
rather, his view of the basis for this structure. According to Husserl, the 
anticipations of future experience by which perception and perceptual givenness 
are co-constituted are not arbitrary, but motivated by justificatory grounds in 
the form of previous perceptions and instances of perceptual givenness. This, 
however, is to say that perceptual givenness is what I propose to call a rational 
mode of givenness: a mode whose instantiation for a subject requires the 
accomplishment of relevant rationally motivated intentions on her part—in this 
case, anticipations of future experiences or appearances of the object perceived. 
And this, I suggest, puts pressure on the idea that perceptual givenness satisfies 
the three requirements of Husserl’s basic conception of justification.  
With regard to the Being Requirement, I argue that there is reason to think 
that Husserl both must and cannot account for the supposed being-
indicativeness of perceptual givenness in terms of perceptual givenness being a 
rational mode of givenness. With regard to the Awareness Requirement, I argue 
that, when combined with the idea that perceptual givenness is a rational mode 
of givenness, the requirement would seem to entail that perceptual givenness is 
impossible, since it would then seem to demand that a perceiving subject can be 
                                                                                                                                                     





aware of all the previous perceptions by which her current perceptual 
anticipations are motivated. Finally, with regard to the Immediacy 
Requirement, I argue that the idea of perceptual givenness being a rational 
mode of givenness would seem to entail that perceptual givenness cannot be an 
immediate justificatory ground. For the idea would seem to entail that any 
instance of such givenness depends on other justificatory grounds for its 
justificatory force—namely, the previous perceptions by which the perceptual 
anticipations involved would be rationally motivated.   
The upshot of my discussion is that Husserl’s perceptual intuitionism 
would appear to be at odds with his basic conception of justification. This poses 
a challenge, not just for Husserlian epistemology of perception, but for any 
epistemology of perception that would want to combine a teleological, access 
internalist or foundationalist conception of epistemic justification with a view of 
perception and perceptual justification relevantly similar to Husserl’s. Thus, for 
instance, recognizing that perceptual givenness is a rational mode of givenness 
in the present sense would seem to put considerable pressure on current neo-
Moorean or dogmatist accounts of perceptual justification.   
In making my case, I leave out of consideration many complications 
relating to Husserl’s theory of perception, including the different ways it 
changed over the course of his thinking, and the many interpretations to which 
it has been subjected. I take this to be defensible, however. First, as already 
indicated, the problem arises from fundamental aspects of his theory, aspects 
that remained more or less invariant throughout the course of his thinking, and 
that any interpretation must recognize as crucial. Second, my aim in considering 
these aspects is not to establish that Husserl’s perceptual intuitionism is 
incompatible with his basic conception of justification, but merely to pose a 
challenge that, I believe, anyone whishing to combine the two would have to try 
to meet.69
                                                   





Husserl’s Riddle of Cognition 
 
Eine erkenntnistheoretische Arbeit von Jahrtausenden und 
doch nicht einmal die reinliche und klare Problemstellung! 
Aber hier von allem gilt es, daß die Problemstellung die 
größte wissenschaftliche Leistung ist. Der Weg von dunklen 
intellektuellen Unbehagen, von dem Gefühl der Unklarheit 
in betreff der Erkenntnissachlage bis zur reinen 
Herausstellung dessen, was hier vernünftigerweise zu 
fragen ist, ist ungleich viel größer als der Weg nachher bis 
zur Lösung (XXIV 340). 
 
Für den Anfang handelt es sich darum, die Art des 
Unklarheit zu klären, die das Motiv für eine immanente 
Phänomenologie und phänomenologische Kritik der 
“Vernunft” ist (XXXVI 41). 
 
 
What is the correct method in epistemology? Or, somewhat differently, what is 
the nature of epistemological cognition, the form of cognition by means of 
which epistemological problems are to be solved? The answer to this question 
must, at least in part, be dictated by the specific nature of the problems 
concerned. This, at any rate, is Husserl’s view: He holds that epistemology is 
possible only as phenomenology, in that genuine epistemological problems can 
be solved only by means of phenomenological cognition (XXXV 270). And, in a 
number of texts, he argues that this is so because the nature of the central 
problem of epistemology places certain methodological constraints on its 
solution, which constraints phenomenological cognition alone can satisfy (cf. M 
VII 74; XXXVI 41).1  
According to the line of argument developed in these texts, the central 
problem of epistemology is the “riddle of cognition” (Rätsel der Erkenntnis), 
which Husserl specifies as the “problem of transcendence” (Problem der 
Transzendenz) (cf. II 36; VII 367). On one formulation, this is the problem of 
how there can be “transcendent cognition” (transzendente Erkenntnis), or 
cognition of “transcendent objects” (transzendente Gegenstände), in the sense 
of objects that exist “in themselves” (an sich), or independently of mind (cf. 
XXIV 152, 369; M VII 5). And the most decisive constraint that, according to 
                                                   
1 Most of these texts belong to the transitional period from Husserl’s so-called 
transcendental turn around 1906 to his first comprehensive presentation of transcendental 
phenomenology in Ideen I in 1913. The most important are Husserliana XXIV, II and M VII, as 





Husserl, flows from the nature of this problem is that it cannot be solved by 
means of transcendent cognition, since trying to account for the possibility of a 
given kind of cognition by means of cognitions of that very kind would be 
viciously circular (X 346; XXXVI 83; IX 290 ff.).2 But, Husserl argues, the only 
form of non-transcendent cognition is phenomenological cognition—roughly, 
immediate reflective cognition of the essence of one’s conscious experiences 
construed, not as mental states of oneself as a human being, but as “pure” 
experiences belonging to oneself as a “pure” or “transcendental” ego (cf. III/1 
156 ff.). So, he concludes, the problem of transcendence, and, by extension, any 
other genuine epistemological problem, can be solved only by means of 
phenomenological cognition, which, then, constitutes the only form of 
epistemological cognition. 
One difficulty involved in assessing this argument from the problem of 
transcendence, or transcendence argument, as I shall call it, is that Husserl, as 
already indicated, offers several formulations of the problem of transcendence, 
each of which is cast in terms a different concept of transcendent cognition. So 
to see which conditions the above mentioned constraint places on 
epistemological cognition, and whether phenomenological cognition can 
plausibly meet them, one would need to determine the relation between these 
different formulations, and decide which, if any, is the ultimate one. 
Despite its importance when it comes to understanding and assessing the 
transcendence argument—which is arguably the central argument by means of 
which Husserl seeks to establish that epistemology is possible only as 
phenomenology—this task has not been taken up in the literature in a 
systematic way. In what follows, I want to contribute to remedying this. 
Husserl’s problem of transcendence is a complex one, however, and for reasons 
of space, I will only seek to determine its most basic form. In doing so, I will not 
be following Husserl’s exposition in any one particular text. Instead, I will be 
drawing on different texts, from which I will extract and combine different 
formulations of the problem, in order, thereby, to bring out a more or less 
                                                   
2 For an account of this requirement, see Lohmar (2002). For a critical discussion of it, 





explicit line of reasoning within which the formulations can be seen to form a 
sequence of increasing fundamentality.    
I begin by distinguishing the problem that figures in the transcendence 
argument from two other problems also described by Husserl as problems of 
transcendence, suggesting that it be designated as the problem of rational 
transcendence. I then give a general characterization of the problem, clarifying 
certain key aspects of it. I go on to present four specifications of the problem, 
related to four specifications of the concept of transcendent cognition, arguing 
that the most fundamental is its specification as what I propose to call the 
problem of defeasible cognition. I close with a brief consideration of the view of 
epistemological cognition to which, given the transcendence argument, Husserl 
would be committed by this specification.   
 
1.  The Threefold Problem of Transcendence 
As so far characterized, the riddle of cognition—the problem of 
transcendence that figures in the transcendence argument—is the problem of 
the possibility of transcendent cognition. There are at least three problems in 
Husserl characterizable in this way, however, each of which corresponds to a 
different concept of cognition. 
On the first and broadest of these, a cognition is an “intentional 
experience” (intentionale Erlebnis)—a conscious experience that has the 
inherent character of being “of” or “directed on” something (VII 377). That on 
which such an experience has the character of being directed Husserl calls its 
“intentional object” (intentionale Gegenstand) (XIX/1 414; cf. IX 430). The 
intentional object of an intentional experience is not a particular kind of entity 
with a particular kind of being, but simply that on which the experience has the 
character of being directed, whatever it might be (cf. XIX/1 438 ff.).3 Indeed, 
intentional objects need not even exist (XIX/1 386; cf. XXV 148). So the class of 
potential Husserlian intentional objects is extremely broad, including anything 
on which a given experience can be directed, which, for Husserl, includes 
                                                   
3 As so construed, Husserl’s conception of intentional objects would be what Crane calls a 
schematic, as opposed to a substantial conception (2001, 15 ff.). I should note that this construal 
is controversial. For a similar interpretation, see Drummond (1990) and Meixner (2006). For an 





everything that may figure as a subject of predication (M III 145, 153; III/1 15; M 
VII 87).  
The problem of transcendence corresponding to this concept of cognition 
is to understand how experiences can be intentionally directed on transcendent 
objects (cf. XXIV 153; XXXVI 26; XXX 341 f.). Let us refer to this as the problem 
of mere transcendence. The problem can be seen to arise from two assumptions. 
The first is that intentional directedness is what Husserl calls an “intentional 
relation” (intentionale Beziehung), whose relata are intentional experiences and 
the objects on which they are directed (XIX/1 385 f.). The second is that 
intentional relations cannot be construed as real relations, since real relations 
require the existence of their relata, and intentional objects, as we have seen, 
need not exist.4 And this makes it unclear how they are to be construed.5 
On Husserl’s second concept of cognition, a cognition is what could be 
called a veridical intentional experience—an experience whose directedness on, 
or intending of, its object is true or correct in the sense that the object 
concerned actually exists or has “being” (Sein) (cf. VII 377). The problem of 
transcendence corresponding to this concept of cognition is to understand how 
positings of transcendent objects can be veridical in this sense. We could refer to 
this as the problem of veridical transcendence, or the problem of how veridical 
transcendent cognition is possible. This problem, too, can be seen to arise from 
two assumptions. The first is that the possibility of veridical intentional 
experiences would be unintelligible unless the logical categories and laws by 
which, supposedly, any correct intending of objects is determined and 
normatively regulated—categories such as subject and predicate, and laws such 
as the law of non-contradiction—somehow corresponded to the ontological 
categories and laws of reality as it is in itself (cf. XXIV 390 f.). The second is that 
                                                   
4 As Smith and McIntyre put it, Husserlian intentional relations are “existence-
independent” (1982, 13 ff.). 
5 Husserl will attempt to construe them in terms of intentional experiences having what 
he calls a “sense” (Sinn) or “signification” (Bedeutung), which supposedly determines both 
which object the experience is directed on, and which features the object is presented as having 
(II 19). It is important to see, however, that with this proposal Husserl does not so much take 
himself to be offering a solution to the problem of mere transcendence, as offering a heading for 
such a solution. Thus, having maintained that “‘thinking relates itself’ to things that are not 
immanent to it, and that, when they have being at all, have being in themselves, through its 
immanent significational content [immanenten Bedeutungsgehalt]”, he goes on to ask: “But, 





it is, initially, unclear how they could so correspond. In Husserl’s words: “What 
do the things in themselves care about our ways of thinking and the logical laws 
that govern them?” (II 3/1)6  
On Husserl’s third concept of cognition, or what he calls the concept of 
cognition “in the pregnant sense”, a cognition is a rational intentional 
experience, which is an experience of which the following is true (cf. VII 377; 
XXXVI 26 f.; M III 76). First, it involves a “positing” (Setzung) of its intentional 
object, where to posit an object is to take it to have “being” (Sein) (cf. XIX/1 
499).7 Second, the positing involved is “rational” (vernünftig), in the sense of 
being motivated by “justificatory grounds” (Rechtsgründe), grounds that 
provide epistemic justification for it (cf. VII 377).  
Husserl can be seen to place at least three requirements on justificatory 
grounds.8 The first is that they be being-indicative, in the sense, roughly, of 
making it likely that the object posited has being, where guaranteeing that this 
is so would be the upper limit of making it likely (cf. VII 377; XXIV 154). The 
second is that they be reflectively accessible (cf. XXIV 130; XXXVI 84; XXX 
316). And the third is that they be either immediate or mediate, where, roughly, 
an immediate ground is one that does not depend on other grounds for its 
justificatory force, and a mediate ground is one that does depend for its 
justificatory force on other grounds, at least one of which must be immediate 
(cf. XXIV 136; III/1 326).  
The problem of transcendence corresponding to this concept of cognition 
is, initially at least, that of understanding how positings of transcendent objects 
can be rational in the sense just delineated—in the sense, that is, of being 
motivated by immediate or mediate being-indicative justificatory grounds of 
which the subject is suitably aware.9 Let us refer to this as the problem of 
                                                   
6 See also, for instance, XXV 185 ff. and XXXVI 47. This problem is similar to what 
McGinn calls the “matching problem”, the problem of how our concepts can “match” the 
properties of things (1989, 11 f.). 
7 To be precise, this would be what Husserl calls ”doxic” positing, which he distinguishes 
from various other forms of positing (cf. III/1 268 ff.).  
8 For a more detailed account of these conditions, see Essay 3. 
9 I say “initially at least” since, as I will argue below, the problem does not, ultimately, 
seem to concern the possibility of rational positings of objects of a certain kind—transcendent 
ones—but the possibility of rational positings motivated by justificatory grounds of a certain 





rational transcendence, or the problem of how rational transcendent cognition 
is possible. Of the three problems considered, this is the problem Husserl 
regards as the central problem of epistemology, and the one that figures in the 
transcendence argument (cf. XXXVI 7 f.).10 In what follows, therefore, this is 
also the one I will be focusing on, and the one I shall have in mind when 
referring simply to the problem of transcendence.  
 
2.  The General Nature of the Problem 
Before turning to see how, exactly, Husserl construes the problem of 
transcendence, I want to make two points with regard to its general nature. 
First, the problem is not a problem of justification, but what could be called a 
problem of understanding. That is, the problem is not whether transcendent 
cognition is possible, but how it is possible. And so the task it poses is not to 
justify that such cognition is possible, in the face of sceptical arguments to the 
contrary, but to make intelligible what such cognition is or consists in, by 
clarifying its “sense” (Sinn) or “essence” (Wesen) (VII 378).11 Indeed, taking 
scepticism about the possibility of transcendent cognition to derive wholly from 
a lack of clarity with regard to its essence, Husserl argues that the former task 
can seem meaningful and pressing only as long as the latter has not been 
successfully discharged (cf. XXIV 397; VII 67). 
Second, the problem cannot, it seems, be the problem in what Husserl calls 
its “anthropological” formulation, but must be the problem in what he calls its 
“radical” or “pure” formulation. In its anthropological formulation, the problem 
concerns the possibility of human transcendent cognition. In Husserl’s words: 
“How is cognition of something that is (or can be) transcendent to 
consciousness possible for us human beings?” (XXV 137) In its pure 
formulation, by contrast, the problem concerns the possibility of transcendent 
cognition as such: “How is it possible that something transcendent to cognizing 
                                                   
10 On the centrality of this problem for Husserl, see Naberhaus (2007, 250 f.) 
11 Husserl argues that such clarification must take the form of descriptions of the essential 
structures of intuitively given instances of transcendent cognition (M III 73). Although a crucial 
part of his view of the method by which the problem of transcendence can and must be solved, 
this claim does not form part of his basic specification of the problem itself, and I will therefore 





consciousness becomes cognizable in it?” (XXV 137)  
The reason why it seems that the problem would have to be the problem in 
its pure formulation is that the problem in its anthropological formulation is 
incoherent, or so Husserl argues. For to ask how human transcendent cognition 
is possible is to ask how a certain kind of transcendent object—“us human 
beings”—can achieve cognitive contact with certain other kinds of transcendent 
objects. And this is to take the general possibility of cognizing transcendent 
objects for granted, and so is to assume the solution to the problem to be solved 
in the very formulation of it (XXV 137; cf. I 116).12 But, taking it that the 
problem that figures in the argument from the problem of transcendence—the 
problem that the argument is to show can only be solved by means of 
phenomenological cognition—must be a coherent one, this would seem to entail 
that the problem cannot be the problem in its anthropological formulation.13 
And, assuming further that the only other available formulation of the problem 
is the pure one, this in turn entails that the problem must be the problem in this 
formulation.  
That this is so is also suggested by the texts. For instance, in a 1906/07 
lecture course, at the beginning of a long description of the problem that will 
figure in a later formulation of the transcendence argument, he writes: 
It is to be noted that in the rest of the exposition the problem of objectivity 
constituting itself in subjectivity is nowhere interpreted as if the genuine problem 
lies in the relation to empirical and, say, human subjectivity (XXIV 149/150). 
That said, there is a consideration suggesting that the problem figuring in 
the transcendence argument must, rather, be the problem in its anthropological 
formulation. Note first that, in its pure formulation, the problem can only be 
seen to concern what Husserl calls “pure” cognition, and by which, very roughly, 
                                                   
12 Formulating the problem in terms, not of the plural “us human beings”, but of the 
singular “I human being” would be of no help here, on Husserl’s view. For in asking how 
transcendent cognition is possible for me as a human being, I would be asking how such 
cognition is possible for me as an embodied being located in objective space. And so I would still 
be taking the general possibility of transcendent cognition for granted (XXV 137 f.; cf. XXXIV 
288).  
13 Husserl’s argument for the incoherence of the anthropological formulation of the 
problem could be challenged. At least this is so if we take the problem to be, not whether, but 
how natural cognition is possible, as we have seen we should. For to presume that I am able 





he means cognitions construed without relying on any transcendent cognitions 
whatsoever (cf. II 7). As a notion of something construable without reliance on 
any kind of transcendent cognition, however, the notion of pure cognition is 
unavailable in what Husserl calls the “natural attitude”—roughly, the cognitive 
perspective we occupy just in case we make cognitive use of transcendent 
cognition of some kind or other (cf. II 17). The notion is available only in the 
“phenomenological attitude”—again roughly, the cognitive perspective that is to 
be established, precisely, by way of a thoroughgoing refraining from making 
cognitive use of transcendent cognitions, or what Husserl calls an 
“epistemological reduction” (II 48; XXIV 214) or “epoché” (XXIV 189; XIII 80). 
And this is to say that the problem of transcendence in its pure formulation is 
available only in the phenomenological attitude, and that it is available in the 
natural attitude only in its anthropological formulation.14  
Now, the transcendence argument must be conducted within the natural 
attitude. For this is the attitude in which we ordinarily find ourselves, and the 
attitude in which we first encounter the problem of transcendence—in Husserl’s 
words, it represents the “position of the beginner” with which any “systematic 
theory of cognition must … itself begin” (XXV 144). And the very point of the 
argument is to bring us to see that the problem can be solved only by means of 
phenomenological cognition, and hence by adopting the phenomenological 
attitude. And the argument cannot, therefore, presuppose that this attitude has 
already been adopted. But if the argument must be conducted in the natural 
attitude, then the problem that figures in it must be available in that attitude. As 
we have just seen, however, the problem cannot be available in the natural 
attitude in its pure formulation, but only in its anthropological formulation.  
It seems, then, that we face a dilemma: On the one hand, the requirement 
that the problem figuring in the transcendence argument be coherent entails 
that it must be the problem in its pure formulation. On the other hand, the 
requirement that the problem be available in the natural attitude entails that it 
                                                                                                                                                     
to how I am able to do so. (For discussion of this point, see Essay 2.)  
14 According to Husserl, in the phenomenological attitude, the problem in its pure 
formulation will, more specifically, take the form of the problem of understanding how 
transcendent being is ”constituted” in complexes of ”pure consciousness” (cf. II 12 ff., 75 f.; III/1 
Part 4). Needless to say, this problem can be no more available in the natural attitude than can 





must be the problem in its incompatible anthropological formulation.  
How, if at all, can this dilemma be resolved? One way of trying to do so 
would be to accept the first horn of the dilemma, and blunt the second by 
arguing that although the problem in its pure formulation is not explicitly 
available in the natural attitude, it is still somehow implicitly available. More 
specifically, one might try arguing that the pure formulation of the problem is 
available in the natural attitude in a nascent form that announces itself, and 
provides a motive for considerations like the transcendence argument, in and 
through its distorting anthropological formulation. Husserl, at any rate, seems 
in effect to attempt to deal with the dilemma in something like this way. For 
instance, having indicated the supposedly intractable difficulties that traditional 
epistemology, with its reliance on the anthropological formulation of the 
problem, runs into, he writes:  
Of course, our opinion cannot be that theory of cognition as such is an empty 
heading, and not rather a heading for big and fully peculiar problems, indeed for 
the biggest problems that the human power of reasoning in general is faced with. 
That which provides the impetus for any transcendental philosophy, even an 
erroneous one, is an unclarity that already in the natural attitude becomes a 
philosophical torment, the unclarity of how the relation, which remains in the 
immanence of consciousness, to objects of consciousness—and, at the highest 
level, the relation involved in scientific cognition of cognized objects—can be 
understood, what this relation really means, how the transcendence that 
constitutes itself in the context of the cognizing consciousness itself, and the 
cognizing that accomplishes this achievement, themselves can be rationally 
clarified (XXXV 271). 
I cannot here attempt to develop and assess this approach to the 
dilemma.15 Instead, I will simply assume that something like it can be made to 
work, and take it that the problem figuring in the transcendence argument is the 
problem in its pure formulation. However, since I am interested in determining, 
not just the problem that figures in the argument, but also the problem as it 
figures in the argument, or the problem in the form it assumes as a putative 
motive for adopting the phenomenological attitude, I will not consider it as it is 
                                                   
15 One difficulty facing the approach is that it would seem to require construing the 
distinction between the natural and the phenomenological attitude as less radical than Husserl 
usually takes it to be (cf. Fink 1933). For if the problem of transcendence in its pure formulation 
is available in the natural attitude, even in a nascent, distorted form, then that attitude cannot, it 
seems, be wholly distinct from the phenomenological attitude, the attitude in which, supposedly, 





explicitly available in that attitude—that is, as a specifically phenomenological 
one. Instead, I want to consider the pure formulation of the problem in the form 
it assumes when announcing itself in its anthropological formulation, while 
disregarding the anthropologizing effects of that formulation. In the terms of 
the passage just quoted, I want to consider the “unclarity that already in the 
natural attitude becomes a philosophical torment” in the form in which it makes 
itself felt when it, supposedly, “provides the impetus for any transcendental 
philosophy”.  
As already noted, however, I will only attempt to determine what I called 
the basic form of the problem—the form of the problem of which its other form 
are complications. And I will do so by considering four Husserlian specifications 
of the problem, and the relations between them.  
 
3. The Problem of Metaphysical Transcendence 
As described so far, the problem of transcendence concerns the possibility 
of rational positings of objects that are transcendent in the sense of existing in 
themselves, independently of being cognized. For lack of a better term, I will 
refer to transcendence in this sense as metaphysical transcendence; and I will 
designate the problem of how rational positings of metaphysically transcendent 
objects are possible as the problem of metaphysical transcendence.16 In a 
formulation of the problem of transcendence from a 1908 research manuscript, 
where the “lived experiences” referred to are rational intentional experiences of 
various kinds, Husserl in effect specifies it in just this way:17  
How is it to be understood that in such connections of lived experiences, called 
“cognitions”, I can achieve cognition of an object that exists in itself, whether or 
not it is cognized? (XXXVI 23) 
As it turns out, however, this cannot be taken as Husserl’s ultimate 
specification of the problem. To see this, let us begin by asking in what, exactly, 
                                                   
16 The term is admittedly somewhat unfortunate. For by ‘metaphysical transcendence’ 
(metaphysische Transzendenz), Husserl on at least some occasions means something that is not 
just an sich, but also in principle uncognizable, which metaphysically transcendent objects in 
the current sense are not (cf. VII 248). 
17 For similar formulations of the problem, see XXIV 150, 339; II 3, 25; XXXVI 41 ff.; and 





the problem of metaphysical transcendence is supposed to consist. Why should 
the possibility of positing metaphysically transcendent objects in a rational way 
pose a mystery? A passage from the 1906/07 lecture course previously cited 
suggests an answer:  
The trivial truism [Selbstverständlichkeit] that there are things [Sachen] in 
themselves and that we just appear on the scene and grasp them, regard them, 
make statements about them, etc. turns into a mystery. Knowing about things in 
themselves means having a subjective experience called “knowing”, and if the 
things are not something itself occurring at the same time in the human 
consciousness, like a feeling, a sensation, and so on, then all talk about knowledge 
seems fictional. No knowing can go beyond itself. It is precisely knowing, 
consciousness, and not something that is not consciousness (XXIV 153/151). 
According to this, the possibility of rational positings of metaphysically 
transcendent objects is mysterious because it entails that there can be rational 
positings of objects that are not experiences or occurrences in consciousness (cf. 
M VII 50). More specifically, the supposedly problematic entailment is that 
there can be rational positings of objects that are not experiences belonging to 
the positing experiences themselves as “proper” (reelle) parts—roughly, parts 
that come into being and cease to exist with the experiences to which they 
belong (cf. II 35; III/1 74). This is already indicated by the two last sentences of 
the passage, and it is further suggested by other formulations of the problem of 
transcendence:  
[T]he cognitive act, the cogitatio, has proper moments [reelle momente] properly 
constituting it. But the physical thing, which it means and supposedly perceives, 
remembers and so on, is not properly to be found in the cogitatio itself, as an 
experience; it is not to be found in the experience as a piece [Stück], a being that 
is really contained therein. So the question is: how can the experience so to speak 
go beyond itself? (II 35/27 f.) 
Specified as the problem of metaphysical transcendence, then, the problem 
of transcendence would appear to be the problem of how a positing can be 
rational when the object posited does not form a proper part of the positing 
experience itself. But to specify the problem in this way is, in effect, to specify it 
in terms of a different Husserlian concept of transcendence, on which an object 
is transcendent precisely if and only if it does not form a proper part of the 





this sense as proper transcendence.18 Given this, it would seem that the problem 
of transcendence may also be specified as what could be called the problem of 
proper transcendence, or the problem of how rational positing of properly 
transcendent objects is possible. And Husserl does, in fact, specify the problem 
in this way:  
I do not now ask: How can consciousness go beyond itself; but, rather, how can it 
become certain of the legitimacy [Rechtmäßigkeit] of its judging. How does the 
“actual world”, which is not a cogitatio in consciousness, authenticate its being in 
the cogitationes—that is, before that tribunal before which it must authenticate 
itself—if it is justifiably [rechtmäßig] to count for this consciousness as the actual 
world? (XXXVI 7 f.)19 
To so specify the problem is, however, implicitly to deny that it may also be 
specified as the problem of metaphysical transcendence—at least ultimately.20 
For, despite what the above passages may suggest, Husserl’s concept of proper 
transcendence is broader than his concept of metaphysical transcendence. 
Among the objects falling under the former, but not under the latter, are 
cognized experiences belonging to streams of consciousness other than that of 
the cognizing subject herself, or to past phases of her own stream.21 These do 
clearly not have being in themselves, but just as clearly they are not proper parts 
of the cognitions whose objects they are (cf. III/1 87). Also included, on 
Husserl’s view, are such things as beautiful and useful objects, or, more 
precisely, the axiological and practical determinations by virtue of which certain 
physical objects qualify as beautiful and useful. Unlike physical determinations 
like extension and colour, which, according to Husserl, have being in themselves 
                                                   
18 Ingarden calls this “ontic” transcendence (1992, 177 ff.), and Willard refers to it as 
“ontological” transcendence (1995, 158). 
19 My translation of this passage draws on Naberhaus’s translation in his (2007, 250). 
20 This is not to say that, on Husserl’s view, there are no special problems relating to the 
possibility of rational positings of metaphysically transcendent objects. It is just to say that, 
judging from the passages cited, the mystery with which it supposedly presents us derives, not 
from the fact that the objects rationally posited are metaphysically transcendent, but from the 
fact that they are properly transcendent. Consequently, we need to distinguish between what 
could be called the general problem of proper transcendence, which concerns the very 
possibility of properly transcendent rational acts, and a range of specific problems concerning 
the possibility of specific kinds of such acts, acts directed on objects that are metaphysically 
transcendent as well as acts directed on objects that are not.  
21 To be sure, cognized experiences belonging to streams of consciousness other than the 
subject’s own have being in themselves in relation to her stream of consciousness. But they do 





(IV 59), such determinations depend for their being on certain kinds of 
intentional experiences—in this case, experiences of evaluation and practical 
intention (IV 14 f.; IX 118). Yet, they do not depend on these experiences in the 
sense of forming proper parts of them. The beauty of the statue I see is present 
as a determination, not of my experience of seeing the statue, but of the statue 
itself: What I see is, precisely, the beauty of the statue (cf. IV 8 f.).  
 
4. The Problem of Proper Transcendence 
Assuming that the riddle of cognition may be specified as the problem of 
proper transcendence, what exactly is this problem? Why should the possibility 
of positing properly transcendent objects in a rational way be so mysterious? To 
see how Husserl answers this question, it will be useful first to take a look at 
why he regards the possibility of rational positings of properly immanent 
objects as readily intelligible, where a properly immanent object is one that does 
belong to its experience as a proper part. What Husserl calls “immanent 
perception” (immanente Wahrnehmung) provides an example—indeed, for 
him, the only example—of such positings. Roughly speaking, a Husserlian 
immanent perception is a rational positing of a current experience belonging to 
the same stream of consciousness as it itself does. As such, Husserl argues, it is 
an intentional experience whose object belongs to it as a proper part, or, as he 
also puts it, forms an “unmediated unity” with it (III/1 78). And this, he 
maintains, means that the rationality of the involved positing is unproblematic:  
[T]he rationality of the positing of something that the positing consciousness 
contains within itself is beyond question. In reflective experience is, say, the 
desire on which the I directs its experiential gaze is not just transcendently 
supposed; the desire is not just the intentional object of the experience, but at the 
same time properly [reell] integrated in it. By contrast, where I posit a physical 
thing and, in general, a transcendency, there I posit something that does not 
enter into the consciousness of it with its proper essence [Eigenwesen] (XXXVI 
82). 
Why is the rationality of immanent perception beyond question? This 
passage indicates an answer:  
We do not understand how perception can reach what is transcendent; but we 
understand how perception, in the form of reflective and purely immanent 





Well, we directly see and directly grasp what we mean in the manner of seeing 
and grasping. ... Seeing, or the grasping of what is selfgiven, in so far as it is actual 
seeing and actual selfgivenness in the strictest sense, and not another sort of 
givenness, which intends [meint] something that is not given—this is an ultimate. 
It is an absolute self-evidence [Selbstverständlichkeit] (II 49 f./39 f.). 
According to this, the possibility of rationally positing properly immanent 
objects is unproblematic because such objects can be “selfgiven” (selbstgegeben) 
in Husserl’s strictest sense of the term. To see what this claim amounts to, note 
first that for an object to be selfgiven in the present sense is for it to be 
“adequately” given, where to be thus given is to be “bodily selfgiven” (leibhaft 
Selbstgegeben) in an absolute way (cf. III/1 319 ff.). Bodily selfgivenness is a 
“mode of givenness” (Gegebenheitsweise) of intentional objects, by which 
Husserl means, roughly, a way of being present to consciousness. It contrasts 
with two other modes of givenness. As selfgivenness it contrasts with modes in 
which an object is present, not “as itself”, but only as represented by some other 
object, like a sign or an image (III/1 90). And as bodily selfgivenness it contrasts 
with modes in which, although present as itself in the sense of not being 
represented by another object, an object is not present “in the flesh”, but only as 
“presentiated” (vergegenwärtigt), or “as if” present in the flesh, as it supposedly 
is when it is present as, for instance, remembered or phantasized (III/1 90; XXV 
169).  
Now, instances of bodily selfgivenness may vary in different ways, of which 
I will here mention two. First, they may vary with regard to the specific type of 
bodily selfgivenness involved. For, Husserl argues, to every basic kind of 
intentional objects there corresponds a way of being bodily selfgiven that is 
proper to objects of that kind (III 10 f.; 321). For instance, intentional 
experiences, spatio-temporal particulars and states of affairs involving spatio-
temporal particulars have their own distinct ways of being bodily selfgiven. 
Second, as already suggested above, instances of bodily selfgivenness may vary 
with regard to their degree of bodily selfgivenness—that is, with regard to the 
extent to which the attributed features of the objects given are bodily selfgiven.22 
Absolutely bodily selfgiven objects, then, are objects all of whose features are 
                                                   
22 These two dimensions of variability are closely related, on Husserl’s view, since, he 





bodily selfgiven. They contrast with relatively bodily selfgiven objects, objects 
only a more or less restricted range of whose features are bodily selfgiven. 
Let us return to Husserl’s claim that the possibility of rational positings of 
properly immanent objects is unproblematic. As we now can see, his reason for 
this claim—that properly immanent objects can be adequately given—amounts 
to the claim that such objects can be present to consciousness in such a way that 
all of their features are bodily selfgiven. I will not attempt to determine the 
correctness of this claim here.23 What matters at present is that it suggests a 
reason why the possibility of rationally positing properly transcendent objects 
should be problematic—namely, that unlike properly immanent objects, 
properly transcendent objects cannot be present to consciousness in this way. It 
suggests, in other words, that the problem of transcendence, construed as the 
problem of proper transcendence, amounts to the problem of how positings of 
objects that are not adequately given may be rational. But to so construe the 
problem is, in effect, to specify it in terms of a yet another Husserlian concept of 
transcendence, on which an object is transcendent precisely if and only if it is 
not adequately given (II 35; XXIV 234; XIII 171). Intentional experiences whose 
objects are adequately given being characterized as “adequate intuitions” 
(adäquate Anschauungen), we could refer to transcendence in this sense as 
intuitional transcendence.24 Given this, it seems that the problem of 
transcendence can, or can also, be specified as what we might call the problem 
of intuitional transcendence, or the problem of how rational positing of 
intuitionally transcendent objects is possible.  
As the following formulation of the problem indicates, Husserl does, 
indeed, specify it in this way:  
[H]ow can cognition posit something as being that is not directly and truly given 
in it? (II 35/28) 
                                                                                                                                                     
general nature (III/1 321).  
23 Husserl’s justification for the claim is, roughly, that conscious experience are not 
spatial, and therefore have no sides or aspects that would be “hidden” in an immanent 
perception of them (cf. III/1 88).  
24 Ingarden refers to this as one of four epistemological concepts of transcendence in 






Again, characterizing the problematic feature of the forms of cognition whose 
possibility falls within the scope of the problem, he writes:  
[W]hat is not self-evident, problematic, and perhaps even mysterious concerns 
the transcending intending [Meinen], that is, the intending, believing, and even 
elaborate justifying of something that is not given (II 50/40). 
And yet again, referring to transcendent cognition:   
[I]ts transcendence is questionable; the being of the objectivity 
[Gegenständlichkeit] to which it relates itself in so far as it is transcendent is not 
given to me, and in question is, precisely, how that objectivity can still be posited, 
and what sense it has and may have, if such positing is to be possible (II 46/36).  
However, to specify the problem as the problem of intuitional 
transcendence is also to deny that it can, ultimately, be specified as the problem 
of proper transcendence. For despite what the above presentation may suggest, 
Husserl’s concept of intuitional transcendence is narrower than his concept of 
proper transcendence. Specifically, he holds that whereas all intuitionally 
transcendent objects are properly transcendent, some properly transcendent 
objects may be intuitionally immanent, where an object is intuitionally 
immanent just in case it is adequately given. Supposed examples of such objects 
include certain abstract or, in Husserl’s terms, “ideal” (ideale) objects, objects 
like universals or essences and mathematical states of affairs (II 51, 60). Take 
the essence red—roughly, red conceived as what all red things have in common. 
This object is surely properly transcendent, Husserl argues: It can figure as the 
identical intentional object of different intentional experiences—I can think of 
the essence red at several different times and in several different ways—and it 
cannot, therefore, constitute a proper part of any one of them. Yet, it can also, 
Husserl insists, be intuitionally immanent. For, unlike particular red things, the 
essence red does not have any hidden sides or aspects preventing it from being 
capable of being adequately given (II 56 f.). I will not attempt to decide whether 
or not Husserl is right to hold that properly transcendent objects can be 
intuitionally immanent.25 What is important here is only that his doing so 
implies that the problem of transcendence cannot, on his view, ultimately be 
                                                   
25 The later Husserl came to have misgivings about this claim. See, for instance, VIII 33 f., 





specified as the problem of properly transcendent cognition. For it implies that 
some rational positings of properly transcendent objects will be no more 
mysterious with respect to their possibility than will rational positings of 
properly immanent objects—namely, those whose objects are intuitionally 
immanent. 
 
5.  The Problem of Intuitional Transcendence  
Taking it that the problem of transcendence is to be specified as the 
problem of intuitional transcendence, in what does the problem consist? Why 
should the possibility of rationally positing objects that are not adequately given 
be so enigmatic? To answer this question, let us begin by asking why Husserl 
claims that the possibility of positing adequately given objects in a rational way 
is unmysterious, which, as we have seen, he does.  
Note first that, on Husserl’s view, adequate givenness is sufficient for 
apodictic givenness, where an object is apodictically given just in case it is 
reflectively recognizable as guaranteed to be actual or have being (cf. VIII 35; I 
55 f.). Thus, for instance, in the case of properly immanent objects, Husserl 
attributes what he regards as their indubitable being precisely to their being 
adequately given:  
What is properly immanent qualifies as indubitable, precisely because it does not 
present anything else, does not “mean” anything “beyond” itself, because what is 
here meant is also fully and wholly adequately selfgiven (II 5/3). 
And he says of immanent perception that it guarantees the being of its object on 
account of the fact that the latter is adequately given, or given as an “absolute 
self”, as he puts it here:  
Every perception of something immanent necessarily guarantees the existence of 
its object. If the reflective grasping directs itself on my experience, then I have 
grasped an absolute self, whose existence is not negatable—that is, the insight 
that it does not exist is in principle impossible; it would be a countersense to 
regard it as possible that an experience that is given in this way does not exist 
(III/1 96/100). 
His justification for the claim is, very roughly, that if an object is 
adequately given, it cannot come to be bodily selfgiven in a different way, or 





does, that bodily selfgivenness is the “originary”, or most fundamental, mode of 
givenness of intentional objects, he takes this to mean that the object must then 
be actual (cf. VIII 31 ff.).26 
Now, assuming, as Husserl does, that an object’s being adequately given 
can provide a motive for positing it, the claim that adequate givenness is 
sufficient for apodictic givenness suggests a reason why the possibility of 
positing intuitionally immanent objects in a rational way should be readily 
intelligible. For, since the adequate givenness of an object must, necessarily, be 
reflectively accessible, the claim would imply that any positing of an adequately 
given object that is motivated by its adequate givenness will, thereby, be 
motivated by a reflectively accessible item that guarantees the being of that 
object. And, given that rational positings are positings motivated by Husserlian 
justificatory grounds—that is, reflectively accessible and being-indicative 
motives for positing—it is hard to see what could provide a clearer instance of 
rational positing than such a positing. For what could be a better example of a 
Husserlian justificatory ground than a reflectively accessible item that indicates 
the being of an object in the sense of guaranteeing it (cf. III/1 317)? 
However, Husserl does not only claim that adequate givenness is sufficient 
for apodictic givenness. He also, as a rule, claims that it is necessary (VIII 35). 
And this suggests a reason why the possibility of positing intuitionally 
transcendent objects in a rational way should not be readily intelligible. For it 
implies that, unlike positings of intuitionally immanent objects, positings of 
intuitionally transcendent objects cannot, in principle, be motivated by the 
reflectively recognizable guaranteed being of the objects posited. And this may 
be seen to make it unclear how such positings could still be rational in Husserl’s 
sense. For what could serve as their motivating justificatory grounds? How, or 
in what sense, can a reflectively accessible item indicate the being of an object 
when it cannot do so in the sense of guaranteeing it? 
                                                   
26 Bodily selfgivenness is the most fundamental mode of givenness of intentional objects 
in the sense that whereas it is not dependent on any other mode of givenness for its possibility, 
all other modes is thus dependent on it: The givenness of an object as “presentiated” depends on 
the possibility of objects being bodily selfgiven since such givenness has the inherent character 
of being a modification of bodily selfgivenness (III/1 233). And the givenness of an object as 
represented by another object depends on the possibility of bodily selfgivenness since the 
representing object must, ultimately, be either a bodily selfgiven or a presentiated one (cf. III/1 





That this is, in fact, the supposed reason why the possibility of rational 
positings of intuitionally transcendent objects should be problematic is also 
suggested in a more direct way by the texts. Thus, for instance, in the context of 
discussing the justificatory force of perception of physical objects, or “outer 
perception” (äussere Wahrnehmung), which Husserl takes to be a form of 
immediate rational cognition whose objects can never be apodictically given, he 
writes: 
If immediate experiential cognition (in the form of perception and, thereby, 
immediate cognition of any kind whatsoever) were such an absolutely clear and 
indubitable grasping of a being-in-itself that every doubt as to whether … the 
cognized does not exist would be fully non-sensical and excluded, then everything 
would be in order. So, to the extent that cognition leads back to absolute 
selfgivenness, which excludes every doubt as non-sensical, is it no mystery 
[Rätsel]. This requirement the cognition of nature [Naturerkenntnis] does not 
satisfy (XXXVI 46). 
And again:  
The absolute givenness is essentially unproblematic precisely in the sense of the 
problem of transcendence. Positing of a factual existent that is not given itself in 
the absolute sense is enigmatic just because it is not given itself. If we possess and 
if we apprehend something itself without going beyond what is truly given itself 
in our meaning, stating and judging, then it makes no sense to doubt (X 
352/363). 
On the present construal, the possibility of positing intuitionally 
transcendent object in a rational way is problematic because intuitionally 
transcendent objects cannot be apodictically given, and because positings of 
such objects cannot, therefore, be motivated by their reflectively recognizable 
guaranteed being. And this is to say that, construed as the problem of intuitional 
transcendence, the problem of transcendence amounts to the problem of how 
positings based on grounds that fail to recognizably guarantee the being of the 
objects posited can still be rational, or how grounds of this kind can still 
constitute justificatory grounds. It is, in other words, to say that the problem 
amounts to what could be called the problem of the possibility of defeasible 
cognition, in the sense of rational positings based on defeasible justificatory 
grounds—grounds that fail to recognizably guarantee the being of the objects for 
which they constitute grounds—or the problem of the possibility of grounds of 





How does the problem of intuitional transcendence relate to the problem 
of defeasible cognition? In most of the relevant texts, Husserl in effect takes the 
problems to be equivalent, arguing, as he there does, that adequate givenness is 
not just sufficient, but necessary for apodictic givenness (cf. VIII 35). For this 
view entails that all and only intuitionally transcendent cognitions are 
defeasible. At least one text suggests a different answer, however. In 
Cartesianische Meditationen he denies that adequate givenness is necessary for 
apodictic givenness (I 55). And this entails that at least some intuitionally 
transcendent cognitions are indefeasible, and hence that the problem of 
intuitional transcendence and the problem of defeasible cognition are not 
equivalent after all.  
For this reason, and because the problem of defeasible cognition in any 
case constitutes the core of the problem of intuitional transcendence, as we have 
seen, I take this problem to represent Husserl’s ultimate specification of the 
problem of transcendence. I now want to consider some aspects of the problem 
as so specified.  
 
6. The Problem of Defeasible Cognition 
As I have argued, the heart of the problem of defeasible cognition concerns 
the possibility of defeasible justificatory grounds. To see more clearly what this 
problem consists in, note first that, on Husserl’s view, both mediate and 
immediate justificatory grounds may be defeasible: To characterize a ground as 
immediate is not, in and of itself, to say anything about the strength of the 
justification it provides, but only about the conditions of that justification—
namely, that it does not depend on justification provided by other justificatory 
grounds (cf. III/1 51). Add to this that, as Husserl also holds, any justificatory 
ground is either immediate, or suitably related to an immediate ground, and it 
follows that the basic question concerning defeasible justificatory grounds must 
be the question of the possibility of immediate grounds of this sort: How, or in 
what sense, can an immediate justificatory ground indicate the being of an 
object when it cannot do so in the sense of recognizably guaranteeing it? 
To see what this question, for its part, amounts to, note further that 





ground (cf. III/1 51). Indeed, recognizing different kinds of immediate 
justificatory grounds, he takes bodily selfgivenness to be the most basic ground 
of this sort. That said, he also holds that the degree of justification, or being-
indicativeness, provided by instances of bodily selfgivenness varies with their 
degree of such givenness (cf. III/1 51). We have already seen him claim that the 
being-indicativeness of instances of absolute bodily selfgivenness is itself 
absolute, in the sense that any such instance guarantees the being of the object 
given. What we should now note is that he also holds that the being-
indicativeness of instances of relative bodily selfgivenness is itself relative, in the 
sense that they do not, in most cases at least, guarantee the being of the objects 
concerned, and this for parallel reasons:27 If the attributed features of an object 
are not all bodily selfgiven, then the object could come to be bodily selfgiven in a 
way different from how it is presently given, or come to be recognizable as not 
being capable of being bodily selfgiven at all, which means that it could turn out 
to be different from how it is presently given as being, or turn out not to be at all 
(cf. XXXVI 109).  
Given this, the basic question of the possibility of immediate defeasible 
justificatory grounds can, more precisely, be taken as the question of how the 
relative bodily selfgivenness of an object can constitute an immediate 
justificatory ground for positing that object, when its indicating the being of the 
object cannot be a matter of guaranteeing it. For Husserl, one instance of this 
question concerns outer perceptual givenness: that is, the way in which physical 
objects are present to consciousness when they occur as objects of outer 
perception. Outer perceptual givenness is a form of bodily selfgivenness—the 
one specific to physical objects, the mode of givenness in which they are most 
originarily present to consciousness (III/1 11). So the perceptual givenness of a 
physical object constitutes an immediate justificatory ground for positing it 
(XXXVI 118; III/1 319). Outer perceptual givenness is only a relative form of 
bodily selfgivenness, however: For a feature of a physical object to be bodily 
selfgiven in the strict sense is for it to be sensuously present. But outer 
perception is necessarily perspectival, in that it must present its object from a 
                                                   
27 I say “in most cases” to allow for the later Husserl’s view, noted in the previous section, 





certain point of view, one determined by the position of the perceiver’s body. 
And, since physical objects are essentially spatial, this means that any 
perceptually given physical object will be present as having features that are not 
bodily selfgiven in the strict sense—features pertaining to its flanks, rear and 
insides—which will be present in a non-sensuous, more or less “empty” manner 
(XVI 51; XI 18 f.). And so, although the perceptual givenness of a physical object 
is an immediate justificatory ground for positing the object, it can never 
constitute an indefeasible ground for doing so (cf. XXXVI 109; III/1 319).  
According to Husserl, however, the question of how the perceptual 
givenness of a physical object can constitute a justificatory ground for positing it 
is not merely an instance of the general question of the possibility of immediate 
defeasible justificatory grounds. It is also the most important instance of that 
question. For he takes it that perceptual givenness constitutes the ultimate 
ground, not just for any cognition relating to the natural world, whether 
scientific or non-scientific, but for any non-phenomenological cognition 
whatsoever (cf. XIII 121; EU 13). And lack of clarity with regard to how it can 
constitute a justificatory ground would, therefore, entail a lack of clarity with 
regard to the rationality of any such cognition.    
 
7.  Conclusion 
 On the specification I have arrived at, Husserl’s riddle of cognition, 
construed as the problem that figures in the transcendence argument, is the 
problem of how defeasible cognition is possible. And the core of this problem is 
the problem of how there can be defeasible immediate justificatory grounds, in 
the form of relative bodily selfgivenness, outer perceptual givenness in 
particular. 
Returning to the question with which I began, this means that Husserl 
must be seen to be committed to a very strong view of the nature of 
epistemological cognition, on which a form of cognition is epistemological only 
if it is indefeasible. According to what I called his transcendence argument, as 
we recall, the problem of transcendence cannot, on pain of circularity, be solved 
by means of cognitions of the kind whose possibility it concerns. But if the 





say it cannot be solved by means of such cognition, or equivalently, that it can 
be solved, if at all, only by means of indefeasible cognition. And if, as Husserl 
holds, what applies to the form of cognition required to solve the problem of 
transcendence applies to epistemological cognition in general, this is, in turn, to 
say that no form of cognition qualifies as epistemological unless it is 
indefeasible.  
A consequence of this is that Husserl cannot consistently hold that 
phenomenological cognition may be defeasible, and still serve as a means for 
solving the problem of transcendence, or any other genuine epistemological 
problem. To be sure, the later Husserl might appear to hold just this, as many 
have noted.28 Given the above, however, to the extent that phenomenological 
cognition is defeasible, it will fail to qualify as a form of epistemological 
cognition, let alone as the only form of such cognition.29  
  
                                                   
28 See, for instance, Føllesdal (1988), Welton (2002, Ch. 6) and Crowell (2013, Ch. 4). 
Crowell suggests that Husserl could derive the philosophical need for phenomenological 
cognition, not from the demand that philosophical cognition be apodictic, but from the demand 
that it promote “ultimate self-responsibility”, where this does not require that it be apodictic 
(2013, 94). This suggestion fails to take into account, however, that unless one rejects the 
circularity argument just indicated, which Husserl never did, the demand that epistemological 
cognition be apodictic cannot consistently be given up. The same point applies to Poellner’s 
suggestion that “nothing of significance is lost to [Husserlian] phenomenology if it contents 
itself with claiming, for most of its results, an epistemic distinction less ambitious than 
apodicticity” (2007, 416). 
29 I am grateful to Frode Kjosavik, Nicolas de Warren and Ingunn Larsen for helpful 









Husserl’s Argument from the Problem of Transcendence  
 
 
What is the epistemological relevance of Husserlian phenomenology? 
Husserl’s writings contain a wealth of analyses of particular subjects at the heart 
of contemporary epistemological debate, the epistemic role of perceptual 
experience in particular.1 However, they also contain strong and interesting 
claims about the very nature of epistemology, according to which epistemology, 
construed as the theory of the possibility of objective cognition, is possible only 
as phenomenology:2  
If we disregard the metaphysical aims of the critique of cognition [Erkenntniskritik], and 
keep purely to its task of clarifying the essence of cognition and the object of cognition, 
then it is phenomenology of cognition and the object of cognition and forms the first and 
principal part of phenomenology as a whole (II 23/18). 
Husserl also puts the claim by saying that genuine epistemological problems can 
be formulated only as phenomenological ones, which, for him, is equivalent to 
saying that any such problem can be solved only by means of phenomenological 
cognition:  
The rightful problems of epistemology [Erkenntnistheorie] can … only be posed on the 
ground offered by phenomenology. All radical epistemological problems are 
phenomenological; and all other problems that, beyond those, can be designated as 
epistemological, including the problems of the correct “interpretation” of actually existing 
nature and the results of the sciences concerned with it, presupposes the pure 
epistemological problems, the phenomenological ones (XXV 189). 
Husserl offers different considerations in support of this view, one of 
which takes its point of departure from a certain view of the requirements for 
solving what he calls the “riddle of cognition” (Rätsel der Erkenntnis), and 
specifies as the “problem of transcendence” (Problem der Transzendenz) (II 36; 
M VII 76, 91 f.). My purpose in what follows is to reconstruct parts of this 
argument from the problem of transcendence, or transcendence argument, as I 
                                                   
1 For a comprehensive attempt to show the relevance of Husserl’s early phenomenology of 
perception for issues in contemporary epistemology of perception, see Hopp (2011).  





shall call it, and consider Husserl’s case for one of these parts.3 
I begin with a brief presentation of the problem of transcendence. I then 
present what I take to be four of the main premises of the transcendence 
argument, before turning to assess the two arguments Husserl can be seen to 
provide in support of what is arguably the most decisive of these. Arguing that 
the arguments are either unsuccessful or in need of significant elaboration and 
defence, I close by noting some consequences of this for Husserlian 
metaepistemology.   
  
1.  The Problem of Transcendence 
On its most general formulation, the problem that figures in the 
transcendence argument is the problem of how “transcendent cognition” 
(transzendente Erkenntnis) is possible. There are several problems 
characterizable in this way in Husserl, however, each of which corresponds to a 
different concept of transcendent cognition.4 So to see what the problem of 
concern to us here consists in, we must first of get clear about the concept of 
transcendent cognition involved.   
On Husserl’s broadest use of the term, a cognition is an “intentional act” 
(intentionale Akt) (VII 377; M VII 49, 103)—roughly, a conscious experience 
that has the inherent character of being “of” or “directed” on something, where 
the latter constitutes its “intentional object” (intentionale Gegenstand) (XIX/1 
414). On the interpretation I shall be relying on here, a Husserlian intentional 
object is not an object of a particular kind, but simply that on which an 
intentional act has character of being directed, whatever it might be (cf. XIX/1 
438 ff.). For instance, the intentional object of an “outer perception” (äußere 
Wahrnehmung) is the physical object perceived; the intentional object of an act 
of reflecting on an outer perception is that perception; and the intentional object 
of an act of thinking about what Husserl would call the “essence” (Wesen) of 
                                                   
3 This argument represents the predominant way in which Husserl seeks to motivate his 
transcendental phenomenology in the transitional phase that spanned the period between his so 
called transcendental turn around 1906 and the publication of Ideen I in 1913. The most 
relevant texts are Husserliana XXIV, II and M VII, and parts of XXXVI, VII and VIII, which all 
contain somewhat different versions of the argument. My reconstruction may be taken as an 
attempt to articulate part of the core of these different versions.  





outer perceptions—the invariant features by virtue of which they are the kind of 
experiences they are—is that essence.5  
On what Husserl calls the pregnant sense of the term, however, a cognition 
is a “rational act” (Vernunftakt), by which he means an intentional act of which 
the following holds (cf. VII 377; XXXVI 26 f.; M III 76.). First, the act involves a 
“positing” (Setzung) of its intentional object—roughly, a taking the object to 
have “being” (Sein) (cf. XIX/1 499).6 Second, the positing in question is 
“rationally motivated” (vernünftig motiviert), in that it is based on “justificatory 
grounds” (Rechtsgründe), grounds providing epistemic justification for it (cf. 
VII 377).  
On Husserl’s more or less explicit view of justificatory grounds, any 
justificatory ground must meet three requirements. First, it must be being-
indicative, in the sense, roughly, of making it likely that the object for the 
positing of which it constitutes a ground has being and actually has the features 
it is posited as having, where guaranteeing that this is so would be the upper 
limit of making it likely (cf. VII 377; XXIV 154). Second, it must be something of 
which the subject has suitable implicit or explicit awareness (XXIV 130; XXX 
316). Third, it must be either immediate or mediate, where, roughly, an 
immediate justificatory ground is one that does not depend on other 
justificatory grounds for its justificatory force, and a mediate justificatory 
ground is one that is suitably related to an immediate ground (XXIV 136; III/1 
326).7 Thus, an intentional act is rational in Husserl’s sense only if it involves a 
positing of its intentional object, where the positing is based on an immediate or 
mediate being-indicative ground of which the positing subject has suitable 
awareness.  
Now, transcendent cognition of the kind whose possibility the problem of 
transcendence concerns is a kind of rational act. To see what characterizes it, 
note must be taken of a further element of Husserl’s theory of epistemic 
                                                   
5 On the current interpretation, then, Husserl’s concept of an intentional object would be 
what Crane calls a schematic, as opposed to a substantial, concept of an object (2000, 15 ff.). For 
a defence of this interpretation, see Drummond (1990). See also Meixner (2006). For an 
alternative interpretation, see Smith and McIntyre (1982). 
6 Strictly speaking, this would be what Husserl calls “doxic” positing, which is one of 
several forms of positing recognized by him (cf. III/1 268).  





justification: namely, his view that the “originary givenness” (originäre 
Gegebenheit) of an intentional object constitutes an immediate justificatory 
ground for positing it. Originary givenness is a “mode of givenness” 
(Gegebenheitsweise) of intentional objects, a way of being present to 
consciousness. For an object to be originarily given is, roughly, for it to be 
present as “itself”, or “in the flesh”, as opposed to, say, being present as 
represented by some other object, or as merely imagined or thought about (III/1 
90; M VII 108 f.).  
Husserl holds that all categories of objects have their own particular way of 
being originarily given (III/1 10 f.). For instance, whereas physical objects are 
originarily given in outer perception, intentional acts are originarily given in 
acts of reflection or “immanent perception” (immanente Wahrnehmung), and 
essences are originarily given in acts of so called “ideation” (Ideation) or “eidetic 
intuition” (eidetische Anschauung). That said, Husserl also holds that objects 
can be originarily given to different degrees, where the degree of givenness is 
determined by the extent to which their features are present in the flesh, and 
where an object is “adequately given” just in case all of its features are thus 
present. And he further holds that whether or not an object can be adequately 
given depends on its general kind (III/1 321). Physical objects, for instance, 
cannot be adequately given, since, being spatial, they will always be perceived as 
having features that are not present in the flesh—namely, features relating to 
the sides of the object that are “hidden” from the perceiver’s current perspective 
(XVI 51; XI 18 f.). By contrast, intentional acts can be adequately given, Husserl 
argues, since they are not spatial, and will therefore not be perceived as having 
any “hidden” sides or features (cf. III/1 88).8   
According to Husserl, then, all forms of originary givenness constitute 
immediate justificatory grounds for positing objects of the relevant kinds (III/1 
51). Thus, the outer perceptual givenness of a physical object, the immanent 
perceptual givenness of an experience, and the eidetic intuitedness of an essence 
                                                   
8 As many have noted, Husserl later came to have reservations about, or even reject, the 
claim that intentional acts can be adequately given. (See, for instance, Crowell 2013, 86.) This 
notwithstanding, the claim forms parts of the transcendence argument, as we shall see. And 
since my purpose here is to consider this argument, I will not take these reservations into 





all provide immediate justification for positing the objects given. Different 
forms of originary givenness provide justification to different degrees, however, 
with the degree of justification provided by an instance of givenness being 
determined by its degree of bodily selfgivenness. Specifically, Husserl argues, 
the adequate givenness of an object recognizably guarantees the being of the 
object, and thereby constitutes an “apodictic”, absolute or indefeasible 
justificatory ground for positing it (VIII 35). By contrast, the inadequate 
givenness of an object does not guarantee its being, and therefore constitutes 
only a relative or defeasible ground for positing it (cf. III/1 319).  
Now, Husserl offers several more or less explicit specifications of the 
concept of the transcendent cognition whose possibility the problem of 
transcendence concerns. On what is arguably his most fundamental explicit 
specification, transcendent cognition is cognition of non-adequately given 
objects. More precisely, a transcendent cognition is a rational act where the 
positing involved is motivated by a justificatory ground other than the adequate 
givenness of the object posited (II 46, 50). As a rule, however, Husserl holds 
that the adequate givenness of an object constitutes not just a, but the only 
indefeasible ground for positing it (cf. VIII 35).9 And it seems clear that when he 
regards as problematic the possibility of positings motivated by grounds other 
than the adequate givenness of the objects posited, it is because such positings 
cannot be motivated by indefeasible grounds, and that it is therefore unclear in 
what sense they can be construed as rational (cf. XXXVI 46; X 352). But this 
suggests that, on what would seem to be the ultimate specification of the 
concept of transcendent cognition in terms of which the problem of 
transcendence is cast, transcendent cognition is defeasible cognition: rational 
acts whose positings are motivated by defeasible grounds, in the sense of 
grounds that fail to recognizably guarantee the being of the objects posited.10 
Given this, the problem of transcendence that figures in the transcendence 
argument can also be specified as the problem of how defeasible cognition is 
                                                   
9 I say “as a rule” since, in some late texts, Husserl allows that, in some cases at least, 
something other than the adequate givenness of an object can constitute an indefeasible ground 
for positing it (cf. I 55).   






possible. For future reference, it is important to emphasize that the problem is 
not whether transcendent or defeasible cognition is possible, but how it is 
possible. We can put this by saying that the problem of transcendence is not a 
problem of justification, but a problem of understanding: The task it poses is 
not to justify that there can be transcendent or defeasible cognition, but to make 
intelligible what such cognition essentially is or consists in.11 Referring to the 
general task of epistemology, Husserl writes:  
It should not be said that cognition, true and genuine cognition, is never given, that for 
every cognition epistemology has first to decide whether it is valid or not, and that prior 
to that it lacks any inherent justification. … Certainly, it is correct that logic establishes 
laws under which any cognition stands, that the critique of cognition [Erkenntniskritik] 
provides clarifications under whose generality all cognitions fall. But this is not to say that 
before logic and the critique of cognition are constituted, and called upon for normative 
evaluation [Normierung], no cognition is a cognition, that no cognition carries its 
legitimation of right [Rechtsausweis] within itself (XXIV 196).  
And, in a different text, he describes the aim of epistemology as follows:      
[W]hat we want to understand is what these so called acts of intuition, of thinking, of 
cognition actually are, and what it is about them that makes them mean this or that in 
this or that way. We want to study what belongs to their immanent essence and to the 
sense of their meaning [Meinen], study the immanent relations and laws that are 
grounded therein (VII 378; Husserl’s emphasis). 
It is also important to emphasize that the problem is entirely general: It 
does not concern the possibility of this or that kind of transcendent cognition, 
but the possibility of transcendent cognition as such. That is, it concerns the 
possibility of any and all forms of rational positings based on defeasible 
grounds, or grounds other than the adequate givenness of the objects posited, 
irrespective of whether these objects are physical things, experiences, essences, 
or some other kind of object. 
                                                   
11 This is something of a commonplace among commentators. Thus, Sokolowski writes: 
“Husserl does not want to prove that we encounter objectivity; he accepts that as a patent fact, 
but he does want to explain how it is possible, how it can be understood (1970, 39). Willard 
makes much the same point: “[W]hen [Husserl] asks how a certain kind of knowledge is 
possible, the ‘how’ is not a sceptical ‘how’, and does not mean ‘whether’. Rather, he is inquiring 
only about the means, or the nature of the specific structures and processes, through which 
subjective experiences succeed in cognitively grasping independent and publicly accessible 
objects” (1984, 5). And in a similar vein, after having stated that “[the] epistemological concern 
is not the predominant theme of phenomenology,” Mohanty says: “The concern is rather about 
what is involved in knowledge (as well as in other sorts of experience, moral, aesthetic) than in 
justifying any cognitive (or other non-cognitive) claims. The motive of ‘blocking scepticism’—





2. The Transcendence Argument 
I turn now to what I have called Husserl’s transcendence argument: his 
attempt to use a consideration of the requirements for solving the problem of 
transcendence to show that epistemology is possible only as phenomenology, or, 
equivalently, that any genuine epistemological problem can be solved only by 
means of phenomenological cognition. As noted, I will not attempt to 
reconstruct the entire argument, but will only seek to identify some of its main 
premises. In doing so, I will not be following Husserl’s exposition of the 
argument in any one particular text, but will be extracting, combining and 
condensing elements from different texts, thereby giving a presentation of what 
I take to be the core of his reasoning. 
The first question to ask is why solving the problem of transcendence 
should be so important. What may be taken as the first main premise of the 
transcendence argument can be seen as an attempt to answer this question:  
(Centrality Claim): The problem of transcendence is the central problem of epistemology.  
That Husserl endorses some such claim, and that he does, in fact, take it to 
form part of the transcendence argument, is suggested by the following passage, 
which occurs in the course of one of his most explicit formulations of the 
argument:     
Transcendence is the initial and leading problem of the critique of cognition 
[Erkenntniskritik]. It is the riddle that stands in the path of natural cognition, and forms 
the impetus for new research. One could at the outset designate solving this problem as 
the task of the critique of cognition, and thereby give the new discipline its first 
preliminary delimitation, instead of more generally designating the problem of the 
essence of cognition as such as its theme (II 36/28). 
Husserl’s endorsement of something like the Centrality Claim is also suggested 
by his arguing that the problem of transcendence is “essentially one” with the 
totality of possible problems of cognition:  
The questions of transcendence in immanence are essentially one [wesensmäßig eins] 
with the total complex of possible questions of cognitions as such, and all questions that 
can concern the universe of essential occurrences [Wesensvorkommnisse] of pure 
immanence (VII 367).12 
                                                   





Although these passages clearly indicates that Husserl regards the problem 
of transcendence as epistemologically central in some sense, they do not make it 
clear what, exactly, that sense is. A prima facie plausible interpretation would 
be to take him to hold, roughly, that any other epistemological problem is such 
only by virtue of being essentially related to the problem of transcendence, 
either as a problem the solving of which is required for solving that problem, or 
as a problem for the solving of which solving that problem is required. 
Assuming that the problem of transcendence is the central problem of 
epistemology, in this or some other relevant sense, what are the requirements 
for solving it? The next main premise of the transcendence argument provides a 
partial answer to this question:  
(No Transcendence Requirement): The problem of transcendence cannot be solved by 
means of transcendent cognition.  
In Husserl’s words:   
The problem of the How (how transcendent cognition is possible, and more generally: 
how cognition in general is possible) can never be solved on the basis of pregiven 
knowledge of what is transcendent, of pregiven propositions thereof, taken no matter 
from where, even from the exact sciences (II 38/30). 
He also puts the requirement by saying that solving the problem of 
transcendence demands the performance of an “epistemological reduction” (II 
48; XXIV 214, 240), or “epoché (XXIV 189, 195, 207; XIII 80), by which he 
means a refraining from “making use” of transcendent cognition.13 On the 
current construal of the term, to make use of a cognition in solving a problem 
means, roughly, to base the solution to the problem, in whole or in part, on the 
supposed veridicality of that cognition (XXIV 213 ff., 370; II 6). Thus, I would 
be making cognitive use of my justified belief that I am six feet tall in solving the 
                                                   
13 Husserl also refers to this operation as, inter alia, phenomenological reduction (II 6; 
XXIV 211; XXXVI 175; III/1 69), transcendental reduction (III/1 125; III/2 563; VIII 82; IX 473 
f.) and transcendental-phenomenological reduction (III/2 642 f.). However, he also uses these 
terms to designate a more comprehensive operation that, for present purposes, and very 
simplified, can be construed as consisting of the former operation taken together with the 
phenomenological clarification of the possibility of transcendent cognition to be delineated 
below. (For discussion of the place of the epoché within this more comprehensive operation, see 







problem of whether I will fit in a particular bed, if I were to use it as basis for 
concluding that I will not fit in that bed. For, in so doing, I would be basing my 
solution to the problem on its being the case that I am six feet tall. By contrast, I 
would not be making cognitive use of that belief in solving the problem of 
determining what I am currently thinking, if I were to use it as a basis for the 
higher-order belief that I justifiably believe that I am six feet tall. For, in so 
doing, I would be basing my belief, not on its being the case that I am six feet 
tall, but only on its being the case that I believe that this is so.  
Given this, the No Transcendence Requirement can be put by saying that, 
in solving the problem of transcendence, one can never make use of 
transcendent or defeasible cognitions, in the sense of basing one’s conclusions 
on their supposed veridicality. Leaving consideration of Husserl’s proposed 
justification for this requirement for Section 3, here I only want to note one of 
its supposed implications—namely, that no solution to the problem of 
transcendence can, in any way, rely on the supposed existence of the natural 
world. For, Husserl argues, any belief in the existence of the natural world must, 
ultimately, be based on outer perception, perception of physical objects (cf. XIII 
121; III/1 56 ff.; XXV 15). As we have seen, however, physical objects can never 
be adequately given in perception, and so any cognition based on outer 
perception will be transcendent or defeasible. To rely on the supposed existence 
of the world, then, would be to rely on the supposed veridicality of transcendent 
or defeasible cognition, which, as just noted, is precisely what the No 
Transcendence Requirement prohibits.  
Assuming that the problem of transcendence can be solved, if at all, only 
by means of cognition of some sort, the No Transcendence Requirement entails 
that it can be solved only by means of non-transcendent or indefeasible 
cognition—cognition based on indefeasible justificatory grounds, grounds that 
recognizably guarantee the being of the objects for the positing of which they 
constitute grounds. In Husserl’s words, it is “in the nature of the problem” that 
the investigation by which the problem is to be solved must be conducted 





exhibited and seen as absolute there” (XXIV 200/196; cf. II 60 f.).14      
This brings us to the third main premise of the transcendence argument, 
which might be put as follows:  
(Phenomenology Claim): Phenomenological cognition is the only kind of non-
transcendent cognition.  
The premise can be seen to rest on two claims. The first is that only two 
kinds of objects can be adequately given. One of these is one’s current 
intentional acts, which are adequately given in immanent perception (II 29 ff., 
49 f.). We should note that what is adequately given in such perception does 
not, according to Husserl, include only what he calls the “proper” (reelle) 
contents of the acts perceived—that is, the non-repeatable parts and features 
unique to them as temporal occurrences. Included are also their “non-proper” 
(irrelle) contents, by which he means, roughly, their intentional objects 
considered as, and only as, their intentional objects, or what he calls their 
“intended objects as intended” or “noemata” (cf. M VII 54 ff.; III/1 202 ff.).15 
The other kind of object that can be adequately given are the essences of one’s 
intentional acts and their noemata, which can be thus given in eidetic intuition 
(cf. M VII 83, 88).16 Given Husserl’s previously mentioned view that the 
adequate givenness of an object constitutes the only indefeasible ground for 
positing it, this is equivalent to saying that there are only two kinds of 
indefeasible grounds—namely, intentional acts and their noemata, and the 
                                                   
14 As will become clear in Section 3, the presumed reason why only cognitions based on 
“absolute givens” are fit as means for solving the problem of transcendence is not the mere fact 
that, as based on such grounds, they will be indefeasible, but the fact that, as indefeasible, they 
will not exhibit the problem that is to be solved by their means (cf. M VII 50, 74; M III 90). 
Thus, Poellner is wrong to attribute Husserl’s demand that phenomenological cognition be 
indefeasible or “apodictic” to a commitment to the “classical foundationalist aspiration to 
provide philosophy with a set of basic non-inferential propositions that are known with 
certainty to be true” (2007, 415). As just indicated, and as we shall see in more detail later, the 
demand must, rather, be attributed to a concern for the need to avoid a certain kind of 
presumed inconsistency.  
15 This, at any rate, is Husserl’s view from around 1906, or thereabouts. The exact nature 
of Husserlian noemata, and their relation to actual objects, is a matter of controversy. For two 
influential conflicting views, see Smith and McIntyre (1982) and Drummond (1990). Taking a 
stand on this issue is not required for present purposes, and I will therefore leave it aside. 
16 Strictly speaking, from the time of Ideen I at least, Husserl takes the set of possible 
indefeasible grounds to include also the adequate givenness of the subject of pure acts, or what 
he calls the “pure I” (III/1 123). However, since this complication does not matter in what 





essences of both of these, as adequately given. And so he can claim that 
“transcendental subjectivity”—the investigative sphere left behind after 
performance of the epoché—contains “the only store of apodictic immediacies, 
of absolutely indubitable experiential givens” (VIII 41). 
The second claim is that a cognition is phenomenological just in case it is 
based exclusively on grounds of these kinds, the latter in particular. More 
specifically, and very roughly, a phenomenological cognition in the strict sense 
of the term is one that is based only on the adequately given essences of 
intentional acts and their noemata, in the sense of consisting in no more than 
accurate descriptions of these essences as thus given (cf. III/1 156 ff.).  
Before we move on, we should note that the acts on whose eidetically 
intuited essences phenomenological cognition is supposedly based cannot, 
according to Husserl, be construed as psychological acts, in the sense of mental 
states of human beings. For, as so construed, they could not be taken to be 
adequately given, and thereby as constituting indefeasible grounds, since they 
would then be taken to belong to denizens of the natural world, none of whom 
can, as noted, be adequately given. Taking it that refraining from making use of 
non-adequate or defeasible cognition would leave us with our acts and their 
essences as possible grounds for positing, Husserl concludes that both they, as 
adequately given, and the originary intuitions whose objects they are must be 
construed, not as psychological, but as “pure” experiences—pure in the sense of 
being rationally positable without any reliance on transcendent cognition, 
perceptual or otherwise (II 7, 45; XXIV 209 ff.; 215 f.). 
Together the No Transcendence Requirement and the Phenomenology 
Claim entail that phenomenological cognition is the only epistemologically 
admissible kind of cognition—that is, the only kind of cognition by means of 
which the problem of transcendence can be solved, if it can be solved at all. This 
is not sufficient for Husserl, however, who also wants to establish that 
phenomenological cognition is epistemologically fecund, in the sense of being a 
kind of cognition by means of which the problem of transcendence can actually 
be solved. 
With this we reach what may be seen as the fourth main premise of the 





(Clarification Claim):  To solve the problem of transcendence is to clarify the possibility 
of transcendent cognition. 
This premise, too, can be seen to rest on two claims. The first is the 
previously noted claim that the problem of transcendence is a problem, not of 
justification, but of understanding—a problem, not of establishing the 
possibility of transcendent cognition, but of making that possibility intelligible. 
The second is that to make the possibility of something intelligible is to “clarify” 
(aufklären) it, where to do so is to accurately describe its essence on the basis of 
the originary givenness of the latter (cf. III/1 156 ff.). 
Given this, phenomenological cognition would not just be 
epistemologically admissible, but would also be epistemologically fecund. For, 
as a description of the essences of pure intentional acts and their noemata on 
the basis of their originary givenness, phenomenological cognition would 
amount to a clarification of the possibility of those acts. And phenomenological 
cognition of the essence of pure transcendent cognition and its noemata would, 
therefore, amount to a clarification of the possibility of transcendent cognition, 
which it to say that it would be a kind of cognition by means of which the 
problem of transcendence can actually be solved.17  
The four main premises of the transcendence argument so far considered 
together entail that the central problem of epistemology can be solved only by 
means of phenomenological cognition. If correct, this would be a highly 
interesting metaepistemological result. But it would not be enough for Husserl, 
who, as we have seen, wants to establish that any epistemological problem can 
be solved only by means of phenomenological cognition.  
For reasons of space, I will not here attempt to identify the additional 
premises on which Husserl must be seen to rely in taking himself to be able to 
reach this further conclusion. Instead, I now want to consider Husserl’s case for 
the No Transcendence Requirement, which is arguably the most fundamental 
                                                   
17 More specifically, the phenomenological cognition by which the problem of 
transcendence is to be solved is to take the form of a description of the “correlation” between 
pure cognitions and their noemata, conceived as a relation of “constitution”, in the sense of a 
relation of the former “constituting” the latter (cf. II 12 ff., 75 f.; III/1 Part 4). The precise 
content of Husserl’s conception of constitution, and its implications for, among other things, the 
nature of his transcendental idealism, is a matter of debate. For a classical account, see 
Sokolowski (1970). For recent contributions, see, for instance, Smith (2003), Zahavi (2007b) 





premise of the argument. For this premise is crucial when it comes to showing 
the need for phenomenological cognition in solving the problem of 
transcendence. So if it cannot be sustained, there would seem to be little point 
in trying to establish the other premises, at least in the context of attempting to 
use a consideration of the requirements for solving the problem of 
transcendence to show that epistemology is possible only as phenomenology. 
Husserl can be seen to attempt to support the No Transcendence 
Requirement by means of two more or less explicit arguments, which I shall call 
the circularity argument and the metabasis argument.18 I will consider these in 
turn.  
 
3.  The Circularity Argument 
According to the circularity argument, one cannot solve the problem of 
transcendence by means of transcendent cognition since attempting to do so 
would be presupposing that the problem has already been solved, and would 
hence be viciously circular:  
If it is in principle unintelligible to us how consciousness with its consciousness-
characters [Bewusstseinscharakteren] can come to grasp and determine an object that is 
in principle transcendent to it, and in such way that it is not just itself intellectually 
satisfied, but in such a way that this transcendent object actually is, and is as it has been 
determined to be—if, I say, this is in principle unintelligible to us, then any attempted 
solution that appeals to a particular kind of transcendent existents, and to what they do or 
do not do, is a circle (XXXVI 83).19 
Attempting to solve the problem of transcendence by means of 
transcendent cognition would, plausibly, be circular in some sense. But why 
should it have to be viciously so? If the problem were a problem of 
justification—if it were a problem of justifying that there can be transcendent 
cognition—the answer would appear straightforward. For using transcendent 
cognition to establish that there can be transcendent cognition would, indeed, 
seem to be presupposing that the problem to be solved has already been solved. 
But, as we have seen, the problem is not a problem of justification, but of 
understanding—a problem, not of justifying the possibility of transcendent 
                                                   
18 Not all commentators distinguish clearly between these arguments. See, for instance, 
Rinofner-Kreidl (2008, 44).  





cognition, but of making it intelligible. And it is not obvious why, in using 
transcendent cognition to make the possibility of transcendent cognition 
intelligible, one would be presupposing the intelligibility of that possibility.20  
The following passage suggests an answer to this question:    
If I am confused, then I do not actually have any right to make use of what is presented as 
valid, in particular when it is precisely this confusion that I want to eliminate (XXIV 
176/174). 
One way of construing this claim is to take it as an endorsement of the 
following general principle:  
(General Principle of Intelligibility): A cognition can be used in solving a problem only if 
the possibility of cognitions of its kind is fully intelligible.  
Given this principle, using transcendent cognition to solve the problem of 
transcendence would be viciously circular. For, by the principle, one can use 
transcendent cognition to solve the problem of transcendence only if the 
possibility of transcendent cognition is fully intelligible. But to solve the 
problem of transcendence is, precisely, to make the possibility of transcendent 
cognition fully intelligible. And so, given the principle, one can use transcendent 
cognition to solve the problem of transcendence only if the problem is already 
solved. 
The General Principle of Intelligibility would provide a basis for the 
circularity claim, then. But the principle is also highly counterintuitive, leading 
to an extreme form of scepticism. For given the plausible assumption that few, if 
any, cognitions are at present fully intelligible with regard to their possibility, it 
entails that few, if any, cognitions may at present be used as problem solving 
means, and hence that few, if any, problems can at present be solved. It is also 
worth noting that Husserl, his apparent endorsement of it notwithstanding, 
implicitly rejects the General Principle of Intelligibility. For he clearly holds that 
cognitions may be used as problem solving means, even if they are unclear with 
regard to their possibility, or epistemologically “naïve”, as he also puts it:  
                                                   
20 In their respective discussions of what I have called Husserl’s circularity argument, 
Lohmar (2002, 753), Rizzoli (2008, 3 f.) and Rinofner-Kreidl (2004, 44 ff.) all appear to find it 
compelling. However, their positive assessment of the argument would, in each case, seem to 
rely on taking the problem of transcendence to be a problem, not of understanding, but of 





In the naïve direction of thinking [Denkrichtung], which is the direction of thinking of the 
sciences in the ordinary sense, one gets to work with a view to [the] givenness of the 
scientific domain concerned: What is valid for such objects? What are their properties, 
under which laws do they stand? One gets to work, one deduces and follows the forms of 
concepts and propositions, one experiences evidence in each step; one induces and 
experiences the preference of probability, etc. One thinks, cognizes, works scientifically 
without investigating the principles on which the sense, the right, the source of truly 
objective validity everywhere ultimately hang (XXIV 164/162). 
Another way of construing Husserl’s claim in the passage quoted, one 
suggested by its last segment—“in particular when it is precisely this confusion 
that I want to eliminate”—is to take it as an endorsement of a more restricted 
principle:  
(Restricted Principle of Intelligibility): A cognition can be used to remove a lack of 
intelligibility only if the possibility of cognitions of its kind is intelligible, in the sense of 
not itself suffering from the lack of intelligibility to be removed. 
That this is, in fact, the principle Husserl means to endorse is further suggested 
by passages like these:   
All the riddles taken together mean: We do not understand science at all. That is: We do 
not understand any of its thus and so characterizable achievements. And this in radical 
generality. Thus, the worm of doubt or unclarity hides in any particular cognition. No 
naturally obtained scientific result is free of it; and therefore we cannot make use of any 
such result as a premise from which to derive what we are looking for: The answer to 
these questions (XXIV 177/174; my emphasis). 
In general, the question concerns the possibility, sense, achievement of objectively valid 
cognition as such. As long as it is not decided or, rather, not even addressed, any 
cognition is affected by the question, it is questionable with regard to its ultimate sense 
and right [Recht]; and therefore it may not be taken as unquestionable beforehand (XXIV 
187/184; my emphasis). 
There are also systematic reasons for taking Husserl to be endorsing only 
the Restricted Principle of Intelligibility. Like the General Principle of 
Intelligibility, the principle would provide a basis for the circularity claim. But, 
unlike that principle, it is invulnerable to the extreme scepticism charge. For it 
disallows the problem solving use of cognitions only under very specific 
circumstances—namely, when it comes to removing a lack of intelligibility 
pertaining to the possibility of those cognitions themselves.  
Assuming that Husserl does endorse the Restricted Principle of 
Intelligibility, why does he do so? From the passages just quoted, it might 





remove a lack of intelligibility pertaining to the possibility of cognitions of its 
kind would raise anew the problem to be solved. That it would do so is seems 
undeniable. The question, however, is why this should be unacceptable. And, as 
far as I know, this question Husserl does not really answer. One option would be 
to appeal to the following principle:21 
(General Principle of Idleness): Any problem solving use of cognitions that raises anew 
the problem to be solved is idle.  
This principle would provide a reason why attempted problem solving uses 
of cognitions that raise anew the problem to be solved would be unacceptable. 
But it is also counterintuitive, implying, as it does, that certain attempted uses 
of cognition must be idle that do not seem to have to be so. Consider the use of 
immanent perception or reflection in attempting to understand the possibility of 
intentional acts—that is, to understand what it means for an experience to be 
intentionally directed on something. Reflection is a kind of intentional act. So 
any attempt to use reflection to understand the possibility of intentional acts 
would, in a sense, raise anew the question to be solved. And, by the General 
Principle of Idleness, it would, therefore, have to be idle. But this seems wrong. 
And it would clearly not be acceptable to Husserl, who holds, not only that the 
possibility of intentional acts can be made intelligible by means of reflection, but 
that this is the only way in which it can be made intelligible.   
Assuming, therefore, that at least some problem solving uses of cognitions 
that raise anew the problem to be solved are not idle, why would this be so? The 
natural answer is that they raise the problem, not its original form, but in a 
modified form that makes it more tractable. Consider again the attempt to use 
reflection to understand the possibility of intentional acts. This might—and, on 
Husserl’s view, would—yield the result that the intentional directedness of 
                                                   
21 Given this principle, the following direct argument for the No Transcendence 
Requirement would also be available: (1) Any problem solving use of cognitions that raises the 
problem to be solved is idle [Principle of Idleness]. (2) Any use of transcendent cognition to 
make the general possibility of transcendent cognition intelligible raises the problem to be 
solved [Assumption]. (3) So any use of transcendent cognition to make the general possibility of 
transcendent cognition intelligible is idle [From (1) and (2)]. (4) So the problem of 
transcendence cannot be solved by means of transcendent cognition [From (3) and Husserl’s 
characterization of the problem of transcendence]. In what follows, I shall consider only the 
argument for the Restricted Principle of Intelligibility, since the crucial premise in this 





intentional acts is a matter of their having an inherent content of the kind that 
Husserl calls “sense” (Sinn) (cf. II 19). But, if so, the problem that would be 
raised anew by this use of reflection would not simply be the problem of how 
experiences can be directed on something, but that problem in a modified 
form—namely, in the form of the problem of how experiences can be directed on 
something by virtue of having a sense. And this form of the problem would, 
arguably, be more manageable, because more specific, than the first. 
That the problem solving use of cognitions that raise anew the problem to 
be solved can be fruitful in this way is, in fact, something that Husserl might be 
seen more or less explicitly to recognize when he points out that epistemological 
clarification must proceed in a “zigzag” manner:  
Progress is here possible only in this way: that a preliminarily achieved, and therefore 
relative, clarity on the one side must help further clarity on the other. The investigation 
can thus never progress in a straight line; it must rather constantly move in zigzag. 
Having arrived at the end, it must in a way always again begin; it must always again 
reflect on the concepts and methods employed in the method itself (M III 8). 
These considerations might suggest that the problem facing the General 
Principle of Idleness can be met by restricting the principle as follows:  
(Restricted Principle of Idleness): Any problem solving use of cognitions that raises anew 
the problem to be solved, in the sense of simply re-raising it in its original form, is idle.  
That this is, in fact, the principle by reference to which Husserl means to 
establish the Restricted Principle of Intelligibility is suggested by passages like 
this:  
If we do not understand how cognition can grasp an object that is an sich vis-à-vis it—an 
object, in other words, that is what it is whether cognition is directed on it or not—then 
obviously we cannot reach this understanding if, remaining in the natural attitude of 
cognition, we let objects existing an sich count as valid, and describe and otherwise 
theoretically cognize them as they are given. For each step here implies the full unsolved 
riddle (M VII 49; my emphasis) 
The Restricted Principle of Idleness is prima facie plausible: If using a 
cognition to solve a problem succeeded only in re-raising the problem in its 
original form, then so using it would clearly seem to be futile. Unlike the 
General Principle of Idleness, it is also invulnerable to counter-examples of the 
kind just rehearsed. For, in allowing that attempted problem-solving uses of 





the problem is raised in a modified form, it allows that, for instance, attempting 
to understand the possibility of intentional acts by means of reflection can be 
productive. 
This invulnerability comes at a price, though. For it means that, despite 
Husserl’s apparent implicit assertions to the contrary, the principle cannot 
replace the General Principle of Idleness in the considered argument for the 
Restricted Principle of Intelligibility. The role of the General Principle of 
Idleness in that argument was to provide a reason why attempted problem 
solving uses of cognitions that raise anew the problem to be solved should be 
unacceptable. But, since the Restricted Principle of Idleness allows that 
attempted problem solving uses of cognitions that raise anew the problem to be 
solved need not be idle, it cannot fill that role.  
I take it, therefore, that the considered argument for the Restricted 
Principle of Intelligibility fails. Of course, this does not mean that one might not 
succeed in supporting the principle by means of a different argument. But the 
usefulness of trying to do so would be questionable. For the principle is 
vulnerable to considerations similar to those adduced against the General 
Principle of Idleness. According to the Restricted Principle of Intelligibility, a 
cognition cannot be used to remove a lack of intelligibility from which the 
possibility of cognitions of its own kind suffers. But this entails that one cannot 
use reflection in attempting to understand the possibility of intentional acts, 
which seems wrong, and is clearly so on Husserl’s view. Or consider a priori 
cognition. It is an understatement to say that the general possibility of a priori 
cognition still remains to be made fully intelligible. And it is arguable that an—if 
not, the—essential means for doing so is, precisely, a priori cognition. This, at 
any rate, is clearly Husserl view. But the Restricted Principle of Intelligibility 
disallows this, and, if a priori cognition cannot be made intelligible by any other 
means, effectively implies, not only that the general possibility of a priori 
cognition cannot be made intelligible, but also that the very attempt to do so 
would be meaningless, which seems implausible.  
I conclude that there is strong reason to believe that the circularity 
argument fails. I now turn to what can be seen as Husserl’s second argument for 





4.  The Metabasis Argument 
According to the metabasis argument, one cannot solve the problem of 
transcendence by means of transcendent cognition since transcendent cognition 
is simply not of the right kind to solve the problem. And to attempt to solve it by 
means of such cognition is, therefore, to commit a so-called metabasis eis allo 
genos, or an illegitimate change of subject.22 More specifically, Husserl argues, 
epistemological states of affairs—the states of affairs on which cognition fit to 
solve the problem of transcendence must be directed—are different from 
transcendent states of affairs—the states of affairs on which transcendent 
cognition can be directed. Thus, he writes:  
Epistemology lies prior to all natural cognition and science, and lies on a wholly different 
plane from natural science (XXIV 176/174). 
And, in a footnote attached to this passage, he elaborates the point as follows:  
On a wholly different plane: It is a false metabasis if we want to derive epistemological 
results from natural science. … The sense of epistemological propositions is different from 
the sense of natural logical propositions, etc. Epistemological states of affairs ‹are› 
different from states of affairs of nature, etc. (XXIV 176/174). 
The question on which the fate of the metabasis argument would seem to 
hang, then, is whether Husserl can substantiate this claim. To do so, he must be 
able to draw the distinction between epistemological and transcendent states of 
affairs in a relevant and dialectically defensible way. As I will now argue, 
however, there is reason to think that he does not succeed in doing so.  
Husserl can be seen to suggest two ways of drawing the required 
distinction. According to the first, the distinction would amount, roughly, to one 
between states of affairs concerning transcendent cognitions and their 
intentional contents or noemata on the one hand, and states of affairs 
concerning things in nature on the other:     
[T]he epistemologist concerns himself with nature and with natural science. But, for all 
that, he is not a natural scientist. He does not deal with nature ‹in order› to investigate 
it—that is, to discover natural-scientific propositions—and with natural science to 
appropriate it, and with natural-scientific thinking to do psychology; but he questions and 
investigates in order ‹to understand› the sense of nature as content of natural-scientific 
                                                   






thinking, of natural-scientific “consciousness”, and the “possibility”, sense, “scope” of 
[the] objective validity of natural-scientific thinking, as thinking concerning a nature 
existing an sich. Accordingly, the “phenomenological reduction” means nothing other the 
requirement to always remain within the sense of one’s investigation, and to not confuse 
epistemology with natural-scientific (objectivistic) investigation (XXIV 410/413). 
In the present context, there are at least two problems with this proposal. 
The first is that it is not clear why states of affairs concerning transcendent 
cognitions and their noemata should be radically distinct from states of affairs 
concerning things in nature. Of course, if we took the transcendent cognitions in 
question to be pure in Husserl’s sense of the term, or rationally positable 
without any reliance on transcendent cognition, then any states of affairs 
concerning them would be radically distinct from any state of affairs concerning 
things in nature, which are not thus positable. But construing epistemological 
states of affairs as states of affairs concerning pure transcendent cognitions and 
their noemata is inadmissible at the present stage of the dialectic. For this 
conception of epistemological states of affairs is, in effect, precisely what the 
transcendence argument is to establish. And so it cannot be presupposed in any 
consideration by which any premise of that argument is to be supported. But if, 
for this reason, we do not simply presuppose that the transcendent cognitions 
concerned must be construed as pure, it is no longer clear why states of affairs 
concerning them should have to be radically distinct from states of affairs 
concerning things in nature. There is nothing in the very concept of 
transcendent cognition demanding that they be construed as pure. At least this 
is so for Husserl, who, although he holds that transcendent cognitions can be 
construed as pure intentional acts, also holds that, from another perspective, 
they can be construed as psychological acts—that is, as mental states of human 
beings, or “things” in nature (cf. II 44 f.; XXIV 215 f.; III/1 116 ff.). 
The second problem is that even if one could, in a dialectically defensible 
way, radically distinguish states of affairs concerning transcendent cognitions 
and their noemata from transcendent states of affairs in the sense of states of 
affairs concerning things in nature, one would not, thereby, have distinguished 
them from any and all transcendent states of affairs. For, given the general 
characterization of transcendent cognition as inadequate or defeasible 
cognition, transcendent states of affairs would be any state of affairs concerning 





basis of indefeasible grounds. And so, by distinguishing states of affairs 
concerning intentional acts from states of affairs concerning things in nature, 
one would have succeeded in distinguishing them from one kind of 
transcendent states of affairs—one kind of states of affairs concerning objects 
that cannot be adequately given. But, assuming, as Husserl does, that the 
domain of objects that cannot be adequately given is not exhausted by things in 
nature, one would not, thereby, have succeeded in distinguishing them from 
transcendent states of affairs in general.  
This problem brings us to what may be seen as Husserl’s second suggested 
way of drawing the distinction between epistemological and transcendent states 
of affairs. According to this proposal, the distinction would be one between 
states of affairs concerning the essence of transcendent cognitions and their 
noemata as adequately given, and states of affairs concerning any and all 
transcendent or non-adequately given objects. That this is, in fact, the 
distinction Husserl has in mind is suggested when, having argued that someone 
who had at his disposal all and only transcendent cognitions would still be 
lacking the understanding needed to solve the problem of transcendence, and so 
make the “relation to transcendence” and the “reaching of a transcendent” 
intelligible, he goes on to ask:  
Where and how can he achieve clarity? Now, if the essence of this relation were 
somewhere given in such a way that he could see [Schauen] it, in such a way that he could 
have the unity of cognition and object of cognition, which the word validity [Triftigkeit] 
suggests, before his eyes, and thereby did not only have knowledge of its possibility, but 
had this possibility in its clear givenness (II 37/29 f.).23  
Why should epistemological states of affairs—the states of affairs through 
the cognition of which the problem of transcendence alone can be solved—have 
to concern the essence of transcendent cognition as adequately given, or as 
available in its “clear givenness”, as he puts it here? Husserl’s answer can be 
seen to consist of two claims. The first is that the problem of transcendence, as a 
problem of making the possibility of transcendent cognition intelligible, is a 
                                                   
23 This passage occurs in a slightly different form in an appendix to the text concerned: 
“When do we have clarity, and where do we have it? Now, when and where the essence of this 
relation would be given to us, in such a way that we could see it. Then we would understand the 
possibility of cognition (for the kind of cognition concerned, the kind with regard to which this 





problem of clarifying that possibility, in the previously noted sense of describing 
the essence of transcendent cognition as originarily given in eidetic intuition. As 
Husserl, referring to the possibility of transcendent cognition, puts it shortly 
after the passage just quoted: 
How can I understand this possibility? Naturally, the answer is: I could understand it only 
if the relation [between cognition and object of cognition] could itself be given as 
something to be seen (II 37/30). 
The second claim is that the clarification by means of which the possibility of 
transcendent cognition alone can be made intelligible must take the form of a 
description of the essence of transcendent cognition, not just as originarily 
given, but as adequately given. 
Both of these claims could be challenged. With regard to the first, we could 
question the underlying assumption that to make the possibility of something 
fully intelligible consists in clarifying that possibility, in the sense of describing 
its essence on the basis of the originary givenness of that essence. Although not 
clearly false, this assumption is very strong and stands in need of significant 
defence, relying, as it does, on a number of contentious ideas, including the idea 
that Husserlian eidetic intuitions are actually possible.  
With regard to the second, we could ask why, if we grant that the 
possibility of transcendent cognition can be made fully intelligible only by way 
of Husserlian clarification, the required givenness would have to be an adequate 
one. Husserl does, after all, acknowledge that not all essences can be adequately 
given (III/1 345; cf. VIII 33 ff.).24 So why should the essence of transcendent 
cognition have to be capable of being thus given? To be sure, the clarification of 
the possibility of transcendent cognition achievable by means of descriptions of 
its essence as inadequately given would be less perfect than one achievable by 
means of descriptions of its essence as adequately given. But if the essence of 
transcendent cognition should, in fact, be incapable of being adequately given, 
less than perfect clarification would be the only form of clarification 
obtainable.25 
                                                   
24 On this point, see, for instance, Mohanty (1973, 223 ff.) and Smith (2012, 316).   
25 Crowell suggests what is, in effect, a version of the metabasis argument, designed to 
show that “[w]orldly things don’t belong to the terrain of philosophical inquiry at all” (2013, 95). 





5.  Conclusion 
I have found cause to question both of the arguments for the No 
Transcendence Requirement considered. I have argued that there is strong 
reason to believe that the circularity argument fails. And I have argued that the 
success of the metabasis argument requires the provision of strong support for 
two questionable claims: that the possibility of transcendent cognition can be 
made intelligible only by clarifying it, in the sense of describing the essence of 
transcendent cognition on the basis of the originary givenness of that essence; 
and that the originary givenness concerned must be an adequate one.  
The No Transcendence Requirement being the most decisive premise of 
the transcendence argument, failure to establish it would entail the failure of 
that argument. Such failure would not, by itself, allow us to reject the 
argument’s conclusion—that epistemology is possible only as phenomenology—
since that conclusion might be reachable by means of other arguments, 
arguments not relying on the No Transcendence Requirement, or other 
premises to the same effect. Without being able to argue the point here, 
however, I think it is at least questionable whether there can be any argument of 
this kind.26  
Conversely, if the No Transcendence Requirement could be established, 
whether by means of the metabasis argument or some other argument, that 
                                                                                                                                                     
demand for “ultimate self-responsibility” entails that the domain of philosophical inquiry 
consists in “the (reflectively grasped) intentional structure of mental acts” (2013, 95). The 
second is that this domain “exhibits its own laws—normative rather than causal, intentional 
rather than natural” (2013, 95). The main problem here is with the second premise, which 
remains unsupported. For, even granting that the general subject matter of philosophy is the 
intentional structure of mental acts, why should this structure have to be conceived as the 
structure of mental acts construed as non-natural occurrences? The problem is made more 
pressing by Crowell’s admission, on Husserl’s behalf, that philosophical cognition need not be 
indefeasible or apodictic, allowing, as this does, that it can be transcendent.   
26 At any rate, it is a fact that the other considerations of Husserl’s that can be taken as 
attempts to establish the epistemological indispensability of phenomenology—the ones 
commonly referred to as other “ways” to the transcendental-phenomenological reduction—all 
involve crucial appeals to the indispensability of the epoché. (For the classical account of these 
ways, see Kern 1978. For critical engagements with Kern’s construal, see Drummond 1975 and 
Larsen 2003.) An interesting feature of the transcendence argument, conceived as a way to the 
reduction, is that it introduces the need for the epoché by reference to the presumed 
requirements for solving a problem that is supposed to be recognizable as pressing in the 
natural attitude. For it thereby holds out the promise of a solution to the much discussed 
problem, first noted by Fink (1933), of the motivation for the reduction—the problem that, it 
might first seem, the need for the epoché can only be motivated from the standpoint of the 





would not, by itself, guarantee the success of the transcendence argument, 
which would require the establishment of its other premises as well. Perhaps the 
most controversial of these is the Phenomenology Claim, the claim that 
phenomenological cognition is the only kind of indefeasible cognition. I cannot 
here consider Husserl’s case for this claim. I will say this, though. In discussions 
of Husserl’s view of the epistemic status of phenomenological cognition, it has 
become common to point out that he found it increasingly hard to maintain that 
phenomenological cognition can be indefeasible, or at least that it can be 
indefeasible to the extent required for it also to be epistemologically fecund.27 I 
will not here dwell on the reasons for this development, or Husserl’s many 
attempts to deal with the problem.28 I merely want to point out that, from the 
point of view of the transcendence argument at least, what is at stake is no less 
than the possibility of solving the central problem of epistemology, and, hence, 
by supposed implication, any epistemological problem at all. For to the extent 
that phenomenological cognition would have to be deemed defeasible, it would 
also, by the No Transcendence Requirement, have to be deemed 
epistemologically inadmissible. 
Finally, should it turn out that Husserl’s claim that epistemology is 
possible only as phenomenology cannot be established by means of the 
transcendence argument or any other argument, it would by no means follow 
that phenomenology lacks epistemological relevance. But it would make it 
unclear what, exactly, that relevance might consist in. This is especially so if the 
Phenomenology Claim should turn out to be unsustainable, raising, as this 
would, the question of how, exactly, phenomenological cognition is to be 
distinguished from other forms of cognition, and, in particular, from 
introspective psychological cognition, if it cannot be distinguished from them by 
being non-transcendent or indefeasible.29 For, although failure to answer this 
                                                   
27 See, for instance, Welton (2002, Ch. 6), Poellner (2007), and Crowell (2013, Ch. 4).   
28 See, in particular, XXXV. 
29 Crowell suggests that even if, as Husserl came to realize, the philosophical need for 
phenomenological cognition cannot be derived from the demand for apodicticity, it can still be 
derived from the demand for “ultimate self-responsibility”, in so far as the latter can be met only 
through a “methodological intuitionism based on first-person Evidenz, direct seeing of the 
things themselves” (2013, 92). The question, though, is in what sense, exactly, this 
methodological intuitionism would be a phenomenological one, if it did not meet the 





question would not entail that Husserl’s many analyses of cognitive phenomena 
of various kinds of are epistemologically irrelevant, it would leave obscure in 
what sense they would be phenomenological, and hence in what sense their 




                                                                                                                                                     
“ultimate grounding” of our cognitive practices, meaning, among other things, that it “cannot 
take anything for granted” (2013, 94). But, in a Husserlian perspective at least, not to take 
anything for granted is, precisely, to remain within the bounds of what is adequately and thus 
apodictically given.  
30 I want to thank Frode Kjosavik and Ingunn Larsen for valuable comments on an earlier 











Perceptual Givenness and Justification in Husserl 
 
 
According to Husserl, the perceptual givenness of a physical object—
roughly, its presence as an intentional object of perceptual experience—is an 
epistemic justifier for belief about it. In what follows, I suggest that this claim is 
in tension with Husserl’s general theory of epistemic justification. More 
specifically, I argue that aspects of his analysis of perceptual givenness provide 
at least some reason to think that it fails to satisfy what could be called his basic 
conception of epistemic justification, or justification for short. This conception 
being teleological, access internalist and modestly foundationalist, my argument 
potentially raises a problem, not just for Husserlian epistemology of perception, 
but also for other attempts to combine such accounts of justification with 
accounts of perceptual experience and its epistemic role relevantly similar to 
Husserl’s.  
I begin with a brief outline of Husserl’s basic conception of “rational acts” 
(Vernunftakte), which constitutes the context for his basic conception of 
justification. I then present the conception itself, specifying it in terms of three 
requirements on epistemic justifiers. Next I delineate Husserl’s notion of 
perceptual givenness, with emphasis on its supposed character as an 
“inadequate” form of givenness. I then turn to his view of the epistemic role of 
perceptual givenness, on which it meets the three requirements on epistemic 
justifiers previously described. I proceed to argue that, on account of its 
supposed inadequacy, perceptual givenness as described by Husserl is what I 
propose to call a rational mode of givenness. And I go on to argue that this, in 
different ways, gives at least some reason to doubt that it satisfies his basic 
conception of justification. I close with a brief consideration of the 







1. Husserl’s Basic Conception of Rational Acts 
Husserlian rational acts are a subset of “intentional acts” (intentionale 
Akte)—phenomenally conscious mental occurrences, or “lived experiences” 
(Erlebnisse), that have the character of being “of” or “directed on” something, 
which something constitutes their “intentional object” (intentionale 
Gegenstand) (XIX/1 414). Intentional objects in Husserl’s sense of the term are 
not a particular kind of entity, but simply that on which an intentional act has 
the character of being directed, whatever it might be (cf. XIX/1 438 ff.).1 Husserl 
draws a number of implications from this, of which I will here note three.  
First, the concept of intentional objects is extremely broad. Anything—be it 
physical or mental, concrete or abstract, existent or non-existent, actual or 
fictional, a particular or a state of affairs, a property or a substance—may be an 
intentional object, and will be if it is that on which some intentional act has the 
character of being directed (cf. XIX/1 386 f., 427). Second, any intentional 
object will be presented as having a more or less extensive set of more or less 
determinate features; and one the same intentional object can, at different time, 
be presented with different sets of features (XIX/1 414 f.).2 Third, any 
intentional object will be presented in a certain “mode of givenness” 
(Gegebenheitsweise), a certain way of being consciously present to the subject 
of the act (cf. III/1 232 ff.). Take my computer screen. The screen can figure as 
the intentional object of acts of various kinds: perceptual acts, recollective acts, 
acts of symbolic representation, and so on. In all of these it is present in a 
different way: as something perceived, as something remembered and as 
something represented by a symbol of some kind. And to specify what these ‘as 
…’ phrases refer to is to specify the different modes of givenness in which the 
screen is presented in the acts concerned. 
                                                   
1 At least this is so on the interpretation I shall be relying on here. For a defence of this 
interpretation, see (Drummond 1990). For a different interpretation, see Smith and McIntyre 
(1982). 
2 Husserl takes both the identity and the features of intentional objects to be determined 
by a certain content of the corresponding acts that he calls their “sense” (Sinn) (cf. II 19; XXIV 
150). Although a crucial part of his analysis of intentionality, I will not take his notion of sense 
into account in what follows, for two reasons. First, the points I wish to make can be made in 
equally adequate, and more economic, ways without it. Second, disregarding the notion allows 
me to steer clear of the controversy concerning the nature of Husserlian senses, and their 
relation to intentional acts on the one hand, and intentional objects on the other, to which my 
points are insensitive. (For two influential and conflicting contributions to the debate, see Smith 




Now, rational acts have two main distinguishing features. The first, by 
which they differ from acts like imaginings and mere thoughts, is that they 
involve a “positing” (Setzung) of their intentional object, by which, roughly, 
Husserl means a taking the object to have “being” (Sein) (XIX/1 499).3 
Depending on the case, this taking will be either “monothetic” (monothetisch) 
or “polythetic” (polythetisch) (cf. XIX/1 501; III/1 275 f.). Monothetic positings 
are non-propositional positings of particulars objects, like my computer. By 
contrast, polythetic positings are propositional positings of “categorial” or 
“synthetic” objects, such as the state of affairs of my computer’s being grey. The 
second main distinguishing feature of rational acts, by which they differ from 
positing acts like, say, lucky guesses, is that the positing involved is “rationally 
motivated” (vernünftig motiviert), in the sense of being based on an epistemic 
justifier or “justificatory ground” (Rechtsgrund) (III/1 316; cf. VIII 330).4 
To be rational, then, an intentional act must satisfy three conditions: (i) it 
must involve a monothetic or polythetic positing of its intentional object; (ii) the 
subject of the act must have justificatory grounds for the positing; and (iii) the 
positing must be based on or motivated by those grounds. My concern here is 
with the second condition, and, in particular, with the requirements that 
Husserl places on justificatory grounds. I will consider three such requirements: 
namely, those that can be seen to make up what I propose to call his basic 






                                                   
3 I am simplifying here. First, the positing referred to is what Husserl calls “doxic” 
positing, which is one of several forms of positing recognized by him (cf. III/1 268 ff.). (For 
discussion of Husserl’s differentiated concept of positing, see Melle 1988 and 1990.) Second, 
doxic positing is not exhausted by attributions of being simpliciter, but includes any and all 
attributions of “being-characters” (Seinscharactere), which, in addition to that of being 
simpliciter, also includes such characters as being dubitable, possible and probable (III/1 239 
ff.). Since these complications do not matter in what follows, I shall repress them, and 
understand by ‘positing’ only attributions of being simpliciter.    
4 Despite what the term might suggest, Husserlian justificatory grounds need not, as we 
shall see, be propositionally structured.  
5 This conception is not explicit in Husserl. However, I take it to be implicit in passages 




2. Husserl’s Basic Conception of Justification  
The first requirement could be put as follows:  
(Being Requirement): G is a justificatory ground for a subject S to posit an object 
O only if G indicates that O has being, and hence indicates that S’s positing of O 
would be correct.6   
Husserl’s commitment to some such requirement is indicated by passages 
like the following characterization of rational acts, or “cognition in the pregnant 
sense” (Erkenntnis in prägnanten Sinn), as he says here:  
The objectual relation [gegenständliche Beziehung] is supposed to be sometimes 
correct and sometimes false, and this difference is supposed to emerge in 
cognition in the pregnant sense of an intentional experience in which 
immediately, or on the basis of mediating grounds, we see: it is thus, and not just 
presumably, but truly and actually (VII 377). 
Given what Husserl says elsewhere, it is natural to see the Being 
Requirement as expressive of a so called teleological or veristic conception of 
justification, on which, roughly, justification is a means to an end, the end being 
the possession of truth and the avoidance of falsity (cf. XXXVI 85; VIII 398).7 
Contrary to what the passage just quoted might suggest, however, Husserl does 
not, as we shall see, hold that a justificatory ground for positing an object must 
guarantee its being, but only that it must make it likely, where guaranteeing the 
object’s being would be the upper limit of making it likely. 
The second requirement could be put thus:  
(Awareness Requirement): G is a justificatory ground for a subject S to posit an 
object O only if S is suitably aware of G.  
Husserl’s endorsement of a requirement to this effect may be gleaned from 
passages like the following:  
All cognition accomplishes itself as subjective act, and the subjective act must 
contain within itself that which represents and justifies its claim of right 
[Rechtanspruch]. Only there is ‹the justification› [das Recht] to be found (XXIV 
130; my emphases). 
                                                   
6 In light of note 3 above, this requirement can be seen as an instance of what might be 
called the Being-Character Requirement: G is a justificatory ground for S to posit an object O as 
having a certain being-character BC only if G indicates that O has BC, and hence indicates that 
S’s positing of O would be correct.  




In the connections of cognitive consciousness itself must everything that makes 
up its claim of right [Rechtsanspruch], and that, when the consciousness is a 
genuine cognition, justifies it in an obvious way, be contained and be capable of 
being exhibited (XXX 316; my emphases). 
An assertion can, so to speak, be made out of the blue, without any rational 
ground [Vernunftgrund], without the asserting I being led by any rational 
grounds. In the meaning, as a living consciousness, there is then nothing that 
provides it with a justificatory ground [Rechtsgrund], and that, when this is not 
expressly stated, would make it possible to state the justificatory ground of its 
positing through mere analysis and reflection on the own content of 
consciousness (XXXVI 84; my emphasis). 
On these passages, something is a justificatory ground for a positing 
involved in a current rational act only if it is, in some sense, contained within 
the act itself. A rational act being a form of conscious experience, this implies 
that something is a justificatory ground only if the experiencing subject is, 
somehow, aware of it in or through her accomplishing the act. And, assuming 
that any requirement on being a justificatory ground for the actual positing 
involved in a current act is, at the same time, a requirement on being a 
justificatory ground for the subject to posit that object, even if she does not 
actually posit it, this, in turn, implies that something is a justificatory ground for 
a subject to posit an object only if she is aware of it—which is what the 
Awareness Requirement states.8 
With the Awareness Requirement, Husserl commits to a version of what is 
often called access internalism, on which, roughly, something is an epistemic 
justifier for a subject only if she has suitable access to it.9 What characterizes 
this version? In particular, how is the required awareness to be specified? On 
the above construal of the requirement, something is a justificatory ground for a 
subject only if she is aware of it in or through accomplishing intentional acts. 
This immediately suggests two candidates for the awareness concerned. The 
first is the intentional awareness that the subject has of the intentional object of 
the act. The second is the so called “experiential“ awareness or “experiencing” 
(erleben) that, according to Husserl, the subject has of the act itself—a non-
intentional form of self-awareness that, he argues, is constitutive of the very 
                                                   
8 The passages quoted in support of this conclusion seem clearly to undermine Hopp’s 
suggestion that Husserl might be taken to endorse a restricted form of epistemological 
externalism (see his 2008a, 2009 and 2012). 
9 For an overview of different forms of epistemic internalism, see Fumerton (1995, 60 ff.) 




being of lived experiences in general.10 Of these forms of awareness, the one 
demanded by the Awareness Requirement would seem to have to be the former. 
At least this is so, if, as there is reason to think, Husserl takes justificatory 
grounds in general to be intentional objects, in so far as they are present in 
certain modes of givenness, or rationally posited, or both (cf. III/1 11, 51, 316; 
XLII 188, 189 ff.).11 This is not, of course, to say that intentional acts, as 
experiences of which the subject is experientially aware, cannot constitute 
justificatory grounds. It is just to say that they can do so only as the intentional 
objects of other acts. 
Assuming, then, that the awareness required under the Awareness 
Requirement is intentional awareness, how is it to be further specified? For 
present purposes, the following three points will do. First, it can, but need not, 
be epistemic, in the sense of involving a rationally motivated positing of the 
epistemic relevance of the intentional object concerned.12 So, an intentional 
object need not be rationally posited as a justificatory ground in order to be a 
justificatory ground. This is clear from Husserl’s explicit rejection of higher 
order requirements on rational acts, on which a positing act would be rational 
only if it were rationally posited as such in a further rational act (M III 97; VIII 
33). Second, the required awareness can, but need not, be positional, in the 
sense of involving a positing, whether rationally motivated of not, of the 
intentional object concerned. This is clear from the fact that, as we shall see, 
Husserl takes so called “originary intuitions” (originäre Anschauungen), which 
is a species of non-positing intentional acts, to represent awareness of 
justificatory grounds of a certain kind (cf. III/1 51, 316). Third, the awareness 
required can, but need not, be explicit, in the sense of being of the kind involved 
in actually accomplished intentional acts. It can also be implicit, in the sense, 
roughly, of being capable of being made explicit through a mere change of focus 
on the part of the subject (cf. XXXVI 84). This means that, for instance, past 
                                                   
10 For an account of this form of self-awareness, see Zahavi (1999).  
11 As we shall see below, the most fundamental mode of givenness by virtue of being given 
in which an intentional object supposedly qualifies as a justificatory ground is that of “bodily 
selfgivenness” (leibhafte Selbstgegebenheit). 
12 In Bergmann’s terms, the required awareness need only be weak, as opposed to strong, 
awareness (cf. 2006, 13). Whether or not this makes Husserl’s internalism vulnerable to the 
problems Bergmann seeks to raise for access internalisms relying on weak awareness is a topic 




intentional acts that are not currently intentional objects of actually 
accomplished recollective acts of mine qualify as justificatory grounds under the 
Awareness Requirement, provided they are retained in memory in such a way 
that a change of focus on my part would suffice to turn them into such objects.  
The third requirement of Husserl’s basic conception of justification could 
be put in this way:  
(Immediacy Requirement): G is a justificatory ground for a subject S to posit an 
object O only if G is either an immediate or a mediate justificatory ground, where 
a justificatory ground is immediate just in case it does not depend on other 
justificatory grounds for its justificatory force, and meditate just in case it does so 
depend, and where any mediate justificatory ground ultimately depends for its 
justificatory force on one or more immediate justificatory grounds.13  
Husserl’s endorsement of a requirement to this effect is suggested by 
passages like the following two. In the first, he effectively claims that the 
justification provided by a justificatory ground must be either immediate or 
mediate, in the sense indicated:  
One distinguishes those [cognitive acts] that carries an immediate justification 
[Rechtfertigung] within themselves, and those that derive a justification from 
determinate kinds of connections with other cognitive acts, those that possesses 
such justification only in connection and mediately (XXIV 136/134 f.).  
And in the next, he claims that all mediate justification ultimately derives from 
immediate justification: 
As is well known, all mediate justification [Begründung] leads back to immediate 
justification. With respect to all domains of objects and positings related to them, 
the primal source of all legitimacy lies in the immediate evidence, and more 
particularly, in the originary evidence, or in the originary givenness motivating it 
(III/1 326).14 
Husserl’s endorsement of the Immediacy Requirement commits him to a 
form of epistemological foundationalism. How strong is this foundationalism? 
For now, suffice it to say that to endorse the idea that there is, or can be, 
immediate justificatory grounds, is not, by itself, to commit to the idea that 
there is, or can be, indefeasible justificatory grounds: To characterize a 
                                                   
13 Note that a justificatory ground may depend on another justificatory ground for its 
existence, and still be immediate in this sense, as long as it does not also depend on that ground 
for its justificatory force. For this distinction, see Alston (1976) and Pryor (2000).  




justificatory ground as immediate, in the present sense, is not to make a claim 
about the strength of the justification it provides, but only about its relation to 
other grounds the subject might possess—namely, that the justification it 
provides is independent of any justification provided by such other grounds.15 
Thus, for all that the passages quoted indicate, and as we shall see below, 
Husserl’s is a modest foundationalism, on which the immediate justificatory 
grounds required need not be indefeasible.16 
Now, according to what could be called Husserl’s perceptual intuitionism, 
perceptual givenness constitutes a justificatory ground, and thus satisfies the 
three requirements just delineated. To see what this view amounts to, we must 
first take a look at his notion of perceptual givenness itself. 
 
3. Perceptual Givenness as an Inadequate Mode of Givenness 
Husserl’s theory of perception is comprehensive and complex, and 
underwent numerous changes and refinements over the years. For present 
purposes, however, rehearsing a few basic points will suffice.17 
As I shall construe the term here, perceptual givenness is a mode of 
                                                   
15 See Alston (1976); Pollock (1986); and Pryor (2000).  
16 Drummond denies that Husserl endorses moderate foundationalism, on the presumed 
grounds that, for Husserl, any supposedly foundational experience will be “associatively 
informed” by previously made judgements, which, Drummond argues, implies that “foundations 
present themselves in the form of a hermeneutic circle” (1991, 62). I believe this denial to be 
unfounded for two reasons. First, it flies in the face of the seemingly unequivocal commitment 
to foundationalism expressed in passages like the above. Second, as Hopp points out, 
Drummond’s argument for the denial fails, since the fact that supposedly foundational 
perceptual experiences may, and perhaps always do, depend on previous judgements for their 
content does not entail that they also depend on them for their justification (2008a, 200). That 
said, I believe Drummond is gesturing towards a cogent argument to the effect that, given 
Husserl’s account of perception, perception cannot, in fact, provide immediate justification, an 
argument akin to the one I will present in Section 8. Unlike Drummond, however, I regard the 
conclusion to this argument, not as expressive of, but as contrary to, Husserl’s official view, 
which, on my construal, is that his account of perception is not only consistent with holding that 
perception provides immediate justification, but actually serves to clarify the sense in which it 
does so. 
17 After 1906, or thereabouts, Husserl conducted most of his analyses of perception, and 
intentionality in general, within the framework supposedly established by the so called 
“transcendental-phenomenological reduction”—very roughly, an operation whereby one refrains 
from making use of positings of physical and other worldly objects in order to study the essential 
structures of those positings. The exact nature of this operation, as well as its motivation and 
implications, are controversial, however. And since the points I will be making are both 
insensitive to any particular view of the operation, and articulable without reference to it, for 





givenness of physical objects, in the sense of spatio-temporal individuals.18 
More specifically, perceptual givenness is the mode of givenness in which 
physical objects are present when they figure as the intentional objects of “outer 
perceptual intuitions” (äußere Perzeptionen), or perceptual intuitions for short 
(cf. XXIII 353).19 Following Husserl, I shall be focusing on visual perceptual 
intuition, with the understanding that the points I will be making apply, 
mutatatis mutandis, to his view of perceptual intuition in the other sense-
modalities as well.  
Perceptual givenness is an example of “bodily selfgivenness” (leibhafte 
Selbstgegebenheit), which can be characterized in terms of two contrasting 
modes of givenness. As selfgivenness it differs from representational modes, 
modes in which objects are present, not “as themselves”, but only as represented 
by other objects, like signs or images (III/1 90). And as bodily selfgivenness it 
differs from so called “presentiating” (vergegenwärtigende) modes, modes in 
which, although not represented by others objects, objects are not present “in 
the flesh”, but only “as if” they were present in the flesh, as they are when they 
are present as, say, remembered or phantasized (III/1 90; XXV 169).  
Husserl characterizes bodily selfgivenness as “originary givenness” 
(originäre Gegebenheit) on the grounds that it constitutes the most basic mode 
of givenness of intentional objects, a mode on which all other modes, in one way 
or another, depend for their possibility: The possibility of objects being bodily 
selfgiven is necessary for the possibility of objects being given as presentiated, 
since an object’s givenness as presentiated—its being present “as if” present in 
the flesh—has the inherent character of being a modification of bodily 
selfgivenness (III/1 233). The possibility of objects being bodily selfgiven is also 
necessary for the possibility of objects being given in representational modes, 
                                                   
18 Husserl draws a distinction between two senses of ‘physical object’, or, rather, between 
two levels of perceived spatio-temporal individuals: “phantoms” (Phantome) or “sense-things” 
(Sinnendinge), by which he means individuals that, in addition to extension and duration, are 
possessed only of sensuous qualities like colour and texture (IV 37); and “substances” 
(Substanzen) or “material things” (materielle Dinge), by which he means individuals possessed 
of causal properties like elasticity and penetrability (IV 44). Of these two, the former is taken to 
be the more fundamental, in the sense, roughly, that substances attain to givenness only on the 
basis of the givenness of systematically co-varying phantoms (cf. IV 41 ff.). Although I do not 
make this explicit, the points to follow apply most immediately to the givenness of phantoms. 
However, due to the supposed relationship between phantoms and substances just indicated, 
mutatis mutandis the points also apply to the givenness of substances.  
19 I translate Perzeption as ‘perceptual intuition’ to distinguish it from what Husserl calls 




since the representing objects involved must be either bodily selfgiven or 
presentiated (cf. III/1 234). 
Perceptual givenness, then, is the bodily selfgivenness of physical objects, 
the mode of givenness in which they are present as themselves, in the flesh. And 
it is therefore also the originary mode of givenness of physical objects, they 
mode in which they are most basically present as the kind of objects they are 
(III/1 11).  
As an act whose object is originarily given, perceptual intuition is an 
“originary giving intuition” (originär gebende Anschauung), or originary 
intuition for short (III/1 51). Originary intuitions are either “adequate” or 
“inadequate” (cf. III/1 319 ff.). An adequate intuition is one whose intentional 
object is adequately given, where an object is so given just in case it is actually 
given with respect to all the features attributed to it. Husserl’s prime example of 
such intuition is “immanent perception” (immanente Wahrnehmung): the 
direct reflective experience that, he holds, I may have of my own current 
experiences (II 49 f.). By contrast, an inadequate intuition is one whose 
intentional object is inadequately given, where to be thus given is to be actually 
given with respect only to a more or less restricted range of attributed features. 
An example of such intuition is, precisely, perceptual intuition (M VII 115; XI 18 
f.): As perceptually given, any physical object is intentionally present as a three-
dimensional object having a number of different features pertaining to all of its 
different sides. But of these features only some will be actually given, in the 
sense of being sensuously present—namely, those pertaining to the currently 
exposed side of the object.20 
The features pertaining to the currently non-exposed sides of perceptually 
given objects are present as features that would become sensuously given, were 
future experience to take one of a range of specifiable possible courses (cf. I 82). 
And so the awareness of non-sensuously given features involved in perceiving a 
physical object takes the form of anticipations of possible future perceptual 
                                                   
20 According to Husserl’s standard account, the sensuous presence of the sensuously 
present features of perceptually given objects is due to certain experiential contents called 
“sensations” (Empfindungen) being “apprehended” (aufgefasst) as experiences of the features 
concerned (XVI 46 f.). This account has been heavily criticized by other phenomenologists. (See 
for instance Gurwitsch 1978, and Drummond 1990). However, since nothing in what follows 
hinges on the correctness of this or any other particular account of the determinants of sensuous 




intuitions or appearances of the object (cf. XXXII 135; EU 28; XIX/2 590). 
These anticipations, for their part, are specifiable in terms of conditionals in 
which the appearances figure as consequents and possible subjectively 
experienced bodily movements, or “kinaestheses”, on the part of the perceiving 
subject figure as antecedents (cf. XIII 84 f.; VI 164; XI 13 ff.).21  
As the above already indicates, perceptual intuition is essentially 
inadequate (cf. III/1 331; I 96). An inessentially inadequate intuition would be 
one involving only anticipations all of which could, in principle, be confirmed or 
“fulfilled” (erfüllt) by the actual givenness of the features anticipated, in a finite 
course of experience. By contrast, an essentially inadequate intuition is one not 
all of whose constituent anticipations can, for essential reasons, be thus fulfilled. 
In other words, essentially inadequate intuitions are inadequate intuitions that 
will exhibit a surplus of unfulfilled anticipations at any point of their duration. 
And the reason why perceptual intuition fits this description is, most 
fundamentally, that physical objects are spatial (XVI 135 ff.). For, since any 
physical object must be perceived from a certain perspective—the one 
determined by the location of the perceiving subject’s body—this implies that 
any perceived physical object will be present as having features that are only 
anticipatorily given: namely, those belonging to the sides of the object that are 
“hidden” from the subject’s current perspective (cf. XI 18 f.). 
According to Husserl, then, any perceptual intuition will involve two kinds 
of intentional directedness or “intentions” (Intentionen): sensuously informed 
or “filled” intentions, by virtue of which features pertaining to the currently 
exposed sides of the thing perceived are sensuously given; and “empty” 
anticipations, by virtue of which features pertaining to the currently hidden 
sides of the thing are non-sensuously and anticipatorily given (XXXII 135; XI 5; 
EU 136 f.). And any instance of perceptual givenness will, consequently, involve 
two different modes of givenness: the sensuous givenness of the former kind of 
features and the non-sensuous and anticipatory givenness of the latter. Any 
physical object that is sensuously given with regard to a range of its attributed 
features will, in other words, be thus given with what Husserl calls an “horizon” 
                                                   
21 For a detailed account of Husserl’s view of the role of bodily movement in perception, 




(Horizont) of merely anticipatorily given features (IX 181).22  
This means that perceptual givenness is what could be called a relative as 
opposed to an absolute form of originary givenness, where an instance of 
originary givenness is absolute just in case it does not depend on the correctness 
of anticipations of further experiences of the object given, and relative if it does 
so depend. Adequate givenness is absolute in this sense: Being actually given 
with respect to all of their features, adequately given objects do not depend for 
their originary givenness on the course of further intentional experiences 
directed at them (cf. III/2 598). But perceptual givenness, and inadequate 
givenness in general, is not: Being actually given only with respect to a more or 
less restricted range of its features, perceptually given objects do depend for 
their originary givenness on the course of further experience, in the sense of 
being originarily given only if further perceptions will serve to fulfil, rather than 
disappoint, the anticipations by virtue of which its anticipatorily given features 
are present (XXXVI 82; cf. XXXII 138).23 
For Husserl, the relativity of perceptual givenness means that any instance 
of perceptual givenness will be “presumptive” (präsumptiv), in the sense of 
involving a presumption on the part of the perceiving subject to the effect that 
the further course of experience will be “harmonious” (einstimmig)—that is, 
roughly, be such that the anticipations involved will be fulfilled (III/2 598). 
And, since any perceptual intuition will involve a surplus of relevant unfulfilled 
anticipations at any point of its duration, what is presumed is, ultimately, that 
the process of perception would remain harmonious even if, per impossible, it 
were to run off into infinity.24 By virtue of this presumption, then, the adequate 
                                                   
22 On the current use of the term, horizons are characteristics of intentional objects, or, 
rather, of ways in which they may be given. For a sampling of other uses of the term, both in 
Husserl and among commentators, see Hopp (2011, 54 ff.). 
23 Strictly speaking, the perceptual givenness of an object requires, not that all the 
anticipations involved be fulfilled, but only that a relevant set of them be fulfilled. For the 
disappointment of a set of anticipations would not necessarily mean that the object was not 
perceptually given. It could simply mean that the way in which it was previously perceptually 
given conflict, to a greater or lesser degree, with the way in which it is presently given, in the 
sense that some of its previously anticipatorily given features conflict with some of its presently 
actually given features. Which anticipations will be included in the relevant set—the set of 
anticipations such that, if they were to be disappointed, the object would not be perceptually 
given—will depend both on the type of the object concerned and the circumstances of the 
subject’s perceiving it, including her behaviour in relation to it. This point does not matter in 
what follows, and for the sake of simplicity, I will disregard it.  
24 More precisely, it is a presumption both that the perceptual process would remain 




givenness of any perceptually given object is prefigured in its perceptual 
givenness in the form of an “Idea in the Kantian sense” (Idee im Kantischen 
Sinn)—a regulative ideal that any instance of perceptual givenness occurring in 
the course of a harmonious progress of perception approximates to a greater or 
lesser degree (III/1 330 ff.; XI 21).25  
I have delineated Husserl’s notion of perceptual givenness. Let us now 
return to what I have proposed to call his perceptual intuitionism, the view that 
the perceptual givenness of an object constitutes a justificatory ground for 
positing it. 
 
4. Perceptual Givenness as a Justificatory Ground 
Like his theory of perception in general, Husserl’s theory of the epistemic 
role of perception is highly complex. Again, however, highlighting a few basic 
points will be sufficient here.  
Let us begin by noting that, on Husserl’s view, the perceptual givenness of 
an object constitutes a justificatory ground for two kinds of positing of it. First, 
it constitutes a ground for monothetic positings of the object—that is, non-
propositional affirmations of its being. Indeed, any instance of perceptual 
givenness necessarily motivates such a positing, which, as thus motivated, 
Husserl characterizes as a “perceptual positing” (Wahrnehmungssetzung) 
(XXXVI 5; M VII 109 f.).26 Perceptual intuitions involving such perceptual 
positings he calls “positing perceptual intuitions” (setzende Perzeptionen) or 
Wahrnehmungen (XXIII 353 f.; M VII 111). Thus, he draws a distinction 
between Wahrnehmung and Perzeption, or what I have called perceptual 
intuition. As noted above, Perzeptionen are a kind of originary intuition—
specifically, originary intuitions of physical objects. By contrast, 
Wahrnehmungen, or what I shall call perceptions, are a kind of “originary 
                                                                                                                                                     
that, at any point of its duration, would be possible would be actualized, and that the process 
would have remained infinitely harmonious no matter which of the previously possible courses 
of perception would have been actualized. For a discussion of this point, see Smith (2003, 171 
ff.). 
25 For a discussion of the role of this prefigurement of adequate givenness in Husserl’s 
theory of perception, see Bernet (1978a) and (1978b). 
26 To be more precise, it does so as long as the perceptual intuition concerned does not 
enter into conflict with other perceptual intuitions of the same or other objects, which would 
result in the initially motivated positing’s becoming modified or “modalized” into a negating, 




evidence” (originäre Evidenz), by which Husserl means originary intuitions 
involving positings motivated by the originary givenness of the objects 
intuited—in this case, the perceptual givenness of physical objects (III/1 318; cf. 
XXXVIII 342).  
Second, however, the perceptual givenness of an object also constitutes a 
ground for polythetic positings of the object in the form of perceptual 
judgements relating to it—say, a judgement to the effect that it forms the subject 
of some states of affairs. Two qualifications are in order at this point. The first is 
that what constitutes a justificatory ground here is not the mere perceptual 
givenness of the object, or its presence as an object of a perceptual intuition or 
Perzeption, but its presence as an object of a perception or Wahrnehmung—that 
is, as an object posited in a perceptual positing (cf. XXXVI 5; XXXVIII 242). The 
second qualification is that the justificatory ground concerned is not, strictly 
speaking, the object as given in what Husserl calls “simple” (schlichte) 
perception—that is, a perception directed on individual objects. The ground is, 
rather, the judged state of affairs as given in so called “categorial” (kategoriale) 
perception: a special kind of evidence that is founded on, and thus presupposes, 
simple perception, from which it arises through a process of logical or categorial 
articulation of the object perceived (XIX/2 681 ff.; XXVI 126; EU 242 ff.) 
Now, as his regarding it as a justificatory ground would lead to expect, 
Husserl takes perceptual givenness to satisfy his basic conception of 
justification. With regard to the Being Requirement, he holds that any instance 
of perceptual givenness is indicative of the being of the object given:  
Every experience [Erfahrung] evidently has a right [Recht] in itself. If I see a 
table, then I have a right to say: “That is a table”, the most evident right, a 
primordial right. For I see, precisely, the table itself in the flesh. And that is no 
coincidence, but it is an essential matter that experience has experiential right 
[Erfahrungsrecht] (XXXVI 118).  
As this makes clear, Husserl takes perceptual givenness to be indicative of 
the being of the object given because it constitutes the originary givenness of the 
object—the mode of givenness in which it is present as itself in the flesh (XXXVI 
86). Indeed, he holds that the originary givenness of any object, of whatever 
kind, is indicative of its being (cf. III/1 51, 316). However, he also holds that the 
degree to which it is thus indicative varies with its degree of bodily 




givenness are absolutely being-indicative, in the sense of guaranteeing the being 
of the object given, instances of perceptual givenness, and inadequate givenness 
in general, are only relatively or presumptively being-indicative, where this 
means that they indicate the being of the object given in a merely defeasible way 
(cf. III/1 329; VIII 35; XXXII 138). This difference is a consequence of the 
difference in status between these forms of originary givenness. As noted, 
adequate givenness is absolute, in the sense of not depending on the correctness 
of anticipations of future experience. And, given that originary givenness is a 
justificatory ground for positing at all, this means that the being-indicativeness 
of adequate givenness will, likewise, be absolute. By contrast, perceptual 
givenness is relative or presumptive, in the sense of depending on a 
presumption to the effect that future experience will, or would, fulfil the 
anticipations involved. And this, according to Husserl, means that its being-
indicativeness will be similarly relative or presumptive: 
The being of what is bodily there in the thing-perception is in principle a mere 
pretension; a justified one, in so far as the perception provides an originary 
justificatory ground [Rechtsgrund] for the statement that the thing is, and has 
the properties that appear. But it depends precisely on the further course and 
entire context of experience whether this justified pretension of being retains and 
sustains, and perhaps constantly further confirms, its justification—namely, if 
further experience, and first of all the further continuing harmonious progress of 
the perception, again and again justifiably motivates the positing of the being and 
being-thus of the thing (XXXVI 109). 
Although he does not make any comparable statements with regard to the 
Awareness Requirement, Husserl no doubt takes perceptual givenness to satisfy 
this requirement as well. Indeed, it is, initially, hard to see how it could possibly 
fail to do so. According to this requirement, something is a justificatory ground 
for a subject to posit an object only if she is aware of it, where the awareness 
required is intentional awareness of a kind that need not be epistemic, 
positional or explicit. Being the mode of givenness in which physical objects are 
intentionally present in acts of outer perception, perceptual givenness would 
clearly seem to be a possible subject of intentional awareness. And there is 
nothing in Husserl’s notion of perceptual givenness to suggest that this 
awareness must be epistemic, positional or explicit. 
Finally, Husserl clearly believes that perceptual givenness meets the 




constitutes an immediate justificatory ground in the relevant sense:  
Irrespective of the object-domain [Gegenständlichkeitssphäre] to which it may 
relate itself, cognition, as is well known, is immediate or mediate. That is: 
Cognitions, in the form of judgements that have a—perhaps limited—justificatory 
ground, draw their justification [Recht] either immediately from a being-grasping 
[seinserfassenden], “giving” act, in the way in which, for instance, a perceptual 
judgement immediately “expresses” (or explicates and expresses) what is “given” 
in a perceiving as actual; or they draw their justification from an inferential 
process that, with regard to the question concerning the justification of its 
“premises”, for its part lastly points back to immediately giving acts (III/2 534).27 
And, again:  
Perception is the ultimate source of justification for any assertion of reason 
[Vernunftsbehauptung] concerning existence. For perception is the most 
originary form of experience [Erfahrung] (XXXVI 86).  
Husserl’s claims to the contrary notwithstanding, I want to suggest that 
there are grounds for doubting whether perceptual givenness meets the 
requirements of his basic conception of justification. And I want to suggest that 
these reasons, in different ways, all relate to the fact that Husserlian perceptual 
givenness is what could be called a rational mode of givenness, as we now shall 
see. 
 
                                                   
27 According to this passage, a perceptual judgement can be immediately justified by what 
is given in a perception. In light of the above account, this claim might seem problematic for at 
least two reasons. First, if the perception in question is construed as a categorial perception of 
the judged state of affairs, we might worry whether the justification provided by what is given in 
such perception can really be seen as immediate. For, as we saw, categorial perception is 
founded on, and thereby presupposes, simple perception. And this might, at least initially, 
suggest that whatever justificatory force the perceptual givenness of the states of affairs may 
have derives, in part, from the justificatory force of the perceptual givenness of the individual 
objects on which it is founded, and hence that it cannot, after all, be seen as providing 
immediate justification. Second, the worry would remain even if we were to take the perception 
concerned to be a simple perception of the individual object occurring in the judged state of 
affairs, and so were to take Husserl to hold, contrary to his official view, that perceptual 
judgements can be immediately justified by simple perceptions. For the simple perception of an 
object involves a perceptual positing of the object justified by its perceptual givenness in 
perceptual intuition. And this can make it seem as if, in being justified by a simple perception, a 
perceptual judgement is at least partly justified by something—the perceptual positing 
involved—that is itself justified by something else—the perceptual givenness by which the 
perceptual positing is justified and motivated. And this, in turn, can make it seem as if the 
justification that the perception provides for the perceptual judgement cannot, after all, be 
construed as immediate, depending as it does for its justificatory force on another justificatory 
ground. Addressing these issues here would lead too far afield, requiring, as it would, 
consideration both of Husserl’s conception of categorial perception and of its relation to simple 
perception, and his complex view of the relation between perceptual intuition and perception. 
Fortunately, however, this is not needed, since the points I will be making with regard to 




5. Perceptual Givenness as a Rational Mode of Givenness  
As I shall use the term, a mode of givenness is rational just in case an 
object’s being given for a subject in that mode requires the accomplishment of 
relevant rationally motivated intentions on her part–that is, intentions 
motivated by justificatory grounds. That Husserl, in effect, regards perceptual 
givenness as rational in this sense is clear from his holding that the 
anticipations supposedly involved with any instance of such givenness are not 
random, but rationally motivated. Thus, for instance, he characterizes them as 
“predelineating intentions” (vorzeichnenden Intentionen), by which he means 
intentions for which something “speaks” (cf. XI 22, 41 ff.), or for which the 
subject has “motives and justificatory grounds” (XXXII 256).28  
What are these justificatory grounds? The following passage, where 
“progress of approximation” refers to perception conceived as a process 
oriented towards the regulative idea of adequate givenness, suggest that they are 
of two kinds, which Husserl calls “self-givenness” and the “progress of 
harmonious selfgivenness”: 
Every progress of approximation carries within itself … a necessary horizon of 
coming indubitability, a necessary future-expectation that it will be thus, and 
bring us nearer to the true self [wahre Selbst]. This is not an expectation in 
general, but an expectation that is motivated and justified by the selfgivenness 
and by the progress of harmonious selfgivenness, an expectation that is apodictic 
in this modality of certainty (VIII 399).   
Beginning with the former kind of ground, what is the selfgivenness in 
question? It cannot be the givenness of the perceptually given object taken as a 
whole. For in that case the anticipations concerned would both be conditions of 
the possibility of such givenness and be motivated by it, which would be 
incoherent. It can only, it seems, be a part of the givenness of the object—
specifically, the actual or sensuous givenness of a certain range of its features. 
But how can the sensuous givenness of certain features of an object constitute a 
justificatory ground for the anticipations by virtue of which other features of the 
                                                   
28 I might note that in taking Husserl to construe the anticipations at issue as rationally 
motivated, I am not claiming that he regards them as intentions for which the subject must be 
able to provide justification in the form of justificatory grounds. I am claiming that he takes 
them to be intentions that, by their very nature, always already are justified for the subject, and 





object are anticipatorily given? As it turns out, the supposed justificatory ground 
here is not merely the sensuously givenness of the relevant features, but also the 
“object-type” (Gegenstandstypus) that this givenness activates (cf. XVI 183 f.).  
For present purposes, Husserlian object-types can—very simplified—be 
construed as rules to the effect that such and such object-features typically occur 
in such and such combinations, and appear in such and such ways from such 
and such perspectives (cf. EU 31 f.; 400 f.).29 According to Husserl, any set of 
sensuously given features will invariably activate some object-type of other (EU 
114). The activation will be associatively based: The object-type activated will 
represent a combination of features that includes those instantiated in the set by 
which the object-type is activated. The object-type will, however, also include 
other features, instances of which will not be included in this set. And the 
anticipations of future appearances of features involved will be motivated by the 
object-type in the sense that the anticipatorily appearing features will be, 
precisely, instances of those other features (cf. EU 385 f., 399; XXXII 152 ff.).30  
Roughly speaking, object-types are generated and consolidated through 
repeated perceptual intuitions of objects exhibiting the relevant combinations of 
features, and the retaining of these intuitions in memory, first in fresh memory 
or “retention” (Retention), and then, after a process of becoming increasingly 
vague, in “sleeping” (schlafende) memory, in which they are maintained as 
undifferentiated “sediments” (Sedimente) (EU 136 ff., 385; XI 178).31 We should 
note that the object-types brought about through this process do not simply 
coincide with the memorially retained perceptual intuitions concerned, but are a 
product of them. Thus, an object-type may become associatively activated 
without any corresponding previous perceptual intuitions, be they maintained 
in fresh or sleeping memory, having to become activated too. Upon entering a 
room, my general belief that rooms have floors may become activated, and 
inform my further perceptual intuitions of the room. And although this belief 
has been generated and consolidated through previous particular perceptual 
intuitions of rooms with floors, none of these need be activated along with the 
                                                   
29 For detailed accounts of the nature of Husserlian object-types, and their supposed role 
in perception, see Lohmar (2003) and (2014). See also Rapic (1991). 
30 Depending on the degree of generality of the object-type, the features whose future 
appearance the type gives reason to anticipate will be more or less general, and thus be 




belief (cf. EU 395).  
As already indicated, the object-type associatively activated by the 
sensuous givenness of a set of object-features do not only contribute to motivate 
anticipations of the appearance of further such features, however. It also 
contributes to justifying them, in the sense of constituting a reason for 
anticipating the appearance of precisely these features (cf. EU 114).32 And it 
does so because the object-types are themselves justified—namely, by the 
memorial process through which they are brought into being. The retaining of 
the relevant perceptual intuitions in retention and sleeping memory does not, in 
other words, only serve to generate the object-types, but also provides 
justification for them, a justification that increases with every type-consistent   
(cf. XI 188 f.).  
As this suggests, the first kind of ground by which the perceptual 
anticipations involved with an instance of perceptual givenness are justified, 
what Husserl in the passage quoted above calls “selfgivenness”, should be seen 
as a complex one, consisting, ultimately, of two components. One is the 
memorially retained perceptual intuitions responsible for the generation and 
justification of the object-type by which the anticipations concerned are 
motivated. And the other is the sensuous givenness of the set of object-features 
by which that object-type is associatively activated.  
Let us now turn to the second kind of justificatory ground mentioned in 
the passage quoted above, the “progress of harmonious selfgivenness”. The 
progress in question is that of continuous perceptual fulfilment, whereby 
anticipations of appearances of features of an object become increasingly 
fulfilled by the actual appearances of those features. The supposed relevance of 
such processes in the present context derives from the fact that, as Husserl 
argues, what is achieved through them is not merely a continuous confirmation 
of previous anticipations, but also an increased justification for current ones:  
                                                                                                                                                     
31 For an account of what this retaining in memory consists in, see de Warren (2009). 
32 As Husserl notes, one and the same set sensuously given features may, and often does, 
activate conflicting object-types. This, however, does not detract from the present point—
namely, that he takes the anticipations involved in any instance of perceptual givenness to be, in 
part, rationally motivated by some activated object-type or other. On the contrary, it supports 
the point. For, in the case of a conflict between activated types, the conflict consists, precisely, in 




Every progress of experience in the sense of bringing-closer [Näherbringung] 
and harmonious certainty [offers] not just new certainty in general, but 
[accomplishes], for the future and for any free intervention and the experiential 
future to be accomplished thereby, an originally justified expectation, whose 
correlate is the necessity of the experienced being—a relative necessity, that it 
actually is; the impossibility that it is not (VIII 400).  
And again: 
Evidently, the justificatory force [Rechtskraft] of the expectation must increase 
with the number of earlier inductions and confirmations, presupposed that, 
through analogy, not just the earlier perceptions, but also their pre-expectations 
and fulfilments come to co-awakening and to merging coincidence (XXXII 256).33 
Given this, the second kind of ground by which the perceptual 
anticipations involved with a current instance of perceptual givenness are 
justified would, it seems, consist in memorially retained fulfilments of 
anticipations involved with earlier instances of perceptual givenness belonging 
to the same perceptual process as the current one. And the sense in which the 
retained fulfilments of previous anticipations contribute to justifying the current 
anticipations would be that they provide inductive justification for believing that 
the current anticipations, too, will be fulfilled in the further course of 
perception, a justification whose strength increases with the duration of the 
perceptual process as a harmonious one.    
There is no need here to enter into the question of the supposed relation 
between the two sorts of grounds considered. What matters for present 
purposes are just the following basic points: first, that Husserl takes the 
anticipations involved with an instance of perceptual givenness to be rationally 
motivated, and so takes perceptual givenness to be a rational mode of givenness 
in the present sense of the term; and, second, that he takes the justificatory 
grounds by which the anticipations are rationally motivated to include 
memorially retained perceptual intuitions and perceptual fulfilments. For these 
points are sufficient to pose a challenge to perceptual givenness satisfying the 
three requirements of Husserl’s basic conception of justification. Or so I will 






6. Perceptual Givenness and the Being Requirement 
The problem with regard to the Being Requirement is that there seems to 
be grounds for thinking that the supposed being-indicativeness of perceptual 
givenness both must and cannot be accounted for in terms of perceptual 
givenness being a rational mode of givenness. To see this, recall first that, unlike 
the being-indicativeness of adequate givenness, which is absolute, the being-
indicativeness of perceptual givenness is merely presumptive. That is, an 
instance of perceptual givenness indicates the being of the object given only on 
the presumption that the further process of perception would remain 
harmonious, no matter which of the many currently possible courses it might 
take. Granting for the moment Husserl’s assumption that the adequate 
givenness of a physical object would have guaranteed its being, this means that 
accounting for the being-indicativeness of an instance of perceptual givenness 
must include accounting for the involved presumption about the possibly 
continued harmoniousness of the perceptual process to which the instance 
belongs. In particular, it must include showing that and how the presumption is 
rationally motivated. For unless it were—unless the subject had justificatory 
grounds for taking it that her perceptual process would continue to unfold 
harmoniously—it would be unintelligible how the presumption could contribute 
to establish the being-indicativeness of the instance of perceptual givenness 
concerned. 
Accounting for the being-indicativeness of an instance of perceptual 
givenness, then, must include accounting for the justificatory grounds the 
perceiving subject has for presuming that the relevant anticipations would be 
fulfilled in the further course of perception. This, however, is tantamount to 
saying that it must include accounting for the justificatory grounds she has for 
these anticipations themselves. And, as we saw in the previous section, Husserl 
proposes to account for these grounds, in part, in terms of the previous 
perceptual intuitions responsible for the generation and justification of the 
associatively activated object-types by which the anticipations are motivated. 
But to account for the being-indicativeness of an instance of perceptual 
givenness in terms of the anticipations involved being rationally motivated by 
                                                                                                                                                     




previous perceptual intuitions is, in effect, to account for it in terms of 
perceptual givenness being a rational mode of givenness, of the kind delineated 
above. Indeed, if one accepts that perceptual givenness must involve 
anticipation in the way Husserl supposes, it is hard to see how else one could 
account for its being-indicativeness.  
Inescapable as this approach to the problem of the being-indicativeness of 
perceptual givenness would seem, though, it faces two problems. The first is 
that it requires a solution to a problem that is at least just as hard as the 
problem to be solved. For, on the proposed approach, in order to understand 
how a current instance of perceptual givenness can indicate the being of the 
object given, we need to understand how past perceptual intuitions can provide 
justification for the object-type by virtue of which the current anticipations of 
future perceptual intuitions are motivated. We need, in short, to understand 
how previous experiences can provide justification for positing future ones. 
And, as the long history of attempts to solve the problem of induction makes 
clear, this is no small task.  
The second, and more important problem, is that the proposed approach 
would seem to be circular, in that it would appear to require a solution to the 
very problem that is to be solved. As we have just seen, the approach requires a 
solution to the problem of how past perceptual intuitions can provide 
justification for current anticipations. But any solution to this problem must, for 
its part, rely on a solution to the problem of the being-indicativeness of 
perceptual givenness. To see this, note first that past perceptual intuitions could 
offer justification for current anticipations only if they previously offered 
justification for positing the combinations of features of which they were 
intuitions: From what could the justification that past perceptual intuitions of a 
particular combination of features supposedly provides for positing future 
appearances of that combination ultimately derive, if not from a justification 
that these perceptual intuitions, each of them, previously offered for positing the 
combination as a then currently instantiated one? But, given the Being 
Requirement, this is to say that past instances of the perceptual givenness of a 
combination of features can constitute justificatory grounds for current 
anticipations of appearances of that combination only if those past instances 




of the combination of features in question. And this, in turn, means that solving 
the problem of the being-indicativeness of perceptual givenness is required for 
solving the problem of how perceptual anticipations can be justified by past 
perceptual intuitions. So, to account for the being-indicativeness of an instance 
of perceptual givenness partly in terms of the anticipations involved being 
rationally motivated by past perceptual intuitions is to presuppose that the 
problem to be solved has already been solved.  
Now, these problems, and especially the second, give at least some reason 
to doubt that perceptual givenness satisfies the Being Requirement. At least this 
is so if, as I have suggested, the proposed account of its being-indicativeness is 
the only initially plausible account available. For, if that account is in fact 
circular, we then have at least some reason to believe that perceptual givenness 
cannot be coherently conceived as being-indicative, which, in turn, gives at least 
some reason to doubt that it is, in fact, thus indicative.  
 
7. Perceptual Givenness and the Awareness Requirement 
The problem with regard to the Awareness Requirement is that, when 
combined with the presumed fact that perceptual givenness is a rational mode 
of givenness, the requirement might appear to entail that perceptual givenness 
is impossible. As we recall, if perceptual givenness is a rational mode of 
givenness, then a subject has a physical object perceptually given to her only if 
the anticipations involved are rationally motivated—that is, motivated by 
justificatory grounds. Given the Awareness Requirement, on which something is 
a justificatory ground for a subject only if she is aware of it, this is, in effect, to 
say that a subject has an object perceptually given to her only if she is aware of 
all the justificatory grounds by which her anticipations are motivated. Such 
awareness seems impossible, however: As saw in Section 5, the justificatory 
grounds for the perceptual anticipations involved in an instance of perceptual 
givenness include, among other things, the past perceptual intuitions 
responsible for generating and consolidating the object-type by which those 
anticipations are motivated. And these intuitions, it would seem, are simply to 
numerous and, most of them, too far removed in time, for them all to be subject 
to awareness. If perceptual givenness is a rational mode of givenness, then, the 




requires an impossible form of awareness, and hence that it is itself 
impossible—which, obviously, would mean that it fails to meet the requirement. 
The most promising way of challenging this argument would be to reject 
the premise that there can be no awareness of all the justificatory grounds of 
which, if perceptual givenness is a rational mode of givenness, the Awareness 
Requirement demands that there be awareness. One way of doing so would be 
to argue that, for Husserl at least, the claim makes no sense. For, as we saw in 
Section 5, the past perceptual intuitions by which, supposedly, a subject’s 
object-types have been generated and justified are not previous perceptual 
intuitions simpliciter, but previous intuitions as retained in current memory, be 
it fresh or sleeping.  
It is, of course, true that this is Husserl’s view. But one might well wonder 
whether it can be correct. Is it really plausible that a subject can have a form of 
memorial awareness, even if only very minimal, of all the perceptual intuitions 
by which her object-types have been generated and justified, including those 
accomplished in early childhood? 
Moreover, even if Husserl were right, it is far from clear that the supposed 
memorial awareness of many of the perceptual intuitions in question is of a kind 
that the Awareness Requirement would or should allow. As noted in Section 2, it 
is reasonable to see the requirement as allowing that the required awareness can 
be implicit, where an implicit awareness is one that could, but need not, become 
explicit through a change of mental focus. And while, in ordinary circumstances, 
a subject can be explicitly aware of only a very few of the perceptual intuitions 
serving as justificatory grounds for her object-types, she can, plausibly, be 
implicitly aware of a significantly higher number of them. But it would also 
seem that, if she is to be aware of all of them, the awareness she must have of 
many, if not most, of them must be so minimal as to be not even implicit, 
implying as this would that it could be made explicit. A case in point would, 
again, be those, or most of those, accomplished in early childhood: If they can 
be conceived as retained in memory at all, they can only be conceived as so 
deeply sedimented as to be unreachable by any form of explicit awareness—
which indeed Husserl himself could be seen to recognize (cf. XLII 39). Now, it 
does not follow from the account in Section 2 that such awareness would not be 




allowed, the restrictions the requirement places on justified grounds would be 
so minimal as to undermine whatever motivation it has.34 For it is hard to see 
how there could be a relevant justificatory difference between something of 
which a subject has this sort of minimal awareness, and something of which she 
is not aware at all—say, the reliability of her perceptual faculties. And so it is 
hard to see what basis there could be for a requirement on which the former, but 
not the latter, qualifies as a justificatory ground.  
This problem might suggest a different way of rejecting the premise that 
that there can be no awareness of all the previous perceptual intuitions of which, 
if perceptual givenness is a rational mode of givenness, the Awareness 
Requirement would seem to demand that there be awareness. For if, on pain of 
being deprived of its basis, the requirement should be construed as allowing 
only implicit and explicit awareness, then why not restrict the perceptual 
intuitions of which the requirement demands that there be awareness to 
perceptual intuitions of which there is at least implicit awareness? This would 
make it possible to reject the premise without undermining the rationale for the 
Awareness Requirement, as the first attempted rejection would appear to do.  
The problem with this move, at least from a Husserlian perspective, is that 
it would seem to run counter to Husserl’s view that the perceptual intuitions 
through which object-types become generated, also, and at the same time, 
provide justification for them. For, assuming that perceptual intuitions of which 
a subject is not even implicitly aware—such as intuitions accomplished in early 
childhood—may still have contributed to the generation of at least one object-
type of hers, then, on the current construal of the Awareness Requirement, 
those intuitions would not also have contributed to justifying the type.  
 
8. Perceptual Givenness and the Immediacy Requirement 
With regard to the Immediacy Requirement, the problem is that there is 
reason to think that perceptual givenness is not an immediate justificatory 
ground, which reason, once more, relates to the presumed fact that perceptual 
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its status is any different from a stray hunch or an arbitrary conviction. From that we may 




givenness is a rational mode of givenness. For, given this fact, any instance of 
perceptual givenness would seem to depend for its justificatory force on other 
justificatory grounds—specifically, the previous perceptual intuitions and 
fulfilments by which the perceptual anticipations involved are, in part, 
motivated and justified. And, by the Immediacy Requirement, this would be to 
say that perceptual givenness is not an immediate justificatory ground. 
One way of trying to resist this argument would be to claim that although 
perceptual givenness is a rational mode of givenness, it is not wholly so. 
Specifically, it might be claimed that although, in the case of a perceptually 
given object, the givenness of its non-sensuously present features depends on 
the subject’s having justificatory grounds for the anticipations through which 
these features are given, the givenness of the sensuously present features of the 
object does not so depend. This, if successful, would allow that while the 
perceptual givenness of an object does not provide immediate justification for 
positing the object as a whole, it still provides such justification for positing 
certain features of the object—namely, those that are sensuously present.35 And 
this would suffice for its being an at least partly immediate justificatory ground.  
For this line of argument to succeed, the actual givenness of the sensuously 
present features of a perceptually given object would have to be independent of 
the anticipatory givenness of its non-sensuously present features. For otherwise 
the justificatory grounds required for the givenness of the latter features would 
also be required for the givenness of the former. As we now shall see, however, 
there are reasons to think that this condition cannot be met, reasons that 
Husserl himself provides. 
A perceptually given object is present as having a range of different 
features, some of which are non-sensuously given and some of which are 
sensuously given. But these features are interdependent, and form an integrated 
whole, in which the identity of each feature is at least partly dependent on that 
                                                                                                                                                     
it isn’t a justified belief” (2006, 12). 
35 That this is Husserl’s view receives some measure of support from this passage: 
“Perception justifies only in so far as it is actual perception, only in so far as the genuine 
perceptual appearance is in question. Thus, not with respect to the determinations pertaining to 
the genuinely non-perceived rear side” (XXIV 346/342). This support is, however, effectively 
undermined by the, presumably later, addition of the following footnote: “That is not correct. 
The mode of justification might be a different and less perfect one, but the being of the object 
with rear side determinations is also posited. How else could I justifiably say: There is the thing? 




of the others. And this means that no subset of the features can be given as an 
independent part of the features of the object as a whole (III/1 319). Consider a 
perception of a house from the front. In this case, only the front of the house, 
and the features pertaining to it, are sensuously given. But the sensuously 
present features of the house depend on its non-sensuously present features for 
their identity: The object could not, for instance, be sensuously given as having a 
front-side were it not also given as having a left-side, a right-side and a rear-
side (cf. XVI 51; M VII 130; EU 31). 
However, if the sensuously given features of a perceptually given object 
depend, in this way, on its non-sensuously given features, then their sensuous 
givenness will, as such, depend on the non-sensuous givenness of these other 
features. For the sensuous givenness of the former and the non-sensuous 
givenness of the latter are, precisely, the sensuous and non-sensuous givenness 
of the features concerned. And the interdependence that characterize the 
relation between these features in their respective forms of givenness will, 
therefore, also characterize the relation between these instances of givenness 
themselves. And this is to say that the stated condition for perceptual givenness 
being an at least partly immediate justificatory ground cannot be met.  
Yet another way of challenging the argument would be to claim that 
although perceptual givenness is a rational mode of givenness, this entails only 
that instances of perceptual givenness depend on other justificatory grounds for 
their occurrence, and does not also entail that they depend on them for their 
justificatory force, which is what my argument requires. It might, in other 
words, be argued that from the fact that an instance of perceptual givenness 
requires the subject to have justificatory grounds for the anticipations involved, 
it does not follow that the justification provided by that instance depends on the 
justification provided by those grounds. All that follows it that the very 
occurrence of the instance depends on those grounds, since, without them, there 
would be no anticipations of the kind required for perceptual givenness. 
The problem with this response is that, like the previous one, it requires 
that the actual givenness of the sensuously present features of a perceptually 
given object be independent of the anticipatory givenness of its non-sensuously 
present features. For if the justification provided by an instance of perceptual 




anticipations involved, this can only be because that justification is provided by 
a part of the givenness that these anticipations do not contribute to determine. 
But, as we have just seen, there can be no such part, at least not by Husserl’s 
lights.  
Finally, it could be argued that while the argument presented might show 
that perceptual givenness is not an immediate justificatory ground, it would not, 
for all that, show that perceptual givenness fails to satisfy the Immediacy 
Requirement. For the possibility remains that perceptual givenness is a mediate 
justificatory ground, which could suffice for it to satisfy the requirement. 
Indeed, that it should be construed in this way is, arguably, precisely what the 
argument suggests.  
It is, of course, true that the argument does not show that perceptual 
givenness falls short of the Immediacy Requirement, and this for the reason 
stated. But if sustainable it would, I believe, come close. For if perceptual 
givenness is to be a mediate ground in the sense of the requirement, it would, 
ultimately, have to depend for its justificatory force on an immediate ground. 
And, although I cannot argue the point here, there are no plausible candidates 
for such a ground, at least not in Husserl. But if this is so, then, even granting 
that the argument establishes that perceptual givenness is a mediate ground in 
some other sense, perceptual givenness would not meet the Immediacy 
Requirement as stated. 
 
9. Conclusion 
I have argued that there are reasons to think that Husserlian perceptual 
givenness fails to meet the three requirements of Husserl’s own basic 
conception of justification, reasons relating to the presumed fact that perceptual 
givenness is what I have proposed to call a rational mode of givenness. If the 
argument can be upheld, the upshot is that one may endorse Husserl’s basic 
conception of justification or the view that perceptual givenness is a justificatory 
ground, but not both. This would pose a challenge, not only for Husserlian 
epistemology, but for any approach that would want to combine veritism, access 
internalism or modest foundationalism with a view of perception and perceptual 
justification relevantly similar to Husserl’s.  




weight of the considerations in favour of each of the conflicting views. For a 
Husserlian, it might seem that the best option would be to retain the view that 
perceptual givenness is a justificatory ground, and discard Husserl’s basic 
conception of justification. At least this would be so if the emphasis is placed on 
the crucial epistemological role Husserl accords the former. This option would 
come at a price, though. Not only does Husserl take his basic conception of 
justification to be correct. But an important part of his attempted justification 
for perceptual givenness being a justificatory ground is taken to consist in its 
satisfying this conception. So, opting for the alternative concerned would 
require the provision of a new basis for construing perceptual givenness as a 
justificatory ground, in the form of a non-veritist, non-foundationalist and at 
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